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 This dissertation investigates the issue of public junior high and high school students who 
are punished at school for their online speech that they created when they were off-campus. 
Specifically, it examines the issue of when students are punished at school for online speech that 
criticizes teachers and administrators, rather than the issue of student-on-student cyberbullying. 
Because the United States Supreme Court has not yet accepted any case that involves off-campus 
online student speech, this dissertation summarizes and analyzes federal appellate court decisions 
in such cases. 
 Appellate courts in six federal circuits have heard and ruled in cases involving students’ 
off-campus online speech. This dissertation examines the precedent those courts have applied to 
outline the circumstances under which the courts find for the student or school officials. Because 
court decisions depend on the application of precedential case law, this dissertation includes a 
thorough examination of those major Supreme Court student speech precedents: West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, and 
Morse v. Frederick. 
 This research project also examines how legal analysts are currently interpreting the issue 
of school punishment of off-campus online speech to determine how they recommend courts 
proceed in such cases. Through review of both precedent and law review articles, it examines 
two branches of legal thought that underlie the issue: what role courts see schools playing in the 
  
 
ii 
education of students as citizens and how far courts are willing to go in extending schools’ “in 
loco parentis” role to off-campus speech. It also reports on societal issues underlying student 
speech on social media: how social media users can create “community” online and how teens 
spend their time online. 
 Because legal research carries with it the tradition of offering guidance to judges on how 
to rule in a particular area, this dissertation concludes with a proposal for how courts, including 
the U.S. Supreme Court, should rule in cases involving student speech that is critical of school 
officials or school policy to grant students complete First Amendment protection for all off-
campus online speech that does not threaten the school community with violence or libel anyone, 
whether school official or student.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Social Media as the “Modern Public Square” 
 In striking down a North Carolina law that barred convicted sex offenders from using 
social media, the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2017 acknowledged social media as the “modern 
public square,” and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s majority opinion said that denying people — 
even convicted sex offenders — access to it was “a prohibition unprecedented in the scope of 
First Amendment speech.”1 Kennedy’s opinion gets to the heart of the issue when trying to 
reconcile any perceived differences between physical space (in his term “spatial”) and virtual 
space. 
A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have 
access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, 
speak and listen once more. The Court has sought to protect the right to 
speak in this spatial context. A basic rule, for example is that a street or a 
park is a quintessential forum for the exercise of First Amendment rights. 
… Even in the modern era, these places are still essential venues for public 
gatherings to celebrate some views, to protest others, or simply to learn 
and inquire. 
 While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the 
most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today 
the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the “vast democratic forums of the 
Internet” in general [citation omitted], and social media in particular.2 
 
 Kennedy runs through a quick sampling of the various kinds of social media used in 
America: Facebook, where “users can debate religion and politics with their friends and 
neighbors or share vacation photos”; LinkedIn, where “users can look for work, advertise for 
employees, or review tips on entrepreneurship”; and Twitter, where “users can petition their 
                                                
1 Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. _____ (2017) (slip op, at 8). 
2 Id. at 4-5. 
 2 
elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner.”3 He notes that all 50 
of the nation’s governors and most members of Congress have Twitter accounts to share their 
views on political issues and hear from their constituents; “[i]n short, social media users employ 
these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity.”4  
 North Carolina’s statute barred convicted sex offenders from accessing any “commercial 
social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to 
become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.”5 The statute outlined four 
criteria that the website would have to meet: 1) it is “operated by a person who derives revenue 
from membership fees, advertising, or other sources related to the operation of the Web site”; 2) 
it “[f]acilitates the social introduction between two or more persons for the purposes of 
friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchanges”; 3) it “[a]llows users to create Web 
pages or personal profiles that contain information such as” the user’s name or nickname, 
photographs, and other personal information, and provides links to other people’s profiles; and 4) 
it “[p]rovides users or visitors … mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a 
message board, chat room, electronic mail, or instant messenger.”6 The Court noted that these 
criteria would effectively bar convicted sex offenders from all sorts of websites beyond what are 
commonly thought of as social media. A sex offender could not, for example, post reviews on 
Amazon.com or comments on a newspaper’s website because a child might also use those sites.7  
 Kennedy said the state did not meet the burden of showing that the statute must be so 
broad to prevent sex offenders from using social media to find victims. He noted that the Court’s 
                                                
3 Id. at 5. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 1. 
6 Id. at 1-2. 
7 Id. at 7. 
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holding did not prevent the state from enacting a more specific law that did not infringe protected 
speech in its attempt to prevent sexual abuse of children.8 However, he made clear that denying 
sex offenders who had served their sentences any access to any social media would “prevent the 
user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights,” including those that 
might offer “legitimate benefits from these means for access to the world of ideas, in particular if 
they seek to reform and to pursue lawful and rewarding lives.”9 
 Importantly, Kennedy noted that because the “Cyber Age is a revolution of historic 
proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its full dimension and vast potential to alter how we think, 
express ourselves, and define who we want to be”:10 “This case is one of the first this Court has 
taken to address the relationship between the First Amendment and the modern Internet. As a 
result, the Court must exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First Amendment 
provides scant protection for access to vast networks in that medium.”11 
The Internet as the “New Marketplace of Ideas” 
 Twenty years before the Packingham case, the Supreme Court had reason to grapple with 
how far the First Amendment reached into cyberspace when considering whether parts of the 
1996 Communications Decency Act that aimed at keeping indecent or obscene online speech 
away from children were constitutional or unconstitutional. Although the central issue of that 
case, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,12 has little to do with student-generated speech, 
Justice John Paul Stevens’ majority opinion discussion of First Amendment rights on the Internet 
does, particularly when considering the question of whether school officials can reach beyond 
                                                
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 8. 
10 Id. at 6. 
11 Id. 
12 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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“the schoolhouse gate”13 to punish student speech that occurs online and off school grounds. As 
in the Packingham opinion, Stevens lists the forms of communication, such as email, listservs, 
newsgroups, and chat rooms, then available on the Internet.14 He then notes cyberspace as a 
“unique medium […] located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, 
anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.”15 Noting that the government had taken 
medium-specific factors, such as the scarcity of frequencies, into account when it began 
regulating the broadcast industry,16 Stevens wrote that those limiting factors were not present on 
the Internet and, thus, the government had little reason to regulate “the vast democratic forums of 
the Internet” in the way that it had regulated broadcasting.17 
 Later, again noting the “relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all 
kinds” on the Internet, with its “traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and 
still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue,”18 Stevens pointed out that the Internet 
makes avenues for free speech in the United States — such as the public speaker in the town 
square and the political pamphleteer — even more available to all: “Through the use of chat 
rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther 
than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and news 
groups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.”19  
                                                
13 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
14 Reno, 521 U.S. at 851 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 868. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 870. 
19 Id. 
 5 
The government asserted that its efforts to protect children through regulating the Internet 
would also serve its interest in “fostering the growth of the Internet.”20 Stevens rejected that 
argument: 
The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas contradicts the 
factual basis of this contention. The record demonstrates that the growth of 
the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of 
constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we 
presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more 
likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The 
interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society 
outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.21 
 
Problem and Scope of Study 
 In these two cases, the Supreme Court has spoken of the Internet as the “modern public 
square” and the “new marketplace of ideas” and as having “vast democratic forums” open to all 
at relatively low cost. A person can speak on the Internet without needing access to a broadcast 
license for a radio or television station or to a printing press for a newspaper or magazine or even 
a flier or pamphlet. In its 9-0 Reno decision, the Court has spoken firmly of the need to protect 
online speech from government interference, stating that any government regulation would 
interfere with the free exchange of ideas in the marketplace of ideas.  In its 8-0 Packingham 
decision, the Court has spoken of the need to keep the Internet open and available to all people 
so that their First Amendment rights would not be infringed. Despite these strong statements 
promoting online speech as protected and necessary to citizens’ expression, however, the Court 
has yet to say whether the online speech rights of public school students can be limited or are as 
robust as those of adults and whether schools can punish students for online speech that would 
otherwise be protected if it occurred offline.  
                                                
20 Id. at 885. 
21 Id. 
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The area of case law that governs student online speech is riven with inconsistencies. The 
Supreme Court has not accepted any student online speech case thus far, and U.S. appellate 
circuits cannot agree on a uniform method to weigh students’ free speech rights against the 
competing interests of school authorities to maintain order to carry out the educational mission. 
As case law stands right now, students more often than not end up on the losing side when 
school authorities seek to punish their off-campus but online speech. Of the 12 appellate circuits 
that hear these kinds of cases,22 six have not heard cases involving student online speech. Of the 
six that have (the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth), five have gone against the 
student involved. On the heels of the Packingham case, it is clear the Supreme Court recognizes 
that online speech falls under First Amendment protection and that access to social media in 
order to exercise First Amendment rights is also essential for all American citizens. Whether the 
Court will be willing to extend those rights to junior high and high school students is an 
unknown quantity, as are six of the appellate circuits. Additionally, five appellate courts have 
proven to be accommodating to schools that wish to punish students for off-campus online 
speech. 
 Thus, this study. It involved researching the appellate decisions that involved student 
online speech and studying relevant precedents and law review articles to attempt to divine a 
way forward for courts to weigh students’ First Amendment rights against the needs of schools 
to maintain order and the educational mission. Other questions also needed to be explored and 
answered, though at first blush they may seem to have nothing to do with a legal issue. 
                                                
22 The United States’ 94 district, or trial-level, courts are organized into 12 circuits, and the 
circuit courts hear appeals from the district courts within their geographic jurisdiction. An 
unnumbered 13th circuit houses the appellate court for the Federal Circuit, which is not bound by 
geography but hears only particular types of cases from all over the United States.  
 7 
 This dissertation is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the problem along 
with two Supreme Court rulings that might prove beneficial to the student cause. Chapter 2 
discusses the methodology employed to undertake the legal research needed to explore and 
understand the legal issues surrounding student online speech. Chapter 3 is a discussion of 
whether and how virtual communities can be created online that offer people the same benefits 
that physical communities offer, necessary background to further discuss whether social media 
have become, as the Supreme Court opined, the modern public square. Chapter 4 is a discussion 
of how teenagers use social media and how they behave online. It includes a discussion of 
privacy issues involving teens, as studies have shown that one of teens’ concerns is keeping their 
posts away from prying adult eyes while at the same time having really very little idea of how to 
manage privacy settings. Chapter 5 gives the history of the major student speech cases on which 
the Supreme Court has ruled. Chapter 6 contains a literature review of legal journal articles that 
show what lawyers and law students think of the issues surrounding student speech and examines 
the methods they propose to guide the courts. Chapter 7 looks at Supreme Court majority 
opinions, concurring opinions and dissenting opinions to consider the question of what schools’ 
roles are in children’s lives. Chapter 8 explores the U.S. appellate circuit court cases that have 
involved student online speech for a full understanding of the how lower courts are ruling absent 
Supreme Court guidance. Finally, Chapter 9 offers conclusions and discusses possible avenues 
for further research. 
  
 8 
CHAPTER 2 
LEGAL RESEARCH METHODS 
This qualitative study of how U.S. courts are treating junior high and high school 
students’ online or digital speech that is created off school grounds but is punished at school was 
aimed at attempting to determine a federal legal standard that could be applied to such speech. 
Qualitative legal research attempts to analyze how courts are ruling on an issue and why they are 
ruling the way they do. Absent a U.S. Supreme Court ruling on this issue, lower courts have 
tended to weigh students’ speech rights against the competing need of a school to maintain order 
using a few different methods, but no one method has emerged as the go-to way of handling 
these cases, which have increased as social media have become so ubiquitous in the daily lives of 
U.S. teenagers. 
Digital/online speech was defined to include postings on social media or Internet 
websites, email, blogging, texting, and instant messaging. To limit the scope of the study, the 
research was originally planned to examine only cases involving junior high or high school 
students’ speech that was focused on school officials or policies. Therefore, it did not examine 
speech involving college students or what is commonly referred to as “cyberbullying,” or 
student-on-student harassment. However, one cyberbullying case was studied, as it is the only 
off-campus online student speech case that has thus far been ruled on in one appellate circuit. 
Traditional legal research can take many forms, depending on what the research is to be 
used for. However, a basic method is to: 1) identify the facts involved; 2) identify the legal issues 
to be researched; 3) identify the primary sources of the law involved; 4) research the issue, using 
 9 
both primary and secondary sources; and 5) come up with a solution to the legal problem.1 But in 
order to identify the facts involved, the actual cases involving student online speech needed to be 
identified first. 
Primary sources used in legal research are the law itself: constitutions, statutes, 
administrative rules, and court opinions. Court opinions are referred to as common law or case 
law. Sarah Redfield explains that although the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, 
they do not mean the same thing: “The term, ‘common law,’ refers to law created by the courts 
in the absence of enacted law. … In contrast, the term, ‘case law,’ is broader, referring to written 
decisions of courts applying common law and also applying or interpreting constitutional or 
enacted law.”2 Legal researchers read case law because court opinions “interpret and apply 
statutes and regulations, develop the common law, and provide significant constitutional 
interpretation.”3 Court opinions become case law through being used as precedent in future, 
similar cases. The United States’ system of law is dependent on precedent, hewing to the 
doctrine of stare decisis (“let the decision stand”). Higher courts’ precedents are mandatory 
authorities that lower courts in their jurisdictions must follow on cases with similar facts and 
issues of law as the precedent. Redfield notes that “[t]he value of a case lies in its use as 
precedent; a decided case is considered primary authority for a similar case that arises later.”4 A 
precedent from another court outside a court’s jurisdiction may be used as a persuasive authority 
in that a judge’s reasoning may persuade another judge to follow it. The doctrine of stare decisis 
                                                
1 J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 504 (2nd ed. 
1981). 
2 SARAH E. REDFIELD, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 32 (2002). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 33. 
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offers three advantages to the American judicial system.5 It “promotes a sense of stability to our 
law,” which is “essential if there is to be public confidence in the judicial system.”6 Second, it 
“provides some predictability to the outcome of the case.”7 Finally, it “ensures fairness by the 
court,” meaning that “individuals will be treated the same way given a certain set of facts.”8 
However, when facts in a new case differ from previous cases, a court will not follow a previous 
ruling. And, Roberts and Schlueter note, “In some cases, even where the legally significant facts 
are identical, the court for policy reasons may not follow the precedent. This has the positive 
effect of adding flexibility to our law when the needs of society change.”9 Roberts and Schlueter 
note that stare decisis is “important to the legal researcher because it highlights the emphasis on 
case law to the American legal system.”10 
Court opinions are essential to the legal researcher, who will use them to identify facts in 
a case and will examine them to see the reasoning behind the court’s holding. Equally essential 
are secondary sources. In legal research, secondary sources are such things as legal dictionaries 
and encyclopedias, case reporters, treatises, and law review articles. Treatises and law review 
articles never carry mandatory authority, but they may have persuasive authority with a court. 
Indeed, “occasionally courts view this material as highly persuasive, particularly when the author 
is an authority in the field.”11 Treatises and law review articles benefit the legal researcher in two 
ways: to “provide citations to primary sources” and to “describe, explain, and analyze a 
                                                
5 BONITA K. ROBERTS & LINDA L. SCHLUETER, LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE: PATTERNS AND 
PRACTICE 4 (1986). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 COLLEEN K. PAUWELS, LINDA K. FARISS & KEITH BUCKLEY, LEGAL RESEARCH: TRADITIONAL 
SOURCES, NEW TECHNOLOGIES 9 (1999). 
 11 
particular area of the law. This can be especially important when beginning research on an 
unfamiliar topic.”12 In addition, law review articles provide “commentary on the history and 
development of the law or a critique of the current state of a particular area of the law” and can 
offer “theory on how the law should develop.”13 Most legal research methods textbooks 
recommend that researchers read through the list of citations in a primary source and follow up 
with those to see if any of them are useful as factual background or legal interpretations. But, 
whether a researcher begins with primary or secondary sources, “either will lead you to the 
other” through their citation lists.14 
Traditionally, legal researchers would consult case digests and reporters to find primary 
sources. The digest system began to be used in the late 1800s, based on the classification system 
set up by Harvard law school dean Christopher Langdell, which spread from Harvard to other 
law schools.15 M.H. Hoeflich wrote that, thanks to Langdell’s classification system, “professors 
at the newly invigorated university law schools could claim to take a place in their laboratories 
— law libraries — searching out the imperishable truths of legal science just as their colleagues 
in chemistry, biology, or physics were doing for their respective sciences.”16 With the advent of 
online legal databases, however, today’s researcher is freed from Langdell’s system, though 
multiple texts recommend learning how to use it. Bast and Pyle note that with computer-assisted 
legal research, the researcher constructs her own index rather than being tied to print indexing.17 
However, they caution that the success of a computer-assisted search depends on the researcher’s 
                                                
12 Id. at 39. 
13 Id. at 44. 
14 Redfield, supra note 2 at 115. 
15 Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer Age: A Paradigm Shift?, 
93 LAW LIBR. J. 285, 285-87 (2001). 
16 M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 95, 96 (1986), quoted in Bast & Pyle, supra note 15 at 287. 
17 Bast & Pyle, supra note 15 at 292. 
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being precise with choice of keywords but not so precise as to eliminate too many possible 
primary and secondary sources.18 Recall the traditional research method outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter. Bast and Pyle outline a slightly different method for computer-assisted 
legal research. Initially, the researcher will analyze the facts but then will identify keywords that 
will be used to search for primary sources.19 From those primary sources, the researcher will then 
identify a legal principle.20 They caution that some researchers will then be satisfied and never 
move beyond a factual basis for their legal principle rather than taking the time to see how the 
principle fits into the larger framework of that area of law.21 
One other method of legal research needs to be explained, that of Shepardizing a case. 
Frank S. Shepard was a law-book salesman in Chicago in the 1870s who observed that lawyers 
would write notes in the margins of their court reports but could not easily keep track of whether 
a court’s holding in a particular case was still current or had been “reversed or overruled or 
modified.”22 “[S]ome way to link published opinions to subsequent court action in the same case, 
or in other cases dealing with the same issues, had to be found.”23 Shepard began printing 
gummed stickers “whenever one Illinois case modified a previous case,” and he sold those 
stickers to lawyers to put in their Illinois Reports.24 When he died in 1900, his gummed stickers 
gave way to pamphlets and then books that “link[ed] the citations of cases to the citations of later 
cases that affected them.”25 Grossman reports that nearly a century later, Shepard’s citations had 
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spread from Illinois to all state and federal court reporters because “the assumption was made 
that anytime one case is cited by another, the link is worth noting.”26  
Shepard’s citations make it easy for legal researchers to keep track of how precedential 
cases are cited, followed, distinguished or criticized in other cases. Today, Shepardizing a case 
can be accomplished by clicking a button. For example, for this study, the researcher used the 
LexisNexis Academic database available to her through Booth Library at Eastern Illinois 
University. Shepardizing the landmark Tinker case turned up nearly 7,000 citations in November 
2017. A Shepard citation list is subdivided into different categories, depending on the case being 
researched: prior history; subsequent appellate history; citing decisions, which are further 
divided by court jurisdictional divisions at the federal and state levels; annotated statutes; law 
reviews and periodicals; briefs; motions; and pleadings. This researcher found Shepardizing most 
helpful in following cases through to their most updated outcome and in seeing when those cases 
were cited in judicial opinions. However, the Tinker list of citations turned up more than 3,400 
law review and periodical articles that referenced Tinker in some fashion. To find secondary 
sources, the researcher relied on a mix of keyword searches in LexisNexis Academic and the 
more traditional reading of citations in various printed cases and articles to make sure that the 
Tinker references applied to student speech and not to some other set of legal facts. For example, 
Tinker is often cited in such cases as those involving special education programs, disciplining of 
students who caused a disruption at school, and teachers who allege they were fired because of 
their political views. 
Work on this research project began with the already-known Tinker case and the other 
cases identified in Chapter 4. The researcher was also familiar with several more-recent cases 
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that deal specifically with student online speech from following them through news reports. 
Thus, research began by Shepardizing those cases and following their citations to still other 
cases. Yet more student speech cases were discovered through reading law review articles. Thus, 
a mix of computer-assisted research methods and traditional legal research methods, particularly 
relying on secondary sources to point the way to new information, were used to identify the 
cases that formed the foundation of this study.  
Philip Kissam categorized scholarly legal research into six purposes that may overlap. 
The three that are pertinent to this study are: 1) legal analysis, “to reduce, separate, and break 
down cases, statutes and other legal materials into separate elements”; 2) legal synthesis, “to fuse 
the disparate elements of cases and statutes together into coherent or useful legal standards or 
general rules”; and 3) doctrinal resolution, which “includes advising courts or clients on how 
legal doctrine should be applied to specific cases … suggesting resolution of conflicts between 
the decisions of different courts, and criticizing judicial opinions because of their inconsistency 
with general doctrine or their failure to promote policy values.”27 Indeed, this study relied on the 
first two purposes to guide thinking about the primary and secondary sources during the research 
phase and then relied on the third to guide thinking during the writing phase. 
Edward Rubin contends that “the most distinctive feature of standard legal scholarship is 
its prescriptive voice, its consciously declared desire to improve the performance of legal 
decision-makers. …[T]he point of an article about a judicial decision is usually to remonstrate 
with the judge for the conclusion reached and the rationale adopted.”28 Rubin states that even 
when an author agrees with a judge’s decision, the ensuing article is usually still prescriptive: 
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“The point is then to recommend the same course of action to other decision-makers, or to 
encourage the original decision-maker to keep up the good work.”29 Rubin points out that “[t]his 
prescriptive voice distinguishes legal scholarship from most other academic fields. The natural 
sciences and the social sciences characteristically adopt a descriptive stance, while literary critics 
adopt an interpretive one. Only moral philosophers seem to share the legal scholar’s penchant for 
explicit prescription.”30 
There is relatively little academic writing that simply explicates the 
meaning of a judicial decision. More typically, the interpretation of 
meaning is used to criticize a decision that relies upon a differing 
interpretation. This can be a powerful criticism in a legal culture where 
texts serve as the basis of judicial authority. But the general stance of legal 
scholarship, as opposed to practitioner literature, is to prescribe an 
alternative decision to the judge, not to explore the meaning of a legal text 
as a final, inherently valid expression of the law.31 
 
This type of legal scholarship is based on “norms, instrumentalism, or authority,” but “the 
normative one is by far the most important one,” Rubin writes, adding that “[t]he prescriptions of 
contemporary legal scholarship are predominantly based on policy arguments — beliefs about 
the way society should be organized or operated.”32 
This research project took the approach that Kissam and Rubin describe. Using the mix 
of computer-assisted and traditional legal research methods, primary sources of case law at the 
U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. appellate circuit levels were found and analyzed. When needed for 
background understanding, cases at the level of U.S. district courts were also examined. Because 
online student speech is a relatively new area of law, secondary sources of law review articles 
were read and analyzed to improve understanding of the issues involved and to try to come up 
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with a prescription for how courts should be handling student online speech. The literature 
review relied heavily upon law review articles. 
Legal issues were not the only matters to be considered in this project. To ground the 
discussion of students’ online speech rights, the researcher studied the opinions of experts in the 
area of social media and how teenagers create virtual communities on the Internet, using the 
virtual “public sphere”33 to maintain and enhance their real-time, face-to-face interactions and to 
work through the issues they are facing at home and school. That research is presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4 to help readers develop an understanding of these issues. 
The legal research questions that this study considered and answered were: 
RQ1: Do the federal appellate courts recognize more free speech protection for students 
engaged in off-campus online speech as on-campus in-person speech? 
RQ2: Do the statements of the U.S. Supreme Court in student speech cases suggest the 
Court will recognize broad rights for off-campus online student speech? 
RQ3: Are the statements of the U.S. Supreme Court on the character of the Internet as a 
modern public square relevant to the way it should view off-campus online speech? 
The answers to these questions are reported and considered in the pages that follow. The 
findings are then used to help the researcher devise a prescriptive approach to how student online 
speech cases should be handled. 
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CHAPTER 3 
IMAGINING AND DEFINING “COMMUNITY” ONLINE 
How to define “community” is a question that sociologists, media theorists, and others 
have tried to answer for years. How to define community in the era of virtual realms, cyberspace 
and networked publics can be seen merely as a continuation of the earlier attempts to wrestle 
toward some kind of a definition that is applicable in all senses and circumstances. There will be 
disagreements about how to define “cyberspace” and just how akin to the physical world it is. 
Yet considering the idea of “community” in its various contexts may result in some guidelines to 
frame discussion of the online environment. An analogous discussion would be when a 
journalism professor reviews the characteristics of news with her students. Students can agree on 
certain questions that journalists should ask to help identify the news elements (who, what, 
when, where, why, how) and certain characteristics — timeliness, prominence, impact, and 
proximity, to name a few — but in the end, the particulars of the story and the reporter’s 
individual news judgment will guide coverage and lead to the defining of the characteristics in 
terms of that one story. Journalists can agree on a general framework for determining news 
values, but reporting is as much art as it is science, and in the art lies the distinctive touch that a 
journalist can bring to bear on a story. In much the same way, considering that “community” is a 
human construct — that is, an imagined entity, to borrow a term from Benedict Anderson1 — the 
people who study human behavior (whether online or off) can discuss and eventually agree on 
some commonalities in the ways they consider community. 
 In fact, the news characteristic of “proximity” may be a good place to start to look at 
“community.” Journalists agree that news consumers are more interested in an event that is 
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happening in their own town — the community to which they have a physical proximity — than 
they are in the next town over, but they are also more interested in the next town over than they 
are in a city far away — unless, that is, they can be made to feel a psychological proximity to the 
news event in the faraway city. When journalists find a way to make their audience feel some 
connection to the story happening farther away, they create a psychological proximity to the 
story, and the audience will be interested in it. In the same way, community can be looked at as 
both close physically — proximate — or close psychologically; sometimes it might even be both 
at the same time, the virtual world reflecting or extending the physical world. The paragraphs 
that follow will examine some of the leading ideas about and definitions of community through 
the past thirty-some years, since Benedict Anderson in 1983 first promulgated his theory of 
nations as imagined political communities: “[A]ll communities larger than primordial villages of 
face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, 
not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”2 If one agrees with 
that statement, then it is but a small step to agreeing that a group of people networked together 
through social media can also be an imagined community. What counts is not whether they have 
ever met in real life or how close or far they are to each other in the geographical world. What 
counts is whether they can imagine themselves to have a connection and that the connection is 
strong enough to bind them into a community. 
 Anderson conceived of the nation being imagined in three ways: as limited (with “finite, 
if elastic, boundaries”), as sovereign (free), and as a community (“the nation is always conceived 
as a deep, horizontal comradeship”).3 In discussing this, Howard Rheingold wrote, “Anderson 
points out that nations and, by extension, communities are imagined in the sense that a given 
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nation exists by virtue of a common acceptance in the minds of the population that it exists. 
Nations must exist in the minds of its [sic] citizens in order to exist at all.”4 Why then may not 
users of social network sites imagine their virtual communities into existence? Rheingold firmly 
believed that virtual communities were real. He described his participation in an early computer 
conferencing system called WELL (Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link) and noted the various ways he 
and others could use it: to gather information, to share knowledge, to play games, to follow news 
events, to seek and give emotional support. Through daily interaction with his fellow WELL 
members (he estimated he spent at least two hours a day online), he came to know them as surely 
as if they had lived nearby and interacted with each other in real life.5  
Not only do I inhabit my virtual communities; to the degree that I carry 
around their conversations in my head and begin to mix it up with them in 
real life, my virtual communities also inhabit my life. I’ve been colonized; 
my sense of family at the most fundamental level has been virtualized.6 
 
Rheingold defined virtual communities as “social aggregations that emerge from the Net when 
enough people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to 
form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace.”7 He traced the idea that communities would 
be a natural offshoot of online communication to 1968 when J.C.R. Licklider and Robert Taylor, 
who were research directors for the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) wrote, “What 
will on-line interactive communities be like? In most fields they will consist of geographically 
separated members, sometimes grouped in small clusters and sometimes working individually. 
They will be communities not of common location, but of common interest.”8 
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 That idea was taken up Jason Ohler, who began to research computer conferencing 
systems in 1990 (pre-Internet, as he notes) when he noticed that participants kept referring to the 
system as a “community.”9 In fact, Ohler said that computer conferencing “gave digital 
community its first real breath of life” by making possible “many-to-many communication.”10 
Computer conferencing allowed participants to define the purpose and spirit of the groups they 
belonged to and “allowed them to gather in ways that reminded us of communities.”11 
Sociologist Barry Wellman outlined a history of community by identifying three forms: 
something he called “solidary,” neighborhoods, and personal.12 The solidary community came 
first, pre-industrial and agriculture-based, heavily reliant upon people in proximity to each other 
sharing responsibility and interest: “place based, intensely local, and personal.”13 Next, during 
the industrial era, came neighborhoods. Still heavily local and personal but no longer isolated, 
neighborhoods were found within larger gatherings of people, such as cities. Life and work were 
no longer intertwined as they were in agriculture.14 Finally came the post-industrial personal 
networks, which Wellman described as occurring when improved transportation allowed people 
to leave their traditional geographic locations behind and, because of communication technology, 
“each of us began to build our own personal communities based on our own personal network.”15 
While Wellman’s three types were idealized versions of community and their realities would not 
have been so neatly delineated, they persist in the collective consciousness because they “serve 
as emotional archetypes in that they capture some fundamental idea of what community provides 
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the human experience.”16 
Ohler calls for schools to educate students in media literacy and ethical behavior so they 
can participate responsibly in three kinds of community: local, global and digital. He defines 
local as “people who can communicate directly with each other without too much effort” who 
are “geographically immediate and often personally meaningful”: families, classrooms, schools, 
neighborhoods and towns.17  Global is defined simply as anything beyond local — “a much 
broader social and environmental setting than we can immediately perceive”: state and country, 
for example.18 Lastly, he defines digital community as groups “primarily sustained through 
electronic rather than geographic proximity” and gathered “by choice rather than due to 
geographic default.”19 
 In tracing the history of sociologists’ attempt to define “community,” Mary Chayko said 
it generally comes down to one of two ways: “either ‘territorially,’ to depict a grouping of people 
relating to one another within a specific geographical area, or ‘emotionally,’ to depict the sense 
of belonging to such a group.”20 Chayko’s emotional connection is the same as the psychological 
proximity of the journalist. Chayko further defines community as requiring at least three people 
who “become socially connected in a generally structured or patterned way, develop a collective 
identity and purpose, and share a […] ‘sense’ of belonging to a social entity.”21 She very 
definitely believes in the possibility of virtual communities being formed, though she prefers the 
term “sociomental” or “portable” community because it removes the implication in the term 
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“virtual” that what happens online is somehow not real.22 She later dropped her requirement that 
three people be involved for a community to be formed. The ingredients required to make a 
community in sociomental space are simply two or more people (the social aspect) and “some 
degree of technological mediation … to facilitate the connection and give us the opportunity to 
know of one another, which is the mental aspect.”23 And while she objects to the term “virtual,” 
she has no such compunction against using geographic terms to describe sociomental space: “I 
find it useful to consider sociomental space as a ‘place’ in which groups of people who may be 
physically separated create connections, bonds, communities, and entire social worlds. To do this 
mental maps of these social worlds are created, then constantly used and updated.”24 She says 
people have long used mental maps to help map their physical and social environments, so they 
map not only space (whether physical or imagined) but also such things as relationships, past 
interactions with other people, and people’s characteristics.25 Mental maps are highly 
individualized and personal, and each person in a community builds a mental map that is a 
representation of that community’s sociomental space, which she calls the “cognitive analog to 
physical space.”26 Online communities, or “communities of the mind,” produce sociomental 
connections, or “mental networks,” that are real to the people in the communities and provide 
them with “a sense of structure, identity, purpose, and belonging.”27 In using the term 
sociomental, Chayko also hopes to make clear that the “social world … is neither synonymous 
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with nor directly analogous to the physical world.”28 And finally, she defines community as “a 
set of people who share a special kind of identity and culture and regular, patterned social 
interaction”29 that is “generally founded on common interests, goals, and values.”30 
 In the traditional definition of community, people who live in close geographic proximity 
to each other interact with each other and offer each other support. The same is true of virtual 
communities, whether called virtual, online, sociomental or portable. As Rheingold noted, a 
person’s tie to another person in a geographic community does not end just because the other 
person happens to be traveling away from the geographic community, say, on vacation. Because 
of the emotional and psychological connections built between the community members, the 
strength of those connections will maintain the community even during a member’s absence. The 
people quoted here agree that the same is true of the ties made in virtual communities. As 
Rheingold put it, “The question of community is central to realms beyond the abstract network of 
[computer-mediated communication] technology.”31 Ohler notes that community will be created 
as long as “the innate desire of humans to congregate in groups in ways that serve everyone’s 
needs individually and collectively” continues.32 And Malcolm Parks, while calling community a 
“notoriously slippery” thing to define, noted these characteristics as most relevant for the 
formation of a community on a social network site or other form of computer-mediated 
communication: “engaging in shared rituals, social regulation, and collective action through 
patterned interaction and the creation of relational linkages among members that promote 
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emotional bonds, a sense of belonging, and a sense of identification with the community.”33 
Kathy Richardson wrote, “The communities of social media may be virtual, but the emotional 
impact of the communication may be all too real. It is, after all, the communication that is the 
real component of the virtual village.”34 That thought resonates with Chayko, who notes that the 
social connections made online “can be vivid, strong, reciprocal, and intimate. In short, we form 
real, consequential social bonds with people we have never met face-to-face.”35  
 To sum, whatever definition of community one would adopt for the physical, geographic 
world, that definition can be adopted for the virtual, portable, sociomental “world,” for the 
“space” that we occupy when we go online. People use geographic descriptors for a reason when 
talking about the online realm. The descriptors help to connect what happens in the virtual world 
of cyberspace with what happens in the physical world. People carry those interactions with 
them when they turn off their computers or set down their smartphones. The journalism 
professor from the beginning of this section can use Facebook to stay in touch with her students 
when they have graduated and left the university. She can follow them on Twitter or contact 
them through email both individually and collectively through an alumni listserv. When she has 
something immediate to communicate, she can send texts to them on their mobile phones. In 
short, it is possible for people to stay present in each other’s lives even when physically 
separated by distance. The professor can maintain whatever level of closeness she wishes to with 
her students long after they leave the university, if they maintain a presence in the virtual world. 
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The professor can participate in the milestones of their lives, even if her only experience of those 
milestones (engagements, weddings, births, graduate school graduations) is through the 
computer-mediated communication offered through social networks. 
Defining Place and Space 
Chayko noted the various technologies that can be used to maintain connections between 
people in a community: from old-fashioned letters and landlines to computers, mobile phones, 
and tablets. Yet, she said, something more is required to bring community to mind: “[W]e seem 
to need to imagine the community as situated in some kind of space. An understanding of the 
process by which we cognitively create such spaces is critical to understanding portability in 
social connectedness.”36 She explained that in sociomental or portable communities, the 
environment in which those communities exist, while imagined, cannot be imagined by a single 
person.37 A social network or community needs at least two people to exist. A solitary person, no 
matter how active his or her imagination, cannot create a sociomental community solo. 
This is the “place” where one might “go” when one’s mind focuses on, 
thinks about, and understands things “in concert” with at least one other 
person — where a sense of proximity with another person might come to 
feel especially strong, or where a distant loved one might feel or seem to 
be “near.”38 
 
The spatial metaphor works in reverse, too, as Chayko noted that in interview after interview, 
people told her that they felt “physically ‘lost’ when out of touch technologically,” a feeling that 
comes because “[p]ortable technologies anchor us in space and give us such a definite sense of 
place” and “because it is so important to us to be cognitively connected; to feel firmly ‘in’ a 
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sociomental space, mentally anchored ‘in’ our portable communities.”39 Just what that virtual 
place or sociomental space or portable community looks like will vary depending on a person’s 
mental maps and point of view. That is different from the mental maps people carry of their 
communities in the physical world. In the physical world, people will share certain markers with 
the other members of their community: how the desks are arranged in the classroom, how many 
blocks they must walk to reach the park. But, as the virtual, sociomental space is imagined, each 
individual in the community will imagine it differently. As Rheingold said, “Point of view, along 
with identity, is one of the great variables in cyberspace. Different people in cyberspace look at 
their virtual communities through differently shaped keyholes.”40 
 Susan Barnes uses the terms “space” and “place” in her description of how computer 
technology is involved in creating the space where computer-mediated human interaction occurs: 
“The combination of the visual computer screen and the transactional nature of e-mail creates a 
set of conditions that enables people transform the void of a computer network into a perceived 
place of human interaction.”41  Despite that, Barnes believes that space is only part of the 
equation. Mediated communication takes place over time as well as over an imagined space.42 
Rheingold also speaks of how networked communication allows people to “build social 
relationships across barriers of space and time.”43 And Steven Jones believes the Internet is 
biased toward time, despite the moniker of cyberspace: “The Internet, if it is appropriate to call it 
any kind of space at all, is less some kind of futuristic ‘cyberspace’ and more a discontinuous 
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narrative space.”44 Jones wants to see more attention paid to the narratives created through 
computer-mediated communication because they reflect the virtual communities to which they 
belong: 
Narratives are not, of course, communities, though they may be artifacts of 
community and may represent a good portion of what communities do to 
maintain and reproduce themselves over time. Narratives may imagine 
communities and we may imagine ourselves to be a part of a community 
based on our reading of a narrative.45 
 
Consideration of time and narrative means that consideration must be paid to Anderson’s 
notion of simultaneity: the notion that although a citizen of a nation cannot possibly meet every 
other citizen of the nation, he can imagine that they exist at the same time that he exists.46 
Nations, bounded as they are by other nations, are not moving through space but are moving 
through time.47 Chayko thinks of simultaneity as two people who are separated physically going 
through the same experience (for example, watching a television program) at the same time.48 
The people will feel that they went through the experience together even though they 
experienced it in two separate locations. Paddy Scannell notes that broadcast media create the 
possibility for people to be “in two places at once, or two times at once.49 A person watching a 
television program will be seated in his own physical living room, but his mind will be where the 
TV program is taking place, whether that place is real or fictional. Scannell noted that public 
events take place in two places at once, thanks to broadcast technology: the physical place where 
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the event is occurring and the place where it is being watched.50  Though he was writing of pre-
Internet days, the principle that applies to broadcast is also applicable to the Internet thanks to 
live-streaming or video reports posted on news organizations’ websites. 
In its own context (its own time and place) any event creates and sustains 
its own being, its own world. In its extended, relayed, mediated form it 
simultaneously enters into other worlds and their ways of being. The event 
is thus “doubled”: there is the event-in-situ, and (at the same time) the 
event-as-broadcast, the former being embedded in the latter. It is not that 
broadcasting creates the event that it transmits, but that in broadcasting the 
event it creates a new event — the event as broadcast.51 
 
Broadcasting becomes a mediator between the actual event and the place where it is seen, 
imbuing public events with “a degree of phenomenal complexity they did not hitherto possess, 
and this has consequences for the character of the events themselves.”52 Computer-mediated 
communication is, by its very nature, situated in two (or more) sites at the same time. When 
someone emails a colleague, the initial email and any ensuing back-and-forth replies all take 
place in both offices. If someone posts a picture of her dog eating a carrot on Facebook and 23 
people comment and another 88 “like” the post, that communication has taken place in as many 
as 112 different places, across virtual space and real time. Let’s say the original post was made at 
8 p.m., and the last person comments at 7 a.m. the next day. That conversation about a dog has 
taken place over an 11-hour period, and yet no one had to sit there for 11 hours. The person who 
posted the photo might have gone to sleep at midnight. Meanwhile, friends who were awake 
through the night or simply in a different time zone could comment or like at any time. Or 
perhaps someone who does not get on Facebook frequently doesn’t discover the conversation 
until days later, leading it to resurface in the news feed of anyone who commented or liked in the 
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first place. And that is just for an inconsequential photo of a dog. Imagine how much more 
important a post in a cancer support group would be. 
Rheingold cited Ray Oldenburg’s description in his 1991 book The Great Good Place of 
three essential places in people’s lives: where they live, where they work, and where they go for 
fun (“conviviality,” as Oldenburg put it). Facebook, Twitter and other social networking sites 
represent the “third space” where people go for fun, what Oldenburg called “the power of 
informal public life.”53 Chayko builds on that, noting that today’s portable devices allow people 
to access their third space any time.54 For example, an employee can be sitting at his office desk 
and when he wants to take a break from work, he can log onto Facebook or Twitter or pick up 
his phone to play a mobile game. Many such games have chat features, and the man may 
encounter a note from a friend when he logs in. In those few moments, though the man is 
physically present in his second space, his work space, in his mind, in his virtual life, he is in his 
third space. Chayko would approve of the man’s use of his third space to relieve boredom at 
work: “Regardless of how satisfying home and work may be, most of us want our lives to consist 
of something more.”55 
 Most teens embrace social media because it offers them a way to hang out with their 
friends even when they cannot leave their physical homes. Whether their travel is limited by 
parental rules or unavailable transportation, if they can be in their bedrooms yet still be online 
with their friends, that satisfies their need to be social. As danah boyd points out, social media 
often are “the only ‘public’ spaces in which teens can easily congregate with large groups of 
                                                
53 Oldenburg cited in RHEINGOLD, supra note 4, at 25. 
54 CHAYKO, supra note 22, at 70-71. 
55 Id. at 71. 
 30 
their peers. More significantly, teens can gather in them while still physically stuck at home.”56 
Boyd notes, “Teens are looking for a place of their own to make sense of the world beyond their 
bedrooms.”57 If they can do that without actually leaving their bedrooms, so much the better. Yet 
this hanging out online can lead to teens’ being punished at school if their online, off-campus 
speech is deemed by school officials to cause a disruption at school. 
Social Media as Public Sphere 
Recognizing the term “the public sphere” is essential to any discussion of speech rights in 
cyberspace. As used by sociologist Jürgen Habermas, the term comes from the German word 
Öffentlichkeit, which he defined as “a realm of our social life in which something approaching 
public opinion can be formed” with access guaranteed to everyone.58 The notion of a public 
sphere grew from the tradition of salons and coffee houses in the 18th century where people 
would gather to read and discuss events of the day. In much the same way, people today can 
“gather” on social media. In fact, social media today are much more accessible than the salons 
and coffee houses of old because while those were ideally open to everyone, in actuality they 
were really only open to people who could afford the time to read and participate in them, which 
usually meant men of means. Habermas recognized this shortcoming but did not let it negate the 
ideal of the public sphere as a place where people could gather to discuss public issues. 
James Finlayson explains that, to Habermas: “The public sphere is a space where subjects 
participate as equals in rational discussion in pursuit of truth and the common good. As ideas, 
openness, inclusiveness, equality, and freedom were beyond reproach.”59 While not directly 
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analogous to social media posts and tweets filled with selfies and videos of cats, the ideal of the 
public sphere has a role to play in social media of the modern era. Indeed, one need only look at 
the social activism that followed the school shooting in Parkland, Florida, in February 2018 to 
see the uses to which teens can put social media in service of a cause. Harnessing the power and 
reach of social media platforms, teen survivors organized a “March for Our Lives” in 
Washington, D.C., on the one-month anniversary of the shooting.  
Writing in The New York Times in March 2018, Kevin Roose, whose column covers 
technology, business, and culture, noted the flaws of social media, including how scrolling 
through a Twitter feed can make a person feel “anxious, twitchy, a little world weary.”60 Those 
flaws stem from the market-based model used by social media platforms, whose intent is to make 
money through advertising aimed at users. Habermas identified that same flaw as contributing to 
the decline of the public sphere in the 19th and 20th centuries, as mass-circulation newspapers 
and magazines turned from serving the public interest through news coverage and opinion 
sections to generating profits for owners and shareholders, “from a journalism of conviction to 
one of commerce.”61 Newspapers rose to prominence as purveyors of public opinion, Habermas 
writes, yet for a while “remained an institution of the public itself, effective in the manner of a 
mediator and intensifier of public discussion, no longer a mere organ for the spreading of news 
but not yet the medium of a consumer culture.”62 In much the same way, social media’s roots as 
connectors of humans have given way to the capitalistic drive to profit. Roose writes that the 
market requires social media platforms to keep growing: “Facebook can’t stop monetizing our 
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personal data for the same reason that Starbucks can’t stop selling coffee — it’s the heart of the 
enterprise.”63 
Despite the public sphere’s shortcomings in reality, Habermas maintains the optimistic 
view that the public sphere remains a laudable goal for the good that it could do. As Finlayson 
writes, “The ideal of a universally accessible, voluntary association of private people, coming 
together as equals to engage in unconstrained debate in the pursuit of truth and the common good 
was Utopian to be sure, but it was a Utopia that was, and still is, worth pursuing.”64 That promise 
could still be fulfilled by social media, despite concerns about privacy and data collection, 
despite trolls who invade comment sections, despite the sharing of articles masquerading as 
objective news reports that in reality are either opinion pieces or just plain false.  
Roose writes: 
The original dream of social media — producing healthy discussions, 
unlocking new forms of creativity, connecting people to others with 
similar interests — shouldn’t be discarded because of the failures of the 
current market leaders. And lots of important things still happen on even 
the most flawed networks. The West Virginia teachers’ strike and last 
weekend’s March for Our Lives, for example, were largely organized on 
Facebook and Twitter.65 
 
 This seems to be the view of social media and the Internet taken by the Supreme Court in 
its Reno and Packingham opinions, which will receive further discussion in Chapter 9. 
The Problem of Simultaneity 
 The idea that speech can take place in two places at once and, while occurring in real 
time, can also extend for days could prove problematic for high school and junior high students 
who take to social media to voice complaints about their teachers and school administrators. 
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Simultaneity could be used by school officials to strengthen their claims that students’ social 
media speech should be punishable at school. The U.S. Supreme Court has so far denied review 
to all such student speech cases that have petitioned for certiorari, and absent the high court’s 
guidance, lower courts at all levels have been left to examine off-campus speech with only the 
Supreme Court’s opinions in the four major student speech cases it has ruled on since the late 
1960s. Most courts have since decided that the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District66 opinion does indeed apply to such off-campus social media speech as long as 
school officials can show that the speech caused a disruption on campus. This study looks only at 
student speech that is directed at school authorities, not at student-on-student cyberbullying, 
which is increasingly punishable at school if schools write anti-cyberbullying rules into their 
student conduct codes. The Tinker opinion said that students and teachers do not surrender their 
First Amendment rights when they enter school grounds as long as their speech does not cause a 
material and substantial disruption at school or does not infringe on the rights of other students. 
Through the years, Tinker has mostly been applied to students who wear T-shirts with political 
statements on them to school or to students who want to have a religious group at school. Yet, in 
recent years, more and more students are being punished at school for social media speech, even 
when they created the speech while off-campus. 
In its 2015 ruling in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board,67 the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the suspension of a student rapper from Mississippi, for writing a rap song 
accusing two teachers of sexually harassing female students. Bell posted the song on Facebook, 
was called into the school office and told that the song could get him in trouble, went home that 
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day, tweaked the song and posted a more polished video on YouTube.68 He wanted people 
connected to the school to see the video and hear his words.69 The Fifth Circuit applied Tinker, 
agreeing with school officials that the mere fact of recording a song with threatening lyrics was 
enough for school officials to forecast a serious disruption and pointing out in its opinion that the 
student aimed the speech at school.70 Note that the court agreed that disrupting two teachers’ 
peace of mind was enough a disruption to meet the “substantial” threshold. Here is a sample of 
Bell’s lyrics: 
Heard you textin number 25 / you want to get it on / 
white dude, guess you got a thing for them yellow bones /  
looking down girls shirts / drool running down your mouth / 
you fucking with the wrong one / going to get a pistol down your mouth / Boww71 
 
If the courts start paying attention to media theory or some savvy lawyer figures this out 
and makes an argument that speech can exist in two places at once, that could complicate things 
going forward. Most courts seem all too willing to punish student speech these days, especially 
when the student speech is rude, crude and/or disrespectful. Absent a Supreme Court ruling, all it 
would take to increase the likelihood teens would be punished at school for their online speech 
would be for some lower courts to begin persuading each other that simultaneity could be 
applied when trying to determine the nexus between the student speech and the school. As in the 
Bell case above, if the school can show that the speech was aimed at students or at personnel at 
the school, courts are more likely to uphold a student’s punishment for that speech. 
Additionally, if courts begin to pay attention to the presence of virtual communities as 
being as real as physical, geographic communities, that might also hurt students. If a lawyer 
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could show that the student’s online community was aware of a tweet or a Facebook post or a 
fake profile or a website, it would probably be that much easier to show a connection, the nexus, 
between the off-campus speech and the campus inside the schoolhouse gate. However, the 
Supreme Court’s 2017 opinion in Packingham v. North Carolina might offset these possible 
troubles by strengthening claims that social media are the new public sphere and that speech 
created in that public sphere, especially when on an issue of public interest, is deserving of First 
Amendment protection. After all, if the Court sees a First Amendment right to participate in 
social media, it is not a stretch to see that the First Amendment would protect some of that 
speech from school officials’ interference. 
The frustrating thing about such incidents is that if the student expressed criticism in a 
letter to the editor of the local newspaper, that speech would absolutely be protected by the First 
Amendment. Of course, the local paper is probably not going to allow the kind of language in a 
letter to the editor that gets students in trouble. But students should have the right to protest what 
they perceive to be poor treatment at school or bad school policies, and the language that they 
use to give voice to that protest should not matter. As the 1971 Supreme Court opinion in Cohen 
v. California said, “For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more 
distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is 
another’s lyric.”72 If a student is walking home from school and sends out a rude tweet because 
he is angry at the school principal, that tweet should not be punishable at school, no matter what 
language the student used, unless he libeled or threatened the principal or his words were 
determined to be fighting words or an incitement to violence that spurred his fellow students to 
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take some sort of unlawful action. Courts should be restrained in punishing students. We don’t 
want to teach a generation of students that they can be punished for criticizing those in power. 
The Increasing Intertwining of Physical and Virtual Spaces 
 The realms of physical and virtual spaces are increasingly intertwined in most people’s 
minds, and that could be troubling in student speech cases. A person can disconnect from his 
virtual community. In fact, Chayko sees that as a plus, noting that “[p]ortable communities 
generally have low ‘entry and exit costs’; compared to face-to-face communities, they are 
relatively easy to become part of and to leave.”73 It is much harder to pull up stakes and move to 
a new geographic community or to change your physical environment. But while a student could 
deactivate a Twitter account or make a Facebook account completely private, he would have a 
much harder time finding a new school if he is suspended for tweeting something rude or crude 
about his principal. And setting a Facebook profile to private doesn’t guarantee privacy, of 
course. In one of the earliest cases included in this study of online speech being punished at 
school, the principal only found out about a fake MySpace profile when another student told him 
about it, and the profile only made its way onto campus because the principal asked that student 
to print out a copy and bring it to school. So, even though the student who created the profile 
thought it was going to be a private joke among his friends, the privacy protections he put in 
place did not hold. The friend who took the profile to school probably violated the social rules of 
the virtual community. Boyd notes that teens contend with this kind of “collapsed context” all 
the time.74 Though they try to imagine their invisible audience, things outside their control can 
happen. For example, a supposed friend can rat them out to the principal. Boyd writes more 
circumspectly on this issue when she says, “Defining and controlling boundaries around public 
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and private can be quite difficult in a networked society, particularly when someone is motivated 
to publicize something that is seemingly private.”75 Another friend may come across a post long 
after it was made, when the context under which it was made has either changed or is no longer 
uppermost in everyone’s mind, and that friend may take offense because the post has been 
separated from its context. A parent or other adult may see a post and not understand the context 
under which it has been made. Any number of things can get between a teen and his intended, 
imagined audience. Boyd notes that teens’ “sense of context is shaped — but not cleanly defined 
— by setting, time, and audience.”76 And Richardson writes that “social media by their nature 
blur distinctions between private and public behavior, raising issues about the understanding of 
appropriate disclosures within the communication and social environment.”77  
 Another positive to the intertwining of physical and virtual spaces is that people literally 
can take their virtual communities with them wherever they go (as long as they have access to 
wi-fi). As Chayko writes, “Online social networks are very effective at helping us bridge 
distances, because the pathways in these networks are always available, always ‘open.’”78 And 
boyd points out that “the bounding forces of networked publics are less constrained by 
geography and temporal collocation than unmediated publics.”79 
 A downside to this intertwining would be the further blurring of the lines between public 
and private spaces. Even in a social media profile, users have to monitor what their privacy 
settings are and manage them according to how much privacy they want. Social media sites 
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encourage people to share, share, share, leading many parents to worry that their teens are 
oversharing information that is being picked up by marketing firms. Meanwhile, teens are 
worried that their parents or a friend’s parents or a school official will have access to their sites. 
Parents want their teens to be protected from exploitation; teens want to be protected from 
surveillance by those whom they see as having power over them. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TEENS’ SOCIAL MEDIA HABITS AND USES 
Differences and Similarities in Teens’ and Adults’ Social Media Use 
 Privacy concern is not the only area where teens’ and their parents’ social media desires 
and expectations differ. But their online behavior is similar in many ways. Case in point: While 
more teens than adults report playing games online through their smartphones, computers or 
game consoles, adults also report playing games. In December 2015, Pew Internet Research 
reported that 49 percent of American adults play video games and a full 10 percent identify 
themselves as “gamers.”1 And while 50 percent of men reported that they play video games, 
nearly as many women (48 percent) said they play games, too.2 Compare that to teens: 72 
percent of teens play video games on a computer, game console or mobile device.3 The 
difference between the genders is more pronounced in teens than it is among adults: 84 percent 
of teen boys play video games, while 59 percent of teen girls play.4  
Mary Chayko says teens’ use of social media — or “portable communities,” as she calls 
them — is not so different from that of adults.5 She likens teens’ checking of their social 
networking site profiles and home pages throughout the day to adults’ repeated checking of 
emails.6 When writing about today’s youth as the first generation to grow up so closely 
connected to a computer-mediated world, where many things are experienced in some way as 
extensions of our connected selves (look at footage of any news event to see how many people 
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are more intent on recording what’s happening on their mobile phones than on watching it with 
their own eyes — it seems many are more intent on recording the event for others to experience 
second-hand rather than experiencing it themselves first-hand), researchers must also think about 
and write about today’s parents as the first generation to figure out how to help their children 
navigate that world. While teens are navigating the public spaces that social media afford them, 
their parents are also learning to do the same, with the added responsibility of monitoring their 
children’s online life and making sure they are being both safe and responsible. A Pew report on 
American adults’ social media usage between 2005 and 2015 shows that 65 percent of American 
adults are now using social networking sites, up from just 7 percent in 2005, when Pew began 
tracking it.7 If looking only at American adults who identify themselves as Internet users, that 
number shoots to 76 percent.8 How do teens and adults use social media? As of September 2014, 
of American adults who use social media: 
• 71 percent use Facebook; 
• 28 percent use Pinterest; 
• 28 percent use LinkedIn; 
• 26 percent use Instagram; and 
• 23 percent use Twitter.9  
 As of April 2015, 92 percent of American teens aged 13-17 reported going online daily 
with 24 percent of those saying they are online “almost constantly.”10 Of the teens who use 
social media: 
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 • 71 percent use Facebook (the same percentage as adults); 
 • 52 percent use Instagram; 
 • 41 percent use Snapchat; 
 • 33 percent use Twitter; 
 • 33 percent use Google+; 
 • 24 percent use Vine; 
 • 14 percent use Tumblr; and 
 • 11 percent use some other social media site.11 
And while smartphones have enabled teens’ connectivity,12 the phones themselves are not the 
draw, researchers say.13 In fact, the smartphones of today are the landlines of yesterday, but teens 
can use them anywhere instead of being tethered to the phone in the family room or kitchen.14 
Indeed, Herring and others note that the technology is merely the means for youth (and adults) to 
stay connected to their social circles. For teens, whose movements may be restricted by lack of 
transportation, parental rules, or city curfew and loitering ordinances, the social space of a social 
networking site replaces the “hangout” of yesteryear: the soda shop or the shopping mall.15 Boyd 
writes: 
Teens’ preoccupation with their friends dovetails with their desire to enter 
the public spaces that are freely accessible to adults. Their ability to access 
public spaces for sociable purposes is a critical component of the coming 
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of age process, and yet many of the public spaces where adults gather — 
bars, clubs, and restaurants — are inaccessible to teens.16 
 
Likewise, adults tied to the home because of parenting duties or to the workplace use social 
media to connect with their friends. 
 That connecting involves the activities that people, of whatever age, would do in face-to-
face social settings: gossip, tell jokes, look at each other’s photos, share stories and events of the 
day, ask for information, play games, seek moral support, and flirt or otherwise advance 
romantic relationships. In other words, social media enable people to be a part of each other’s 
lives even if they are not present physically. As Chayko puts it, “In this fairly constant (if 
intermittent) stream of text messages, IMs, photos and other short communications, often made 
without having anything special or particular to say, we are given to sense others’ presence and 
we can assume that our own presence is being sensed in return.”17 Teens face the added tasks 
when using social media of managing their public identities and pushing the boundaries of their 
social world  — tasks their parents worked out in the face-to-face situations or the long telephone 
conversations of their own youth. Indeed, Livingstone points out that computer-mediated 
communication offers teens a bit of a safety net by giving them “a means of managing, or 
avoiding, the potentially embarrassing challenges of face-to-face conversation and so of retaining 
control.”18 When teens using social media begin to feel that they are losing control, they can end 
the conversation by logging off or muting their phones.19 
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 As far as other differences, adults use social media in ways that teens perhaps do not: to 
share political views, to check and share news, for online dating, and for online learning. This 
study can only offer conjecture on this point because no readings turned up any researchers 
asking teens about those kinds of activities. In a survey for its Internet and American Life 
Project, the Pew Research Center reported in October 2012 that 66 percent of the American 
adults who used social networking sites like Facebook or Twitter engaged in at least one of eight 
civic or political activities Pew had identified on social media (such things as posting links to 
political stories, following a politician or public official, or encouraging others to take political 
action, to name just three).20 Indeed, “[t]he use of social media is becoming a feature of political 
and civic engagement for many Americans,” Pew reported.21 Pew found that those who 
identified as having strong ideological ties to either political party were more likely to engage in 
such activities. For example, where 34 percent of Americans said they have posted their own 
thoughts or comments on political or social issues, that number rose to 42 percent for people who 
identified as liberal Democrats and 41 percent for conservative Republicans.22 As far as news 
sharing goes, 50 percent of adult social media users said they share or repost news stories, 
images or videos, and 46 percent discuss news events.23 Among news consumers using 
Facebook, 73 percent said they followed entertainment news through the social networking 
site.24 That was by far the largest category of news followed on Facebook. Some others were: 57 
percent, sports; 55 percent, national government and politics; 51 percent, crime; and 46 percent 
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health and medicine.25 Online dating lags considerably behind other social network sites, but a 
Pew report from February 2016 said 12 percent of American adults in 2015 had used an online 
dating site, up from 9 percent in 2013.26 Nine percent had used a mobile dating app, compared to 
just 3 percent in 2013. And the growth is even greater in two age groups. Those 18-24 had nearly 
tripled from 10 percent in 2013 to 27 percent in 2015, and those 55-64 had doubled from 6 
percent in 2013 to 12 percent in 2015.27 
 Although teens might not be using online dating sites, that does not mean they are not 
using social media to advance their romantic interests. A Pew Research Institute report on 
“Teens, Technology and Romantic Relationships” from October 2015 notes that “the digital 
realm is one part of a broader universe in which teens meet, date and break up with romantic 
partners. Online spaces are used infrequently for meeting romantic partners, but play a major role 
in how teens flirt, woo and communicate with potential and current flames.”28 While 57 percent 
of teens, aged 13-17, have reported making friends with someone online, only 8 percent have 
ever met a romantic partner online, and most of those met through Facebook.29 And while most 
teen romances do not start online, social media plays a definite role in advancing romantic 
relationships begun in the offline world: Half of teens have friended someone on Facebook or 
another social networking site to “let them know they are interested,” and 47 percent “have 
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expressed their attraction by liking, commenting or otherwise interacting with that person on 
social media.”30  
Some researchers have noted that while differences do exist in young people’s access to 
the Internet and, thus, social media, it may not be as cut-and-dried as looking at the “haves and 
have-nots.”31 Reporting the results of a 2004 research project in the U.K., Livingstone and 
Helsper reported that 74 percent of young people aged 9-19 had access to the Internet at home 
and 92 percent had access to it at school. Forty-one percent of children reported that they used 
the Internet daily with another 42 percent using it weekly. Another 13 percent said they used the 
Internet less than once a week, and 3 percent said they never used the Internet at all, which 
Livingstone and Helsper noted is in line with the number of non-users in northern Europe and the 
United States.32 Comparing the children’s use of the Internet with their parents’ use, Lenhart and 
Helsper found that school access seemed to be an equalizing factor for young people; a full 22 
percent of the parents in the study never used the Internet.33 Livingstone and Helsper worry that 
because of school access, the drive to expand Internet access in homes throughout the U.K. 
might lag, thus perpetuating the advantage that children from families with greater income will 
have. They wrote: 
It appears that, although children from different backgrounds make 
equivalent use of the internet if they have equivalent access, existing 
inequalities in access have important consequences. Children and young 
people with home access tend to have spent more years online, to use the 
internet more often, to spend more time online per day and to have higher 
levels of online skills and self-efficacy.34 
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 In the United States, Pew reported, as noted above, that 92 percent of teens aged 13-17 
report going online daily and attributed that increase to the rise of mobile devices.35 The Pew 
study reported “gaps in access to technology which fall along socio-economic, racial and ethnic 
lines.”36 The study asked participants whether they “have or have access to” a smartphone, basic 
cell phone, desk or laptop computer, tablet, and game console. Of three groups identified, 85 
percent of African-American teens reported having access to a smartphone, while 71 percent of 
white and Hispanic teens reported having access.37 Overall, 73 percent of teens reporting having 
access to a smartphone, with 15 percent reporting they had access to a basic cell phone, and 
another 12 percent reporting they had no access to a cell phone. Only 8 percent of African-
American teens had no phone, compared to 12 percent of whites and 14 percent of Hispanics.38 
The numbers are different when looking at household income instead of race or ethnicity: 17 
percent of teens from households with less than $30,000 annual income reported having no cell 
phone, and 18 percent of teens from households with between $30,000 and $49,999 annual 
income reported having no cell phone.39 By contrast, 12 percent of teens from households 
earning between $50,000 and $74,999 annually reporting having no cell phone, and only 9 
percent of teens from households earning $75,000 or more reported having no cell phone.40 
When the question becomes that of access to a laptop or desktop computer or a tablet, lower-
income households again lag behind higher income households.41 
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 Livingstone and Helsper reported that boys and older teens in their study used the 
Internet more frequently than girls and younger children, and that was reflected in the fact that 
they access to the Internet in more places than girls, including being more likely to have Internet 
access in their bedrooms.42 In the United States, a study done of 18- and 19-year-old first-year 
writing program students at the University of Illinois revealed differences in usage of the Internet 
based on gender.43 Hargittai and Hsieh divided social network site (SNS) users into four groups: 
Dabblers, who use only one SNS and only use it sometimes; Samplers, who use more than one 
SNS but not very often; Devotees, who are active users on one SNS; and Omnivores, who are 
active on more than one SNS. The only real demographic difference they found was that women 
were more likely than men to use social network sites, but they attributed that to the fact that 
more of the female students were Omnivores, meaning they used multiple social network sites 
and used them with more regularity than the male students.44 Overall, Hargittai and Hsieh found 
that 9.2 percent of the students in their study were Dabblers, 4.4 percent were Samplers, 32.9 
percent were Devotees and 45.3 percent were Omnivores. Another 12.1 percent of the students 
reported that they did not use social networking sites.45 Hargittai and Hsieh reported “no sharp 
contrast” involving racial backgrounds.46 
The Pew Research Center reported found gender differences in usage of social media. 
Teen girls tended to use text messaging, “visual social media platforms” like Instagram and 
online pinboards like Pinterest, while teen boys tended to use console and video game playing 
                                                
42 LIVINGSTONE & HELSPER, supra note 31, at 678. 
43 Eszter Hargittai & Yu-li Patrick Hsieh, From Dabblers to Omnivores: A Typology of Social 
Network Site Usage in A NETWORKED SELF: IDENTITY, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE ON SOCIAL 
NETWORK SITES, 146-168 (Zizi Papacharissi, ed., Routledge 2011). 
44 Id. at 156. 
45 Id. at 155-56. 
46 Id. at 156. 
 48 
online.47 Lenhart wrote: “Teenage girls use social media sites and platforms — particularly 
visually-oriented ones — for sharing more than their male counterparts do. For their parts, boys 
are more likely than girls to own gaming consoles and play video games.”48 Besides Facebook, a 
comparison of three visually oriented sites shows that 61 percent of teen girls used Instagram, 
compared to 44 percent of teen boys; 51 percent of teen girls used Snapchat, compared to 31 
percent of teen boys; and 33 percent of teen girls used Pinterest, compared to 11 percent of teen 
boys.49  
Livingstone and Helsper found age differences in how young people in the U.K. used the 
Internet. They reported that most 9- to 11-year-olds played games, used it for school, or used it to 
make a drawing or story, while 12- to 17-year-olds reported using it for school work, to visit 
exam revision sites, to play games, or to download music, and 18- to 19-year-olds used it to 
download music, get information not related to school, and to send or receive emails.50  
Social, Cultural, and Psychological Effects of Social Media on Teens 
 A common meme shows a photo of young people walking along in a group with their 
phones out and their faces turned to the phones, not to each other or their surroundings. Several 
versions make the rounds, but the gist is, “This is the real zombie apocalypse.” As connected as 
young people today are to their social networks, it does often seem that their online lives are 
negatively affecting their offline, real-world lives. 
 But danah boyd would counter that teens are not using their cell phones to escape reality 
but instead are using them to stay connected to what’s real for them: their relationships with their 
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friends.51 And Mary Chayko notes that, “Younger people who have grown up with technology 
constantly at their sides do not seem to make the same distinctions among the ‘zones’ of work, 
home, and leisure” and thus see nothing wrong with keeping their smartphones handy.52 And 
while mobile devices can be used in public to keep strangers from striking up a conversation, to 
signal to others that we are not approachable, that connection to a social network site can just as 
easily help maintain friendships struck up on the slimmest of foundations.53 This contradiction 
between appearance and reality is at the heart of the social, cultural and psychological effects 
social media are having on young people today. 
 Writing about the interviews she conducted with 166 teens in 18 states from 2005-2012, 
boyd identified their main motivation as social.54 She noted that the teens she met turned to 
social media to fulfill a need for social time with friends that they could not fulfill in any other 
way. Limited by their parents’ fears of danger, by their distance from public spaces, or by their 
lack of transportation, the teens were “desperate” for a way to spend more time with their 
friends,55 and they found it online: “[B]ecause of a variety of social and cultural factors, social 
media has become an important public space where teens can gather and socialize broadly with 
peers in an informal way.”56 Teens’ “addiction” to social media is nothing more than a new 
manifestation of what teens have always wanted: more time with their friends away from their 
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parents’ watchful eyes: “Most teens aren’t addicted to social media; if anything, they’re addicted 
to each other.”57  
 Ellison, Lampe and Steinfield couch their discussion of social media in terms of social 
capital, a theory that allows researchers to articulate the benefits people get from their 
relationships.58 Citing Robert Putnam, they describe two kinds of social capital: (1) bonding 
social capital that comes from close friends and family, the people we turn to in real life, the 
offline world, for emotional, physical and financial support, and (2) bridging social capital, or 
“weak ties,” to other people: work colleagues, classmates, friends of friends, other 
acquaintances.59 In the days before social media, it was much harder to maintain those “weak 
ties.” We might have thought it would be good to maintain an acquaintance because the person 
might prove useful to us in the future, but the effort it took proved to be too much work for the 
mere possibility of some future payoff.60 But social media have made maintaining those 
acquaintances much easier: “The latent connection can be digitally reconstituted at any time, 
should the need or desire arise.”61 In their study, they found that “intensive use” of Facebook 
brought students “higher levels of social capital, especially bridging social capital.”62 The social 
network site made it easier for students to maintain ties to people whom they might otherwise 
lose track of. 
 Ellison, Lampe, Steinfield and Vitak also reported the results of a 2006 study at Michigan 
State University in which students reported that they used Facebook mainly to either keep in 
touch with old friends or to “check out” someone they had met socially in the real world and not 
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to meet new people or find people to date.63 A later study corroborated those results. Bridging 
social capital requires merely an acquaintance, a connection, between two people to start. What 
may begin as “check[ing] out” after a single face-to-face meeting can become an enduring 
Facebook “friend”ship. Ellison, Lampe, Steinfield and Vitak write: 
Research on proximity has long suggested that proximity between two 
individuals increases the chances that a relationship will form. … 
Facebook extends these proximity based social processes in two ways. 
First, it allows those who formed a relationship through physical 
proximity, but subsequently lost that proximity, to maintain the 
relationship. High school students moving to college, people shifting jobs, 
or families moving are all examples of this. Second, Facebook can 
reinforce relationships formed through proximity that would be too 
ephemeral to survive otherwise. For example, two students who meet 
through a class may connect for the duration of the class because of the 
forced proximity. However, when that proximity is removed, the 
relationship may not survive the sudden increased cost of maintenance. 
Facebook makes it easy to keep lightweight contact with each other even 
when the benefits of proximity are no longer available.64 
 
In that way, social capital is stored against the future need. The relationship can be maintained 
with little effort. Social network sites allow people to determine how much effort to put into 
maintaining an acquaintance and then make it easy to carry out that effort. Direct messaging 
someone is an example of an active effort to stay in touch, and liking someone’s post is a passive 
way to stay in touch.65 
As teens engage in social media, they will become more adept at managing the weak ties 
as well as the strong. Social media offer them just one more alternative way to negotiate how to 
deal with other people. They interact face-to-face (in proximity) with friends at school, and 
social networking sites and text messaging enable them to extend that proximate interaction into 
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the virtual world. Boyd notes: “When teens engage with networked media, they’re trying to take 
control of their lives and their relationship to society. In doing so, they begin to understand how 
people relate to one another and how information flows between people.”66 Teens’ participation 
in social media is evidence of their desire to participate in public life.67 People connect on social 
media for many reasons, and preserving bridging capital may be one of them. Indeed, 
maintaining the weakness of the weak tie may also be a motivating factor in Facebook 
relationships. Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn and Hughes wrote that Facebook friend status “could be 
used to maintain a ritualized distance from people, while at the same time affirming some sort of 
social relationship.”68 They related the story of “Anne,” who demarcated a “decisive distinction 
between real friends she hung out with and mere Facebook friends, with whom she had limited 
contact” (emphasis added).69 As one student put it in the Debatin interviews: “It is like 
socializing without being social.”70 
While much has been made of how self-representations on social media are not true 
representations of the self, but rather carefully constructed images of the self, some recent 
research would contradict that. Teens have admitted sharing false information about themselves 
on social networking sites but only because they are trying to maintain some kind of privacy 
against intrusions they don’t believe the site administrators or visitors need to know: age, 
hometown, etc., or to hide something else, such as posting as though they are straight when, in 
fact, they are gay or lesbian.71 Boyd notes that teens “don’t see social media as a virtual space in 
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which they must choose to be themselves or create an alternate ego.”72 In other words, their 
identity online can be in flux because they are teenagers whose identity really is in flux, being 
not yet fully formed.  
One final thing to keep in mind about how teens present themselves on social networking 
sites, from boyd: “What teens do online cannot be separated from their broader desires and 
interests, attitudes and values. […] Teens’ engagement with social media and other technologies 
is a way of engaging with the broader world.”73 If, as Chayko argues, teens do not maintain 
different zones to compartmentalize themselves for home, work, school, and social life, then 
social network sites really do become what sociologist Ray Oldenburg calls “third spaces” — a 
portable place that floats between home and workplace where people can relax and “socialize 
with minimal obligations or social entanglements.”74 These third spaces can be kept separate or 
be integrated, and because they are “sociomental” (Chayko’s term for “virtual”), people can pay 
attention to each space separately or multitask with an in-person conversation, a Facebook chat, a 
Twitter feed and an Instagram or Snapchat story. 
Privacy Concerns 
 Privacy is one area where the teen’s online behavior could hurt himself or herself. Lapses 
in judgment regarding privacy will directly affect the teen. Invasion of privacy is “part of the 
Facebook reality” through such incidents as the hacking of accounts and sharing of photos that 
embarrass the subject.75 Victims tend to take two approaches to cope with privacy invasion: 1) 
they tighten their privacy settings and 2) they “integrate and transform the incidents into a 
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meaningful and ultimately unthreatening context.”76 Facebook is such an integral part of 
people’s lives, and its benefits so far outweigh privacy concerns, however, that most people do 
not think about giving up their account to prevent further privacy incursions.77 Debatin and his 
fellow researchers found that even when the students they interviewed acknowledged that 
Facebook’s news feed helped to spread rumors and gossip, they saw this as a side effect that was 
part of the cost of tapping into Facebook’s ability to “enhance social connectedness.”78 
 Butler, McCann and Thomas did a study where they combined a 25-question survey 
about users’ awareness of Facebook’s privacy policy with content analysis of their Facebook 
profiles. Although the results are not generalizable because of the small sample size, the 
researchers found that, “Overall, it seems users care more about making an identity for 
themselves on the social networking site than managing who can view that identity.”79 Only 14 
percent of the 235 people who responded to the survey said they had read the latest privacy 
policy changes at the time.80 Another 17 percent said they had read the privacy policy “but only 
when I first created my account.”81 A full 29 percent said they had never read Facebook’s 
privacy policy, and another 12 percent said not only had they not read it, they did not even know 
where to find it.82 The researchers caution that “[s]ocial networking sites are purposely created 
so users can divulge personal information in order to connect with others. The problem is that as 
a society, users tend to overshare information, whether knowingly or unknowingly. This 
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overshare could potentially lead to trouble both personally and professionally.83 Of course, even 
when teens do know about the privacy policy of whatever social networking site they’re one, 
they cannot always control their information once it’s posted. Someone can share it or screen 
shot it and post it somewhere else. In addition, they cannot always control how others, including 
parents, interpret what they post. 
 For many teens, the focus of privacy concerns is that they want to escape parental or 
educational system scrutiny.84 Boyd says that the teens she interviewed do care about privacy: 
When teens — and, for that matter, most adults — seek privacy, they do 
so in relation to those who hold power over them. Unlike privacy 
advocates and more politically conscious adults, teens aren’t typically 
concerned with governments and corporations. Instead, they’re trying to 
avoid surveillance from parents, teachers, and other immediate authority 
figures in their lives. They want the right to be ignored by the people who 
they see as being “in their business.”85 
 
Social media carry with them the added catch that most conversations on them are “public by 
default, private by effort.”86 Facebook’s default privacy setting is “public” unless users go to the 
trouble of changing that to “friends.” But even if someone sets his profile to “friends” only, a 
friend can share or re-post what is intended to be kept within a small network of friends. 
 While teens may tend to think of privacy in terms of avoiding their parents or other 
authority figures, parents, for their part, are concerned about their teens oversharing information 
that is then picked up and used by marketers and advertisers.87 Teens, who spent $208.8 billion 
in 2012, are a huge target for marketers and advertisers. Feng and Xie used data from a Teens 
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and Privacy Survey by Princeton Survey Research to examine teens’ level of social networking 
site use, their parents’ level of privacy concern about online data and marketing, the teens’ level 
of privacy concern about online data collection, teens’ implementation of privacy-setting 
strategies, and teens’ Facebook profile visibility with the aim of looking at the influence of “two 
socialization agents: parental mediation and SNS usage.”88  
 Feng and Xie found that there is a positive relationship between parents’ and teens’ 
concern over privacy. When the parents talked to their children about their concerns, children 
became more aware of privacy issues; this kind of parental involvement is called “active 
mediation.”89 The other type of parental involvement is “restrictive mediation” and consists of 
parents’ controlling their children’s media use through the setting of rules.90 Their analysis also 
showed that teens had adopted several privacy-protection strategies. Among the results, teens 
tried to control access to what they posted, with 76 percent having deleted people from their 
friends’ list, and 57 percent having blocked people from their profiles.91 Teens had also tried to 
alter content to protect their privacy: 62 percent had deleted or edited something they had 
previously posted, 53 percent had deleted comments others made about them, and 58 percent had 
untagged themselves in photos.92 Feng and Xie call for education programs for both 
parents/guardians and children. 
 Daniel Solove notes that notions of privacy have not evolved to keep pace with the 
technological frontier: “Traditionally privacy is viewed in a binary way, dividing the world into 
two distinct realms, the public and the private. If a person is in a public place, she cannot expect 
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privacy.”93 Social media, however, blur those realms. A student can be sitting in the private 
space of her bedroom at home, tweeting or posting online and thereby straddling the private and 
public realms at the same time. The physical place where she is sitting, her bedroom, may lull 
her into a sense that her posts are as protected as she is in her private environment. And, as noted 
above, students may take steps to try to extend their privacy into the online world by setting their 
account to restrict who can see what they post, but all it takes is one friend who shares something 
without permission, and their “private” posts are laid bare for others to see. Solove notes, 
“Privacy is a complicated set of norms, expectations, and desires that goes far beyond the 
simplistic notion that if you’re in public, you have no privacy.”94 Modern technology challenges 
the public-private divide, and the indistinct division challenges students’ freedom to speak at will 
online when what they are speaking about is their school. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MAJOR SUPREME COURT OPINIONS ON STUDENT SPEECH 
Prelude to Tinker: West Virginia v. Barnette 
 In tracing the development of free speech rights of students in the United States, one must 
begin a little further back than the Supreme Court’s landmark 1969 Tinker1 decision. Twenty-six 
years earlier, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,2 the Court held that schools 
could not compel students to salute the American flag because doing so violated the First and 
Fourteenth amendments. So, the Barnette decision can be looked at as the first that recognized 
that the speech rights afforded to adults extended to children; here, specifically, the right not to 
be compelled by a government authority to speak. In rendering that decision, the Court 
overturned its 1940 decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,3 which had held that 
students could be compelled to salute the flag and could be expelled for refusing to do so. The 
law being challenged in Barnette was actually amended by the West Virginia legislature in 
response to the Court’s ruling in Gobitis4 and declared a refusal to salute the flag “an act of 
insubordination” punishable by expulsion.5 Once the student was expelled, he could be declared 
an unlawful truant, and his parents or guardian fined and/or jailed.6 The Barnettes, who were 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, argued that their religion’s interpretation of the Bible forbade saluting or 
pledging allegiance to any flag.7 The majority opinion in Barnette raised three points that are 
important to this study’s discussion of student speech rights. 
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 First, and especially pertinent as a prelude to Tinker, the Court noted that saluting the flag 
is a “form of utterance” and the symbolism behind the flag “is a primitive but effective way of 
communicating ideas.”8 Justice Robert Jackson, writing for the majority, said, “The use of an 
emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from 
mind to mind.”9 Black armbands, a traditional symbol of mourning, were worn by the three 
students suspended from school in the Tinker case as emblems to symbolize opposition to U.S. 
involvement in the Vietnam War. As such, they could be considered an effective, recognizable 
way to communicate the students’ protest against the war. Second, and equally pertinent to 
Tinker, the Court in Barnette noted that the Barnette children’s refusal to salute the flag was 
peaceable and did not infringe on anyone else’s rights. In this, one can hear the echo of what 
would become Tinker’s two requirements for student speech to be protected from school 
interference: both the more well-known requirement that the speech not cause a disruption of the 
school environment and the lesser-known requirement that the speech not infringe on the rights 
of other students. In Barnette, the Court reasoned: 
The freedom asserted by these appellees [the Barnettes] does not bring 
them into collision with rights asserted by any other individual. It is such 
conflicts which most frequently require intervention of the State to 
determine where the rights of one end and those of another begin. But the 
refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere 
with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question in this 
case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is 
between authority and rights of the individual.10 
 
The reference to authority leads to the third point raised in the Barnette opinion that applies to 
much of what will be discussed in the section on online student speech, where the cases 
examined involve students speaking out, usually rudely, against school authority, whether in the 
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form of an administrator, a teacher, or a rule or policy. In Barnette, the Court warns against 
overreach by local government authorities, particularly when that overreach infringes 
constitutional rights: 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the 
citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures — Boards of 
Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and 
highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within 
the limits of the Bill of Rights. … Such Boards are numerous and their 
territorial jurisdiction often small. But small and local authority may feel 
less sense of responsibility to the Constitution, and agencies of publicity 
may be less vigilant in calling it to account.11 
 
It is this overreach that leads to many of the court cases involving student online speech today as 
administrators and faculty stung by student criticism — again, often expressed in crude and 
uncivil language — seek to shut down those students’ very public voices. It is also that overreach 
that leads school administrators to censor student newspapers using the Hazelwood12 ruling as 
justification.  
 Before turning attention to contemporary issues involving students’ online speech, 
however, an examination of the Supreme Court’s four major student speech cases is necessary. 
What will be seen is that a remarkably strong foundation was set by the Tinker decision in 1969, 
but that foundation has been limited by the subsequent decisions in Bethel v. Fraser13 in 1986, 
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier in 1988, and Morse v. Frederick14 in 2007. 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
Writing about the Gobitis and Barnette cases as the foundations of Tinker, Dan L. 
Johnston, who represented the students in the Tinker case, noted that in Barnette, the Court 
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completely changed its reasoning in overturning Gobitis as precedent and thus changed the 
question to be considered in that line of student speech cases: “Where Justice Frankfurter had 
framed the dispute in Gobitis as one between the consciences of the minority and the authority of 
the state to legislate and regulate to achieve loyalty and patriotism, Justice Jackson frames the 
dispute as one between individual conscience and the will of the majority.”15 That line of 
reasoning was continued in Tinker. 
 Johnston maintains that Tinker was not new law — that it reaffirmed earlier rulings in 
favor of student speech rights.16 Yet Tinker has become the foundation of most, if not all, student 
speech cases since, because of the Supreme Court’s declaration that neither students nor teachers 
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”17 In 
Tinker, the Court specified that “students in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under 
our Constitution”18 and said that the right to freedom of expression applies anywhere on campus 
during school hours so long as the expression occurs “without ‘materially and substantially 
interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and 
without colliding with the rights of others.”19 
Johnston summarized the events leading up to the Tinker case thus: The Tinker and 
Eckhardt families were active anti-war protesters who heard of a movement to wear black 
armbands to support Senator Robert Kennedy’s call to extend the temporary Christmas-time 
truce in Vietnam in 1965. At about the same time, an editorial appeared in the student newspaper 
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endorsing the attempt, but school officials, hearing that some students might actually wear 
armbands, rapidly prohibited them and said students who did come to school wearing armbands 
would be asked to take them off or go home. Just before Christmas break, Mary Beth and John 
Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt (along with two younger Tinkers who were not parties to the 
suit) wore armbands to school and were sent home. They did not return to school until after 
Christmas break. The Tinkers and Eckhardts asked the Iowa Civil Liberties Union for help, and 
when a divided school board upheld the school officials’ action, the case was launched.20 
Johnston reported that Chief Justice Warren wanted the Supreme Court to rule for the 
students simply on the fact that other political symbols were allowed in school when the 
armbands were prohibited, but Justice White “argued for a broader First Amendment holding, 
and his position prevailed.”21 Indeed, the Court noted that the school district’s prohibition of 
symbols of protest applied only to the armbands expressing opposition to the Vietnam War, not 
to buttons worn in support of national political campaigns or to the wearing of the Iron Cross, a 
Nazi symbol.22 The Court called the armband protest “closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which, we 
have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment”23 and 
further declared that singling out one kind of expression focused on one kind of opinion, when 
others had been allowed, was impermissible under the Constitution.24 
The Court cited its earlier opinion in Barnette to point out that the First and Fourteenth 
amendments apply to students and that schools have a duty to allow free expression of political 
speech to further students’ education in how to participate in civic life. The schools’ 
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responsibility to “educat[e] the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and 
teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”25 And 
although school officials do have authority to curtail student speech when that speech “intrudes 
upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students,”26 they do not have authority to 
squelch speech merely “to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint.”27 For his part, Johnston noted that the First and Fourteenth amendments 
were each “products of specific political climates” — the First, as part of the Bill of Rights, 
demanded by state representatives to protect the people from the government overreach they had 
suffered at the hands of the English king, and the Fourteenth in response to state and local 
governments’ failure to safeguard the rights of American citizens that led up to and followed the 
Civil War.28 “By their strict language, neither the Bill of Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment 
so much give rights to people as do they proscribe actions of the governments that had violated 
those rights in the recent experience of their enactments,” he wrote.29 He sees the school’s 
disciplining of the children and the federal district and circuit courts’ failure to uphold their 
rights as evidence of “the fragility of the rule of law in times of war.”30 And he has harsh words 
for federal judges who uphold disciplining students for speech that should be protected by 
Tinker: 
To be sure, three decades of federal judges appointed by conservative 
presidents have resulted in decisions that are not consistent with the 
opinions about the role of the First Amendment in public schools 
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expressed so eloquently by Mr. Justice Fortas in Tinker. Ironically, 
conservatives who complained that judges appointed during the 
Roosevelt-Truman-Eisenhower era were not sufficiently respectful of stare 
decisis — that pre-New Deal decisions should be followed not necessarily 
because they were right, but because they established precedential law — 
now support the decisions of conservative judges who fail to apply Tinker 
to comparable factual claims.31 
 
Chipping away at Tinker: Fraser and Hazelwood 
 High school students came away from Tinker with a clearly defined right to exercise their 
freedom of expression even during school hours as long as they did not cause a disruption of the 
school or infringe any other students’ rights. But two cases in the 1980s would begin to curtail 
that freedom. 
 In 1986, the Supreme Court ruled in Bethel School District v. Fraser that schools could 
regulate student language that was “offensively lewd and indecent speech,”32 which had no claim 
to First Amendment protection in the protected setting of a school. In the Fraser case, Bethel 
High School student Matthew Fraser used sexual innuendo in a speech nominating a fellow 
student for student vice president at an assembly of some 600 students. It was reported that 
teachers and some students were embarrassed by the speech; other students apparently mimicked 
the acts described in it. The speech, quoted in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, follows: 
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, 
his character is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of 
Bethel, is firm. 
 Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If 
necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack 
things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally — he 
succeeds. 
 Jeff is a man who will go to the very end — even the climax, for each 
and every one of you. 
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 So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come between 
you and the best our high school can be.33 
 
The day after the speech, Fraser was called into the assistant principal’s office and informed that 
he would be suspended for three days and have his name removed from the roster of possible 
speakers at the high school graduation ceremony for violating a school rule that said, “Conduct 
which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including 
the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.”34 Fraser asked for a review of his punishment, 
and the school’s hearing officer found his speech to be “indecent, lewd, and offensive to the 
modesty and decency of many of the students and faculty in attendance at the assembly.”35 
Fraser served two days of his three-day suspension. Though his name was removed from the 
roster of candidates for graduation speaker, he was elected by write-in vote by his fellow 
students. Meanwhile, he and his father sued the school district, alleging that his First 
Amendment right to free speech had been violated. 
 The U.S. District Court and the Court of Appeals both ruled that the school’s punishment 
violated Fraser’s First and Fourteenth amendment rights. As Justice Marshall noted in his 
dissent, “The District Court and Court of Appeals conscientiously applied Tinker [citation 
omitted], and concluded that the School District had not demonstrated any disruption of the 
educational process.”36 However, the Supreme Court reversed and found that the First 
Amendment did not protect Fraser’s speech. Chief Justice Burger, writing the majority (7–2) 
opinion, said there was a “marked distinction” between the political message sent by Tinker’s 
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35 Id. at 678-679. 
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armbands and the “lewd and obscene speech” in Fraser’s nominating statement.37 Burger cited 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation38 as precedent that the Court had “recognized an interest in 
protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language”39 and said that 
Fraser’s speech fell under that category. Burger noted that schools are the place to teach children 
how to behave civilly when participating in civic life: 
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not 
confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach 
by example the shared values of a civilized social order. Consciously or 
otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—demonstrate the 
appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their 
conduct and deportment in and out of class. […] The schools, as 
instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, 
mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, 
indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this 
confused boy.40 
 
Finally, the Court held that the school district acted within its authority to punish Fraser because 
the punishment was directed at his lewd speech, not a political message: 
Unlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing armbands in Tinker, 
the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any political 
viewpoint. The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials 
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as 
respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational mission. A 
high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit 
monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage 
students.41 
 
In 2001, Fraser was interviewed by David Hudson of the Freedom Forum. In that 
interview, Fraser, then a debate coach at Stanford University, said the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
his case “effectively overruled Tinker”: “Tinker may still be good law de jure, but it has been de 
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facto obliterated.”42 But William Coats, the lawyer who represented the school district, disagreed 
with that assessment. He told Hudson, “Schools should be able to prohibit vulgar and lewd 
speech in a school speech. This type of speech is inherently disruptive. But certainly, speech 
before a student assembly should not resemble speech in a pool hall, tavern or even the boys’ 
locker room.”43 Fraser disagreed: “Public schools are setting a general tone of authority and 
control. They are teaching students to obey authority without question. And in a democracy, that 
is a very dangerous thing to do.”44 
The second Supreme Court ruling from the 1980s requires students to obey authority, if 
the authority is in the form of a principal or teacher who has prior review of a student newspaper 
that bears “the imprimatur of the school.”45 In its 1988 ruling in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier, the Court dealt a blow to free speech and press rights of student journalists. In 
Hazelwood, the principal at Hazelwood East High School in Saint Louis County, Missouri, 
pulled two pages from the Spectrum, the high school’s student newspaper, because of stories 
dealing with teen pregnancy and the impact of divorce on students. The principal was concerned 
that the pregnant students would be identified despite the use of fake names and that, dwelling as 
it did on issues of sexual activity and birth control, the article was “inappropriate” for younger 
readers.46 He was concerned that the story on divorce used a student’s real name when the 
student was making complaints about her father, unaware that the teacher who advised the 
Journalism II class that produced the newspaper had removed the student’s name from the story. 
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The principal also thought that the student’s parents should have been given a chance to respond 
in the article.47 Because he did not think there was time to make changes to the articles and still 
get the paper out before the end of the school year, the principal pulled the two pages that 
contained the stories, along with several other stories that appeared on those pages. The student 
editors sued, alleging that their First Amendment rights had been violated. 
 The District Court found for the school, holding that the principal’s actions were 
justified. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, in part because it held that 
although the newspaper was a part of the school’s curriculum, it was also a public forum 
“intended to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint.”48 As a public forum, the 
newspaper was protected from censorship except when necessary to prevent Tinker’s “material 
and substantial interference with school work or discipline … or the rights of others.”49 
 The Supreme Court reversed. While Tinker explicitly noted that First Amendment 
protections do extend to children, the Court cited the Fraser case, particularly its holdings that 
student rights “are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings” and 
that school boards have the right to determine “what manner of speech in the classroom or in the 
school assembly is inappropriate.”50 In finding that the newspaper was produced as part of a 
newspaper class and was under the control of the journalism teacher in almost all aspects — 
selecting the newspaper editors, deciding both the number of pages in each edition and the 
publication dates, assigning stories, reviewing quotes, and editing stories, among other things — 
the Court held that the student newspaper was not a forum for public expression. Reading the 
board policy that governed the student newspaper, the Court also found that “school officials 
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retained ultimate control over what constituted ‘responsible journalism’ in a school-sponsored 
newspaper.”51 The Court said that Tinker’s requirement for a school “to tolerate particular 
student speech […] is different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school 
affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”52 
The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s 
personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The 
latter question concerns educators’ authority over school-sponsored 
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that 
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to 
bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may fairly be 
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur 
in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty 
members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student 
participants and audiences.53 
 
The Court held that school officials can exercise greater control over such student 
expression as newspapers and theatrical performances because of their need to make sure the 
school’s educational mission is carried out, to protect students from exposure to material that is 
beyond their maturity, and to ensure that an individual student’s views are not believed by the 
public to be representative of the school’s views.54  
Accordingly, we conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker for 
determining when a school may punish student expression need not also 
be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name 
and resources to the dissemination of student expression. Instead, we hold 
that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial 
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored 
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.55 
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Justice William J. Brennan Jr. dissented, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice 
Harry Blackmun, saying the principal violated the First Amendment by censoring the articles 
because they did not disrupt class work or infringe anyone’s rights.56 Pointing out that some 
student speech does disrupt the school’s mission, using Matthew Fraser’s speech as one example, 
Brennan said that other student speech “frustrates the school’s legitimate pedagogical purposes 
merely by expressing a message that conflicts with the school’s.”57 Brennan charged that the 
majority opinion “offer[ed] no more than an obscure tangle of three excuses to afford educators 
‘greater control’ over school-sponsored speech than the Tinker test would permit.”58 Those were: 
the need to control curriculum, a “pedagogical interest” in shielding students from inappropriate 
material, and the need to “dissociate itself from student expression.”59 Tinker would allow a 
teacher to “constitutionally ‘censor’ poor grammar, writing, or research” because allowing such 
things in the newspaper would ‘materially disrup[t]’ the newspaper’s curricular purpose.”60 But 
censoring a newspaper to eliminate material deemed inappropriate would not serve “the 
curricular purposes of a student newspaper, unless one believes that the purpose of the school 
newspaper is to teach students that the press ought never report bad news, express unpopular 
views, or print a thought that might upset its sponsors.”61 Brennan also warned, “The case before 
us aptly illustrates how readily school officials (and courts) can camouflage viewpoint 
discrimination as the ‘mere’ protection of students from sensitive topics.”62 
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Tinker Moves Off Campus: Morse v. Frederick 
 In 2007, the Supreme Court extended Tinker’s reach beyond the schoolhouse gate to 
apply it to student speech that occurred off campus but at a school-sponsored event. Morse v. 
Frederick began in January 2002 when high school senior Joseph Frederick and some friends 
held up a 14-foot banner that stated “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” as the Olympic torch passed by 
their school in Juneau, Alaska. Frederick was across the street from school property when he 
committed the speech that was punished. His banner was confiscated, and Principal Deborah 
Morse suspended him for 10 days for what she believed was speech encouraging illegal drug 
use.63 The school superintendent upheld the suspension, as did the school board. The 
superintendent was careful to explain that Frederick “was not disciplined because the principal of 
the school ‘disagreed’ with his message, but because his speech appeared to advocate the use of 
illegal drugs.”64 Frederick filed suit, alleging that his First Amendment rights had been violated. 
The U.S. District Court ruled against Frederick, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that 
the school did not show that Frederick’s speech posed the threat of substantial disruption.65 The 
Supreme Court ruled that Frederick’s rights were not violated and that Principal Morse acted 
properly because, while Frederick was not on school property, the event was classified as “an 
approved social event or class trip” and the school district’s rules expressly stated that students 
were subject to school conduct rules at such events.66 While Frederick said the phrase “Bong 
Hits 4 Jesus” was nonsense aimed only at getting the television cameras to train on him,67 
Principal Morse interpreted it as a pro-marijuana banner advocating drug use. The Supreme 
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Court ruled 5–4 that the First Amendment does not protect speech aimed at promoting illegal 
drug use, and the majority had no doubt that the banner was doing that: “Gibberish is surely a 
possible interpretation of the words on the banner, but it is not the only one, and dismissing the 
banner as meaningless ignores its undeniable reference to illegal drugs.”68 
 The Court’s opinion, written by Chief Justice John Roberts, cited Tinker, Fraser and 
Hazelwood. Roberts outlined “two basic principles” from Fraser that apply in Morse: 1) that 
“the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the 
rights of adults in other settings”;69 and 2) “that the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not 
absolute”: “Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not conduct the ‘substantial 
disruption’ analysis prescribed by Tinker.”70 Specifically noting that Hazelwood (which is 
referred to in the opinion as Kuhlmeier) does not control the Bong Hits case because no one 
would reasonably believe that Frederick’s banner was school-sanctioned, Roberts nonetheless 
said that Hazelwood “acknowledged that schools may regulate some speech ‘even though the 
government could not censor similar speech outside the school’ […] And, like Fraser, it 
confirms that the rule of Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student speech.”71 Roberts 
noted that Congress has made anti-drug education part of all schools’ educational mission.72 
Combining the “special characteristics of the school environment” as noted in Tinker with the 
federal government’s requirement that schools educate students about drug use “allows schools 
to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting drug use.”73 
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 Roberts stopped short of adopting a broader rule advocated by the school “that 
Frederick’s speech is proscribable because it is plainly ‘offensive’ as the term is used in Fraser” 
because he saw that as being too far-reaching in that “much political and religious speech might 
be perceived as offensive to some” and the Court could proscribe Frederick’s speech simply 
because it was promoting drug use.74 
In a dissent, however, Justice John Paul Stevens stated that he believed Frederick’s 
statement that the banner was nonsense and not meant to promote drug use. 
In my judgment, the First Amendment protects student speech if the 
message itself neither violates a permissible rule nor expressly advocates 
conduct that is illegal and harmful to students. This nonsense banner does 
neither, and the Court does serious violence to the First Amendment in 
upholding—indeed, lauding—a school’s decision to punish Frederick for 
expressing a view with which it disagreed.75 
 
Stevens was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David Souter in his dissent. The dissent 
argued that “censorship based on the content of speech, particularly censorship that depends on 
the viewpoint of the speaker, is subject to the most rigorous burden of justification” for 
infringing First Amendment rights.76 Additionally, Stevens said that punishing someone for 
advocating something in speech is only permissible when it is likely that action will occur.77 
Such was not the case with Frederick’s banner. He offered a caution for where the Morse ruling 
would lead: 
Admittedly, some high school students (including those who use drugs) 
are dumb. Most students, however, do not shed their brains at the 
schoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb advocacy when they see 
it. The notion that the message on this banner would actually persuade 
either the average student or even the dumbest one to change his or her 
behavior is most implausible. That the Court believes such a silly message 
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can be proscribed as advocacy underscores the novelty of its position, and 
suggests that the principle it articulates has no stopping point.78 
 
As Stevens worried about how far the Court was stretching schools’ ability to punish 
student speech when it had to work so hard to “divine its hidden meaning,”79 Justice Samuel 
Alito, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, said he joined the opinion of the Court only on the 
understanding that the ruling applies only to speech “that a reasonable observer would interpret 
as advocating illegal drug use” and that it does not support restrictions of “speech that can 
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue,” including issues 
involving drug policy or laws.80 Further, he noted that the Court’s opinion does not permit school 
officials “to censor any student speech that interferes with a school’s ‘educational mission’”81 
[emphasis added]. Alito’s warning: 
This argument can easily be manipulated in dangerous ways, and I would 
reject it before such abuse occurs. The ‘educational mission’ of the public 
schools is defined by the elected and appointed public officials with 
authority over the schools and by the school administrators and faculty. As 
a result, some public schools have defined their educational missions as 
including the inculcation of whatever political and social views are held 
by the members of these groups.82 
 
While Alito did note that some speech could be curtailed if it was based on the “special 
characteristic of the school setting”; to wit, if it was a “threat to the physical safety of 
students,”83 he also noted that giving school officials such wide latitude to regulate speech under 
an all-encompassing “educational mission” umbrella would endanger student speech. Harking 
back to Tinker, he gave the example of a school district that decided its mission was to support 
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U.S. soldiers in time of war and therefore suppressed all speech, including the students’ black 
armbands, that could be seen as not supporting the soldiers. Vice versa, the school could decide 
that its educational mission was to promote world peace and therefore it could suppress all 
speech that supported soldiers.84 Alito noted, “The ‘educational mission’ argument would give 
public school authorities a license to suppress speech on political and social issues based on 
disagreement with the viewpoint expressed. The argument, therefore, strikes at the very heart of 
the First Amendment.”85  
From the Schoolhouse Gate to Cyberspace 
 What the Supreme Court gave students in 1969 in the form of Tinker’s strong declaration 
that they did not shed their constitutional rights — including their right to free speech — at the 
schoolhouse gate has been steadily curtailed in the intervening decades. Carving out exceptions 
that allow for censorship and/or punishment at school through Fraser for lewd speech and 
through Hazelwood for school-sponsored speech, the Court walked back First Amendment 
protection for student speech at school. Then its ruling in Morse, albeit for speech at a school-
sponsored event, opened the door to making off-campus speech subject to discipline at school. 
Lower courts’ rulings in online student speech cases have shown that it is but a small jump from 
Morse to cyberspace’s off-campus speech. The Court has denied certiorari for three student 
online speech cases that are among those that will be discussed in-depth in Chapter 8, thus giving 
lower courts leeway to rule in whatever way they interpret the four precedents given in Tinker, 
Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse.  
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CHAPTER 6 
LEGAL SCHOLARS’ VIEWS OF OFF-CAMPUS ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH 
A Call for Supreme Court Guidance 
For years, the call has been the same. Legal scholars may differ on the approach the 
Supreme Court should take with off-campus online student speech, but on one thing they agree: 
The Supreme Court needs to act. After explaining the four (at that time) appellate circuit 
decisions involving such speech, Clay Calvert concluded: 
The only items here, in fact, that seem readily clear at this stage are that: 
1) the U.S. Supreme Court needs, very soon, to hear a case that directly 
deals with this issues, thus adding, in the process, a critical fifth decision 
to its current quartet of rulings affecting student free-expression rights; 
and 2) creating a clear, coherent and concise jurisdictional test that not 
only is workable but also strikes a proper balance between the First 
Amendment speech rights of off-campus minors and the need of schools 
to function smoothly and effectively as educational institutions will be a 
prodigious and staggering task.1 
 
That article was published in 2009, about a year after the Supreme Court had denied certioriari to 
Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School District,2 a Second Circuit case 
involving eighth-grader Aaron Wisniewski, who was suspended after using a drawing of a gun 
firing a bullet at a man’s head with blood spatter above and the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen” 
below as his AOL instant messaging icon.3 VanderMolen was Aaron’s English teacher. Years 
later, writing about a case from the Fifth Circuit in which a high school student was suspended 
for posting a performance of an original rap song about coaches sexually harassing female 
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students at school, Katherine Geddes wrote that the appellate judges misapplied the Tinker4 
precedent: “While both the Internet and the prevalence of school violence legitimately support 
the majority’s holding, the court’s final decision suggests that the time has come for the Supreme 
Court to review and clarify Tinker’s application to this new breed of student speech.”5 That 
refrain is sounded again and again in law review articles dealing with off-campus online speech. 
The Supreme Court, which has not accepted a student speech case since its 2007 Morse v. 
Frederick6 decision, needs to update its jurisprudence for the age of the Internet and social 
media. 
 Calvert noted that lower courts “have generally protected the student expression” in off-
campus encounters between students “engaged in much more primitive forms of speech” toward 
teachers and other students.7 He criticized the Second Circuit’s Wisniewski decision as “a rather 
primitive ‘if-then’ formula: If it is reasonably foreseeable that student speech created off campus 
will come to the attention of school authorities, then school authorities may exert disciplinary 
authority over it.”8 Calvert cautioned that using that standard for when school officials may 
punish or censor students’ off-campus online speech means that students will most likely be 
punished at school because of three reasons: “tattletale students,” “curious 
teachers/administrators,” and “in-school buzz/discussion.”9 In other words, there will always be 
talk about outrageous online speech among the school’s denizens, meaning that it is “reasonably 
foreseeable” that any online speech will come to the attention of school authorities. 
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“Everywhere at Once” 
 An unsigned article in the February 2012 Harvard Law Review, covering the Third 
Circuit’s en banc decision in the rehearing of J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School 
District,10 noted that a judge in a concurring opinion “would have expressly held that Tinker does 
not apply to off-campus speech.”11 The judge noted the “‘everywhere at once’ nature of the 
internet,” and, thus, that “the determination of what should qualify as off-campus speech could 
not turn simply on the location of the speaker.”12 
It is precisely this “everywhere at once” quality of the internet that 
highlights the need to resolve the constitutional issue in this case. Because 
the internet blurs the line between students’ school and home lives, there 
is a significant risk that lower protections for on-campus speech might 
seep into all areas of students’ lives, with significant potential 
consequences for their First Amendment rights.13 
 
The article noted that when courts use the Tinker standard to determine whether off-campus 
online speech either creates an actual substantial disruption or gives school officials reason to 
believe there will be a substantial disruption, the facts of each case must be taken into account, 
and because the facts of each case can differ widely, “students will have almost no basis on 
which to predict whether their speech would fall within Tinker’s ambit,”14 leading to a chilling 
effect on students’ free speech. The article points out that students are “particularly vulnerable” 
to this because school disciplinary proceedings “can be arbitrary and unfair” and “[s]chool 
officials may cultivate reputations as strict disciplinarians to head off problems.”15 The article 
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urges that Tinker be applied only to on-campus speech unless a student’s off-campus online 
speech “intentionally targeted” the school, leaving other problematic student speech, such as 
libelous statements or true threats, subject to the same constraints as speech by an adult that falls 
outside First Amendment protection.16 
 Also noting the danger to students of having protection for their off-campus online 
speech hanging on Tinker, Andrew Kloster wrote that “even good precedent in student-friendly 
circuits is difficult to rely on.”17 Kloster was writing after the Supreme Court denied certiorari to 
two cases, the aforementioned J.S. ex rel. Snyder and Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools.18 
Kloster identified three approaches courts could use in deciding whether or how to apply Tinker 
in off-campus online student speech cases. First, as five Third Circuit judges wrote in a 
concurring opinion in Snyder, courts could decide that Tinker does not apply to off-campus 
speech, period: “This approach notes that the First Amendment protects students engaging in off-
campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the community at large. … 
Under this approach, the regulatory arm of the school stops at the schoolhouse gate.”19 Yet, as 
Kloster also notes, this approach runs into the difficulty of determining whether the speech is on-
campus or off-campus. Echoing the problem of simultaneity discussed in Chapter 3, Kloster 
asks, “Is it where the author is sitting when he or she writes, where the speech is heard, where the 
internet servers are located, where the speech is accessed, or some combination of these factors? 
These are not insurmountable problems, but they are real.”20 
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 Kloster’s other approaches are: second, that courts could apply Tinker “to any speech, 
whether on or off campus, that causes a school official to ‘reasonably anticipate substantial 
disruption’ in school”21 as the Eighth Circuit held in D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District 
No. 6022; and, third, that courts could apply the hybrid approach used by the Second Circuit in 
Doninger v. Niehoff23 that begins with speech that officials could “reasonably anticipate” to 
cause substantial disruption but adds the requirement that the speech be intentionally targeted at 
the school.24 However, he calls the Eighth Circuit’s decision “a startlingly broad interpretation of 
the authority of school officials to regulate expression, and truly turns the famous ‘schoolhouse 
gate’ quote on its head — school regulations do not stop at the schoolhouse gate; they follow you 
home!”25 Under the Second Circuit’s Doninger decision, a student’s off-campus online speech 
could “only be regulated when the student knew or should have known that the conduct would 
reach school grounds.”26 Kloster says each of these approaches is problematic, but those 
problems could be eradicated if three things fall into place: 1) the Supreme Court establishes 
“[b]right lines,” 2) school policies are written to establish “explicit First Amendment 
guarantees,” and 3) school officials undergo “a change in culture.”27 
 Aaron Hersh also believes that courts should apply Tinker when examining efforts by 
school officials to punish students for their off-campus online speech, identifying “three 
conceptual categories on which courts should rely: (1) expression meant to bully and harass 
students; (2) expression meant to protest school policy; and (3) expression meant to mock school 
                                                
21 Id. 
22 D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011). 
23 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
24 See Kloster, supra note 17, at 622. 
25 Id. at 621. 
26 Id. at 622. 
27 Id. at 633. 
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officials.”28 Administrators have “wide latitude in regulating student conduct” but “do not enjoy 
unbridled discretion in regulating students’ expression inside or outside of the school 
environment.”29 Hersh notes, however, that the “line dividing appropriate regulation on the one 
hand and impermissible interference with students’ free expression rights on the other is 
ambiguous, leaving school administrators with little guidance.”30 The Internet provides students 
with “access to the marketplace of ideas,” he writes, but he notes that some students use the 
Internet “to express themselves for less than transcendent or virtuous purposes.”31 Hence, the 
student speech cases dealt with in this study. Hersh calls the Second Circuit’s Doninger decision 
“misguided” but looks with approval on the Fourth Circuit’s Kowalski decision because it picked 
up on Tinker’s second, often-overlooked standard for when student speech can be punished at 
school: when it infringes on the rights of others.32 Yet, he, too, calls out the various circuit 
decisions for their lack of agreement, which contributes to a chilling effect on students. That 
chilling effect, in turn, has consequences for democratic society. 
[M]any students may choose not to express themselves for fear of 
punishment or may limit the content of their expression in ways that alter 
its meaning. Surely, some “low value” expression will be chilled, but there 
remains a significant risk that students will avoid expressing views on 
political, religious, social, artistic, or community issues — expression that 
is central to the First Amendment’s free expression provisions. Such a 
chilling effect undermines students’ ability to participate in the 
marketplace of ideas — which is an essential element of the public school 
system — and it also threatens to retard the development of students’ 
political and social engagement. This chilling effect thus directly harms 
not only the students who seek to express their opinions, ideas, and 
                                                
28 Aaron J. Hersh, Note: Rehabilitating Tinker: A Modest Proposal to Protect Public-School 
Students’ First Amendment Free Expression Rights in the Digital Age, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1309, 
1314 (2013). 
29 Id. at 1314-15. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1317. 
32 Id. at 1327, 1332. 
 82 
beliefs, but it also undermines the very principles the First Amendment is 
meant to protect.33 
 
 Hersh would give the most leeway to school officials and courts to punish student speech 
that is aimed at bullying another student, but he would require speech aimed at school officials or 
school policy to cause a substantial disruption before it could be punished. Speech aimed at 
school policy would receive the highest protection “because such expression is ‘at the core of 
what the First Amendment is designed to protect.’”34 School officials who find themselves the 
target of student speech, even immature, vulgar speech, should be limited in being able to punish 
students for such speech because students are “relatively powerless.”35 And he, too, notes that 
off-campus online student speech that is “actively pernicious” is subject to the same rules that 
other such speech is when created by an adult: libel laws, fighting words, incitement and true 
threat doctrines and laws.36 
Threats 
 True threats would be one of two categories of students’ off-campus online speech that 
Christopher Edmunds would make subject to school authority.37 The other would be speech that 
causes a substantial disruption at school. Edmunds takes apart the Fifth Circuit majority’s 
analysis in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board38 because he identifies four problems with it. 
The two most pertinent to this discussion are: 1) that the court “sidestepped the ‘true threat’ 
framework and inexplicably supplanted the longstanding ‘substantial disruption’ test with a 
                                                
33 Id. at 1333-34. 
34 Id. at 1348. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Christopher F. Edmunds, Recent Development: The “Tinker-Bell” Framework: The Fifth 
Circuit Places Facebook Inside the Schoolhouse Gate in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, 
90 TUL. L. REV. 1017 (2016). 
38 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Circ. 2015) (en banc). 
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vague, new ‘threatening, harassing, and intimidating” test that lacks any basis in precedent,” and 
2) “failed to balance the social value of Bell’s speech against the interests of the school.”39 Bell 
wrote a rap song to draw attention to allegations that two coaches at his school were sexually 
harassing girls. As many rappers do, he used violent imagery in his lyrics, including references to 
gun violence and telling the coaches that they should watch their backs. Edmunds notes that rap 
music “is often a form of ‘political expression’ and a ‘genre in which hyperbolic and violent 
language is commonly used in order to convey emotion and meaning — not to make real threats 
of violence.”40 
 Edmunds singles out a dissent in Bell, written by Judge Graves. Graves said Tinker 
should not apply to off-campus speech and came up with a two-part test, which he called the 
“Tinker-Bell” standard, “whereby, in addition to the ‘substantial disruption’ test, a school must 
‘demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the speech and the school’s pedagogical interests.’”41 
Edmunds recommends combining Graves’ Tinker-Bell test with a true-threat analysis as a “more 
useful vehicle for determining whether to allow schools to regulate purely off-campus speech.”42 
 Katherine Geddes also takes issue with the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Bell. She argues that 
the majority opinion in the en banc rehearing created “a broad and vague exception” with its 
“threatening, harassing, or intimidating” category of speech.43 She notes that the court began its 
analysis from the point of view of the school rather than the student, “set[ting] itself up to 
improperly apply Tinker to Bell’s speech.”44  
                                                
39 Edmunds, supra note 37, at 1026. 
40 Id. at 1029. 
41 Id. at 1025-26. 
42 Id. at 1030. 
43 Geddes, supra note 5, at 280. 
44 Id. at 279. 
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And although the majority follows some sister circuits by applying Tinker 
to Bell’s rap song, Tinker’s historical context suggests that the case was 
not meant to apply to off-campus online speech. Instead, “Tinker’s holding 
is expressly grounded in the ‘characteristics of the school environment,’” 
which is notably absent in Bell’s case. Thus, it is inappropriate to apply 
Tinker to speech that inherently lacks those special educational qualities.45 
 
Geddes notes that just because a speaker is a student does not mean that Tinker must apply to 
that speaker’s off-campus online speech; however, given the lack of guidance from the Supreme 
Court, she foresees that Tinker will continue to be misapplied to off-campus student speech 
simply because it takes place online.46 
 Aleah Jones also believes that Tinker should not apply to off-campus student speech, but 
the ambiguity arising from the Supreme Court’s silence on the issue “has allowed public schools 
to use the ‘material and substantial interference’ rule as a justification to invade their students’ 
privacy and punish them for speech originating off-campus.”47 It is clear from Jones’ article that 
she is a First Amendment absolutist, disagreeing as she does with all of the Supreme Court 
precedent following its 1969 Tinker ruling: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,48 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,49 and Morse v. Frederick.50 
What is most concerning about these decisions is their passing 
consideration of the actual or projected impact of the speech at the school, 
instead focusing on the Court’s subjective perception of the speech. What 
is shocking, offensive, or indecorous to courts may very likely be 
commonplace to high-school students, and what is commonplace is less 
likely to disrupt the school environment. Because judges and justices are 
far closer in age to the administrators, courts have tended to interpret 
speech similarly to teachers and administrators. However, since Tinker 
hinges on student reactions, Tinker requires that student perceptions be 
                                                
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 280. 
47 Aleah Jones, Schools, Speech, and Smartphones: Online Speech and the Evolution of the 
Tinker Standard, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 155 (2017). 
48 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
49 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 U.S. 560 (1988). 
50 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
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considered. … The above cases have therefore twisted Tinker into a 
license to punish speech that is not materially disruptive, but merely 
offensive to judicial and administrative sensibilities.51 
 
Jones takes issue with the various appellate circuits’ handling of student speech cases: Doninger, 
Kowalski, and Bell. Even in an incident of cyberbullying, Jones would require schools to take a 
hands-off approach, asking readers to imagine if the school tried to punish a student for bullying 
that took place in person somewhere off school grounds: “Allowing the school such power 
would be to give the school the right to reach into the private lives of their students. … After all, 
in this hypothetical circumstance, the bully was acting outside her capacity as a student.”52 Off-
campus online speech that crosses a line can be punished in other ways, by other means, whether 
civil or criminal. The Fourth Circuit’s Kowalski ruling, with its “sufficient nexus” test of finding 
a connection between the off-campus online speech and a school’s pedagogical interests, “once 
again allows Tinker to apply wherever it can punish.”53 The Fifth Circuit, in its Bell decision, 
“apparently believed that public-school attendees are always acting in the capacity of students 
whenever they create any speech that might be related to school, the students or faculty, or their 
feeling about the institution itself.”54 
When a child enrolled in public school returns home for the day, are they 
still a “student”? If not, their speech can hardly be termed “student 
speech.” It is true that the school day takes up much of a student’s time, 
and is where the majority of their relationships are formed (though the 
online world has even changed this; students can form close relationships 
with people they may never meet in person). However, the school’s 
influence surely must end somewhere. It would be unheard of for a school 
to punish a student for not following a school dress code when that student 
was at home on a Saturday. Digital verbal speech, however, has been 
                                                
51 Jones, supra note 47, at 159. 
52 Id. at 162. 
53 Id. at 162. 
54 Id. at 165. 
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judged in Bell and the like cases as something over which a public school 
should have broader control.55 
 
Proposals to Modify Tinker’s Standard 
 Katherine Landfried zeroes in on both Bell’s speech and the topic of his speech in 
arguing that courts should be applying a two-part threshold test that modifies Tinker’s disruption 
requirement because Tinker does not address technological changes in the age of the Internet.56 
The majority in Bell argue that student on-line speech is still subject to 
Tinker, as this off-campus speech can still make its way to campus and 
cause a disruption. However, Tinker and subsequent case law make a 
distinction that not all speech is immunized by a Constitutional guarantee 
of free speech while at school To expand this reduced level of freedom to 
online activity outside the school essentially eliminates First Amendment 
rights indefinitely for students until high school commencement. This 
blasé trampling of First Amendment rights of students is not what was 
intended by the framers or by the established case law.57 
 
Landfried concedes that when school officials are confronted with what they believe to 
be an actual threat, they must be able to act quickly, but she calls for a “bright line” demarcation 
as to when Tinker applies and would limit it to “geographically on-campus speech or at school-
sponsored events” so that it would follow the Supreme Court’s original Tinker intent.58 She 
proposes a two-part modified Tinker standard for courts to apply to restore stronger First 
Amendment freedom to students when they are off-campus and online.59 She says that her 
standard “provides more opportunity for a student to freely express themselves without being 
susceptible to school authority twenty-four hours a day.”60 
                                                
55 Id. 
56 Katherine D. Landfried, Note: Bell v. Itawamba County School Board: The Need for a Balance 
of Freedom and Authority, 36 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 193 (2017). 
57 Id. at 209. 
58 Id. at 202-3 and 209-10. 
59 Id. at 209-10. 
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First, the off-campus online speech would have to cause an actual, substantial disruption 
at school or pose or threaten a risk to school security.61 Then, if that threshold is cleared, the 
second part would require courts to look at the “subjective intent of the speaker,” which 
Landfried calls “vital” to protect students who are disseminating speech on matters of public 
concern, politics or religion, particularly when their “political speech is directed against the very 
individuals who seek to suppress that speech.”62 Applying her modified standard, she writes, 
would mean that the Itawamba school board would fail on both parts because Bell’s speech did 
not cause an actual disruption at school or carry an actual threat and it was on a matter of public 
concern.63 
 Another scholar, Margaret Malloy, would create a standard that modifies a test laid out in 
Fifth Circuit Judge Jolly’s concurring opinion in Bell, limiting school interference in off-campus 
online student speech to speech that makes a threat.64 Such a rule “would find school authority 
only where an actual threat of harm related to the school community is communicated to the 
community.”65 She proposes a standard built around an “actual threat,” rather than a “true 
threat.” This would keep the matter in the school’s disciplinary system rather than kicking it into 
the criminal justice system. Judge Jolly’s proposed test would allow punishment of speech that 
“conveys a threat against school staff or students, where that threat is ‘connected to the school 
environment,’ and where the threat is communicated to the school or its community members.”66  
However, she notes that the judge’s test would have to be “refined” to clarify and define “actual 
                                                
61 Id. at 210-11. 
62 Id. at 212-13. 
63 Id. at 213-15. 
64 Margaret Malloy, Note: Bell v. Itawamba County School Board: Testing the Limits of First 
Amendment Protection of Off-Campus Student Speech, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1251 (2016). 
65 Id. at 1253. 
66 Id. at 1261. 
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threat.”67 She would like to see it as a civil tort built around a “reasonable person” standard, 
allowing the school administrator to stand as the reasonable person.68 The second and third 
prongs of Judge Jolly’s test incorporate the “sufficient nexus” threshold test used by other 
courts.69 
Because the Jolly test only addresses threatening speech, it presumes that 
all other off-campus speech is protected. Yet it does not foreclose the 
Court from adopting a similar standard in other compelling circumstances 
— such as, perhaps, cyber-bullying. With this narrow exception, if off-
campus speech caused a disruption on campus, that off-campus speech 
would remain protected. The school could choose to punish disruptive in-
school behavior, but not protected off-campus speech.70 
 
 Finally, Allison Martin outlines an intriguing proposal that would see the Supreme Court 
declare cyberspace to be an independent location. Then, speech that takes place there could be 
regulated accordingly, without the need to determine whether it is governed by case law that is 
based on where it originated or where it was read71: “The creation of cyberspace as an 
independent location would allow traditional free speech precedent to peacefully co-exist with a 
new framework for online speech.”72 Under such a proposal, courts would not need to “weigh 
factors such as where the speech was originally created, where it was later accessed, and how 
and when it ever permeated school grounds.”73 Such a proposal would neatly sidestep issues with 
simultaneity. 
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She also would have schools and courts rely on established true threat doctrine, as true 
threats fall outside First Amendment protection.74 Finally, she would limit school officials’ 
ability to punish off-campus online student speech when it is aimed at an adult, unless it 
threatens violence or rises to a “reasonable foreseeability” of substantial disruption. She would, 
instead, remind faculty and staff that they can “pursue legal action for relief through the courts, 
under causes of action such as defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.”75 
Need for Supreme Court Ruling is Clear 
As evidenced by the various schools of thought in these articles, just a few of the 
hundreds that showed up in a search of a legal database when searching for Tinker and online 
speech, legal analysis of and opinions on whether and how off-campus online student speech 
should be subject to school authority are all over the place, but every scholar is able to make a 
solid case for his or her proposals. And so, this chapter ends where it began, with calls for the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari to a student speech case that involves online speech created off 
campus that somehow makes its way onto school grounds. Federal district and appellate courts 
are in serious need of guidance in what standards to apply to such cases. School administrators 
are also in need of guidance (and limits) on what they can do about student speech that originates 
off campus on social media or websites. Most of all, students need to know just what might get 
them in hot water at school so they can make informed decisions about whether to complain 
about school on Twitter or Snapchat with their friends about their homeroom teacher or 
principal. As it stands right now, they have no assurance that their online speech will be 
protected by the First Amendment if it runs afoul of a school official.   
                                                
74 Id. at 794. 
75 Id. at 795. 
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CHAPTER 7 
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF SCHOOLS IN A DEMOCRACY? 
In Loco Parentis 
 Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas thinks the Court’s Tinker ruling that says 
students and teachers do not shed their rights “at the schoolhouse gate” has no basis in the 
Constitution,1 and that’s partly because it weakened the idea of schools standing in loco parentis 
while children are at school. Thomas sees the Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse rulings as steps 
toward restoring order in the schools, limiting as they do the strong statement of constitutional 
rights for students and teachers that Tinker gave.2 Thomas urges the Court to return to the 
doctrine of in loco parentis, which means “in the place of a parent.”3 In his concurring opinion in 
Morse, Thomas sets out a history of the doctrine as it had applied to schools since colonial days: 
“Through the legal doctrine of in loco parentis, courts upheld the right of schools to discipline 
students, to enforce rules, and to maintain order.”4 Thomas notes that the doctrine was enshrined 
as part of American law through the Kent Commentaries on American Law5 in the early 19th 
century, which said, “So the power allowed by law to the parent over the person of the child may 
be delegated to a tutor or instructor, the better to accomplish the purpose of education.”6 The 
doctrine was, however, “rooted in the English common law.”7 Thomas runs through a history of 
                                                
1 See Thomas’ concurring opinion in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 at 410 (2007).  
2 See Thomas’ Morse concurrence, supra note 1. See Thomas’ opinion, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, in Safford Unified School Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 at 382 (2009).  
3 MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW 247 (1996). 
4 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
5 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, *205, *206-*207, cited in Thomas’ 
concurrence, supra note 5, at 413. 
6 Id. 
7 Morse, supra note 5 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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case law at the state level in the 1800s and early 1900s. One example from an 1837 North 
Carolina Supreme Court ruling:  
One of the most sacred duties of parents, is to train up and qualify their 
children, for becoming useful and virtuous members of society; this duty 
cannot be effectually performed without the ability to command 
obedience, to control stubbornness, to quicken diligence, and to reform 
bad habits. … The teacher is the substitute of the parent; … and in the 
exercise of these delegated duties, is invested with his power.8 
 
 Thomas states that “in loco parentis allowed schools to regulate student speech as well. 
Courts routinely preserved the rights of teachers to punish speech that the school or the teacher 
thought was contrary to the interests of the school and its educational goals.”9 He specifically 
points out a California Court of Appeal case from 1915 in which the court upheld a student’s 
punishment for giving a speech in front of the student body that criticized the safety of the school 
building. The court found that the speech “was intended to discredit and humiliate the board in 
the eyes of the students, and tended to impair the discipline of the school.”10 In fact, Thomas 
points out, “The doctrine of in loco parentis limited the ability of schools to set rules and control 
their classrooms in almost no way. It merely limited the imposition of excessive physical 
punishment.”11 Tinker, however, “effected a sea change in students’ speech rights, extending 
them well beyond traditional bounds.”12 
 Thomas believes Tinker “conflicted with the traditional understanding of the judiciary’s 
role in relation to public schooling, a role limited by in loco parentis.”13 He writes: “Perhaps for 
that reason, the Court has since scaled back Tinker’s standard, or rather set the standard aside on 
                                                
8 State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 365-366 (1837). Cited in Thomas’ Morse concurrence, supra 
note 5, at 413-14. 
9 Morse, supra note 5, at 414 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
10 Morse, supra note 5, at 414 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
11 Morse, supra note 5, at 416 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
12 Id. 
13 Morse, supra note 5, at 417 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
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an ad hoc basis.”14 He then runs through how Fraser and Hazelwood limited Tinker’s 
constitutional protections.15 That brings him to Morse. 
Today, the Court creates another exception. In doing so, we continue to 
distance ourselves from Tinker, but we neither overrule it nor offer an 
explanation of when it operates and when it does not. [Citation omitted] I 
am afraid that our jurisprudence now says that students have a right to 
speak in schools except when they don’t — a standard continuously 
developed through litigation against local schools and their administrators. 
In my view, petitioners could prevail for a much simpler reason: As 
originally understood, the Constitution does not afford students a right to 
free speech in public schools. 
     In light of the history of American public education, it cannot seriously 
be suggested that the First Amendment “freedom of speech” encompasses 
a student’s right to speak in public schools. Early public schools gave total 
control to teachers, who expected obedience and respect from students. 
And courts routinely deferred to schools’ authority to make rules and to 
discipline students for violating those rules.16 
 
He points out three elements regarding in loco parentis and student speech: (1) all school rules, 
including those governing student speech, were treated equally; (2) in loco parentis “imposed 
almost no limits on the types of rules that a school could set while students were in school”; and 
(3) “schools and teachers had tremendous discretion in imposing punishments for violations of 
those rules.”17 
 He then rather unrealistically states that parents have the freedom to choose whether to 
send their children to public schools or private schools or to home school them. “Whatever rules 
apply to student speech in public schools, those rules can be challenged by parents in the 
political process,” he writes.18 In addition, if parents do not like the way a public school is run 
                                                
14 Id. 
15 Morse, supra note 5, at 417-18 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
16 Morse, supra note 5, at 419 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
17 Id. 
18 Morse, supra note 5, at 420 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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and they cannot persuade the school board to change its policies, they can “simply move.”19 This 
view reflects a disconnect from the economic reality that most parents’ “choice” of where to live 
is based on where they have jobs, that those jobs may or may not carry enough pay to cover the 
cost of private school tuition, that having those jobs would preclude parents from home 
schooling their children, and that they could not move to some other school district because of 
those jobs. In reality, only the most well-off parents have the choice of where to send their 
children for schooling. 
 Thomas’ criticism is summed up in this paragraph: 
Tinker substituted judicial oversight of the day-to-day affairs of public 
schools. The Tinker Court made little attempt to ground its holding in the 
history of education or in the original understanding of the First 
Amendment. Instead, it imposed a new and malleable standard: Schools 
could not inhibit student speech unless it “substantially interfere[d] with 
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.” 
[Citation omitted] Inherent in the application of that standard are judgment 
calls about what constitutes interference and what constitutes appropriate 
discipline. [Citation omitted] Historically, courts reasoned that only local 
school districts were entitled to make those calls. The Tinker Court 
usurped that traditional authority for the judiciary.20 
 
Thomas ends by pointing out that he joins the majority opinion in Morse “because it erodes 
Tinker’s hold in the realm of student speech, even though it does so by adding to the patchwork 
of exceptions to the Tinker standard. I think the better approach is to dispense with Tinker 
altogether, and given the opportunity, I would do so.”21 
 In the later Supreme Court decision in Safford Unified School Dist. #1 v. Redding, 
Thomas writes a separate opinion that concurs in part and dissents in part.22 Safford involved a 
                                                
19 Morse, supra note 5, at 419-20 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
20 Morse, supra note 5, at 420-21 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
21 Morse, supra note 5, at 422 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
22 Safford Unified School Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 at 382 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
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claim by a student’s mother that the strip search of her 13-year-old daughter, Savanna Redding, 
carried out because she was suspected of having concealed drugs in her undergarments, violated 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable search. The Court held that the search 
was unjustified. Thomas’ concurrence was with the granting of qualified immunity to the school 
officials to spare them from a monetary judgment for conducting the unjustified strip search. He 
dissented because of his belief that the strip search was justified and reasonable. Here, he cites 
his Morse concurrence in the opening paragraph of his Safford opinion: 
The majority imposes a vague and amorphous standard on school 
administrators. It also grants judges sweeping authority to second-guess 
the measures that these officials take to maintain discipline in their schools 
and ensure the health and safety of the students in their charge. This deep 
intrusion into the administration of public schools exemplifies why the 
Court should return to the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis under 
which “the judiciary was reluctant to interfere in the routine business of 
school administration, allowing schools and teachers to set and enforce 
rules and to maintain order.” [Citation omitted]23 
 
Thomas writes that the search was reasonable because “school officials searched where 
the pills could have been hidden.”24 Later, he warns: “Redding would not have been the first 
person to conceal pills in her undergarments. … Nor will she be the last after today’s decision, 
which announces the safest place to secrete contraband in school.”25 Thomas repeats his belief 
that decisions relating to discipline and safety should be left up to local school authorities 
because “[j]udges are not qualified to second-guess the best manner for maintaining quiet and 
order in the school environment,”26 adding that judges are wrong “to assume the responsibility 
for deciding which school rules are important enough to allow for invasive searches and which 
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24 Id. at 387. 
25 Id. at 390. 
26 Id. at 393. 
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rules are not.”27 He later returns to the idea of restoring the in loco parentis doctrine — “the 
common-law view that parents delegate to teachers their authority to discipline and maintain 
order” and states that if it “were to be applied in this case, the search of Redding would stand. 
There can be no doubt that a parent would have the authority to conduct the search at issue in 
this case.”28 He adds that the Court has held that a parent can “authorize a third-party search of a 
child by consenting to such a search, even if the child denies his consent.”29 It seems that 
children, in this view, have no right to control what happens to their bodies, no matter how 
invasive. 
Thomas couches his belief that in loco parentis should be restored in the language of 
denying judicial overreach and restoring local control: 
In the end, the task of implementing and amending public school policies 
is beyond this Court’s function. Parents, teachers, school administrators, 
local politicians, and state officials are all better suited than judges to 
determine the appropriate limits on searches conducted by school officials. 
Preservation of order, discipline, and safety in public schools is simply not 
the domain of the Constitution. And, common sense is not a judicial 
monopoly or a constitutional imperative.30 
This sounds perfectly reasonable if divorced from knowledge of the facts at hand. If Thomas 
would allow the strip search of a 13-year-old girl by an assistant principal and a school nurse on 
the grounds of its being an issue of local control, one can only imagine what he would allow 
schools to do to students who speak up in ways school authorities do not agree with. 
 Thomas himself admits that returning to the in loco parentis standards of the 1800s 
“would find little support today.”31 To return to his Morse concurrence:  
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29 Id. at 400. 
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31 Morse, supra note 5, at 419. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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To be sure, our educational system faces administrative and pedagogical 
challenges different from those faced by 19th-century schools today. And 
the idea of treating children as though it were still the 19th century would 
find little support today. But I see no constitutional imperative requiring 
public schools to allow all student speech.32 
 
Thomas a Lone Voice 
Fortunately, it does not seem that Thomas’ fellow Supreme Court justices give much 
weight to the idea of restoring in loco parentis as a doctrine for public schools in the 21st 
century. Though a search for cases involving this idea was not as extensive as searches for this 
study specifically regarding student speech, Thomas appears to be the only Supreme Court 
justice now on the bench who espouses the idea. In Morse, for example, Chief Justice John 
Roberts’ majority opinion and Justice Samuel Alito’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, predicate the Court’s ruling against the student on the basis of protecting 
students in the school (or school-sponsored) environment from speech advocating drug use.33 
And even Justice John Paul Stevens’ dissent, joined by Justice David Souter and Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, agreed with the majority’s belief that the principal should not be held liable for 
infringing Frederick’s speech by making him take down his banner; the dissent took issue with 
whether the “nonsense” banner was promoting drug use.34 
 Alito’s concurrence in Morse takes issue specifically with the idea of restoring in loco 
parentis, calling it a “dangerous fiction” and noting that most parents have no choice of where 
their children go to school.35 He states that the majority opinion “correctly reaffirms” Tinker’s 
                                                
32 Id. 
33 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 
(2007) (Alito, J., Kennedy, J., concurring). 
34 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 444 (2007) (Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
35 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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“fundamental principle that students do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech 
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’”36  
The public schools are invaluable and beneficent institutions, but they are, 
after all, organs of the State. When public school authorities regulate 
student speech, they act as agents of the State; they do not stand in the 
shoes of the students’ parents. It is a dangerous fiction to pretend that 
parents simply delegate their authority — including their authority to 
determine what their children may say and hear — to public school 
authorities. It is even more dangerous to assume that such a delegation of 
authority somehow strips public school authorities of their status as agents 
of the State. Most parents, realistically, have no choice but to send their 
children to a public school and little ability to influence what occurs in the 
school. It is therefore wrong to treat public school officials, for purposes 
relevant to the First Amendment, as if they were private, nongovernmental 
actors standing in loco parentis.37 
 
Inculcating Democratic Values 
 Indeed, much of the Court’s rhetoric in student speech cases about the role of public 
schools revolves around the responsibility that schools have for teaching students about 
democracy and their role as citizens in their own governance. In its Fraser opinion, for example, 
the Court cites two historians, who stated that public education “must prepare pupils for 
citizenship in the Republic” and “inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in 
themselves.”38  
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not 
confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach 
by example the shared values of a civilized social order. Consciously or 
otherwise, teachers — and indeed the older students — demonstrate the 
appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their 
conduct and deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, like parents, they 
are role models.39 
 
                                                
36 Id. at 422. 
37 Id. at 424. 
38 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986), citing Beard and Beard, New Basic 
History of the United States 228 (1968). 
39 Id. at 683. 
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However, while they may serve as role models, schoolteachers and administrators are 
also agents of the state. In its 1985 ruling in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court upheld a school 
search of a student’s purse and said that school officials do not have to meet the same standards 
as need to be met for search warrants of adults. At the same time, however, the Court also tried 
to “strike the balance between the schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the 
school’s equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place.”40 
Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco parentis in their 
dealings with students: their authority is that of the parent, not the State, 
and is therefore not subject to the limits of the Fourth Amendment. … 
Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings 
of the Court. We have held school officials subject to the commands of the 
First Amendment … and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. … If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is 
difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising 
parental rather than public authority when conducting searches of their 
students. [citations omitted]41 
 
Going further back, to the first case covered in Chapter 5, West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette,42 the Court noted that school boards must perform their duties within the 
confines of the Bill of Rights: “That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for 
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the 
free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as 
mere platitudes.”43 
In a dissent to the Hazelwood opinion, Justice William J. Brennan Jr., joined by Justice 
Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry Blackmun, said public schools serve “vital national 
interests” in the role they play in students’ lives: “The public school conveys to our young the 
                                                
40 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). 
41 Id. at 336. 
42 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
43 Id. at 637. 
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information and tools required not merely to survive in, but to contribute to, civilized society.”44 
He notes that the Court has given schools control over their day-to-day operations and decisions 
but has not “hesitated to intervene where their decisions run afoul of the Constitution.”45 He 
rejects the majority’s rejection of Tinker in the case of the principal who censored the student 
newspaper that “conveys a moral position at odds with the school’s official stance [that] might 
subvert the administration’s legitimate inculcation of its own perception of community values.”46 
He sounds a warning that borrows from Barnette: “If mere incompatibility with the school’s 
pedagogical message were a constitutionally sufficient justification for the suppression of student 
speech, school officials could censor … the students or student organizations … converting our 
public schools into ‘enclaves of totalitarianism’ that ‘strangle the free mind at its source.’”47 
Giving Students a Voice 
Finally, to return to the source of Thomas’ consternation and other justices’ conviction, 
the Tinker opinion states that part of the reason students attend school is for “personal 
intercommunication” with other students, which in itself is “an important part of the educational 
process.”48 Thus, one duty of public schools is to provide opportunities for the exchange of ideas. 
And, as long as that communication does not disrupt the school environment or infringe of the 
rights of other students, that exchange of ideas can take place anywhere on school grounds: in 
the classroom, on the playing field or in the school cafeteria.49 The school cannot limit where 
                                                
44 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) (Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, JJ, dissenting). 
45 Id. at 278-79. 
46 Id. at 280. 
47 Id. 
48 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969). 
49 Id. at 512-13. 
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students may speak: “Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised 
only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots.”50 
To let Tinker have the last word in this discussion: 
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over 
their students. Students in school as well as out of school are “persons” 
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which 
the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their 
obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be regarded as 
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to 
communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of those 
sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a specific 
showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students 
are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.51 
 
 
 
                                                
50 Id. at 513. 
51 Id. at 511. 
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CHAPTER 8 
APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS ON ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH 
Six U.S. Courts of Appeal circuits have heard and ruled on online speech cases involving 
students who created the speech when they were not on school grounds. As things stand now, 
how such speech is handled varies greatly (or slightly) from state to state, district to district, and 
circuit to circuit. And yet, the Supreme Court has not yet agreed to hear an online student speech 
case. As noted in Chapter 6, absent such Supreme Court guidance, and given lower courts’ 
reliance on applying the Tinker standard, with its heavy emphasis on the individual facts of a 
case, students and school administrators do not know from one case to the next whether the 
speech will receive First Amendment protection or not. This chapter summarizes the most recent 
U.S. circuit court cases involving off-campus online student speech. To date, six circuits — the 
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth — have ruled on a total of nine online student 
speech cases. All involve First Amendment issues because they are all based in speech. Five 
involve student expression, while three involve threatening speech.1 One, from the Fourth 
Circuit, involves cyberbullying, and even though student-on-student cyberbullying was generally 
excluded from this study to limit its scope, the case is included here to offer as complete a 
picture of online student speech rulings at the appellate level as possible at the time of writing, 
but also because it is referenced so frequently in other court opinions. The cases are presented in 
chronological order within the circuit in which they were decided. Brief summaries of concurring 
and dissenting opinions are included within each case summary. 
                                                
1 Although the Fifth Circuit found that Taylor Bell’s rap lyrics in Bell v. Itawamba were 
threatening, Bell has been included in the student expression category in this tally. 
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The First, Sixth, Seventh, 10th, 11th, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts have not 
heard any appeals involving off-campus online student speech as of this writing. As noted in 
Chapter 1, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals does not hear these types of cases. 
Second Circuit 
Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School District2 
July 2007 
Aaron Wisniewski was an eighth-grade student at Weedsport Middle School in upstate 
New York in April 2001 when he used a drawing of a person’s head being shot by a gun with 
dots to represent blood spray above it and the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen” below it as his 
icon on AOL Instant Messaging software on his parents’ computer.3 He used this icon for 
approximately three weeks. At some point, a classmate learned of the icon and told the teacher, 
Mr. VanderMolen, about it and later gave him a printed copy. VanderMolen forwarded it to the 
principals at the middle school and high school. They contacted the local police, the school 
superintendent and Aaron’s parents. Aaron admitted he had created the drawing and “expressed 
regret” when questioned by the principals.4 He was suspended for five days but was allowed to 
return, pending a superintendent’s hearing. Mr. VanderMolen asked to stop teaching Aaron’s 
class, and this request was granted.5  
Meanwhile a police investigation was undertaken. The police concluded that Aaron 
meant the icon as a joke and posed no real threat to Mr. VanderMolen. A psychologist also 
                                                
2 Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School District, 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 
2007). 
3 Id. at 35-36. 
4 Id. at 36. 
5 Id.  
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evaluated Aaron and came to the same conclusion as the police. No criminal charges were filed.6 
At the superintendent’s hearing in May, the designated hearing officer charged Aaron under a 
New York education law with “endangering the health and welfare of other students and staff at 
school.”7 In June, the hearing officer found that the icon “was threatening and should not have 
been understood as a joke,” and although its use took place outside school, she concluded that it 
“had disrupted school operations by requiring special attention from school officials, 
replacement of the threatened teacher, and interviewing pupils during class time.”8 She 
recommended that Aaron be suspended for one semester to be served in an alternative school. 
The school board approved the suspension, which Aaron served in fall 2001, and then he 
returned to the school.9 His parents filed suit a year later, alleging, among other things, that 
Aaron’s icon was not a true threat and was protected speech. The district court found that the 
icon was a true threat and thus outside First Amendment protection.10 
The Second Circuit panel decided that the icon did not need to be measured against the 
standard set in Watts v. United States11 because “we think that school officials have significantly 
broader authority to sanction student speech than the Watts standard allows.”12 The court said 
that Tinker was the appropriate First Amendment standard to gauge “school officials’ authority 
                                                
6 Id. 
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 37. 
10 Id. 
11 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), which involved a young man charged with 
making a threat against the president of the United States at a public rally opposing the Vietnam 
War in Washington, D.C. The Supreme Court ruled that Watts’ speech was political hyperbole, 
not a true threat. 
12 Id. at 38. 
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to discipline a student’s expression reasonably understood as urging violent conduct.”13  Judge 
Jon O. Newman wrote for the court:  
Even if Aaron’s transmission of an icon depicting and calling for the 
killing of his teacher could be viewed as an expression of opinion within 
the meaning of Tinker, we conclude that it crosses the boundary of 
protected speech and constitutes student conduct that poses a reasonably 
foreseeable risk that the icon would come up to the attention of school 
authorities and that it would “materially and substantially disrupt the work 
and discipline of the school.” For such conduct, Tinker affords no 
protection against school discipline.14 
 
 In affirming the district court’s decision, the Second Circuit said it was “reasonably 
foreseeable” that the icon would reach the attention of school officials and that, once it did, it 
would cause a substantial disruption at school. “These consequences permit school discipline, 
whether or not Aaron intended his IM icon to be communicated to school authorities or, if 
communicated, to cause a substantial disruption.”15 Aaron’s parents appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.16 
Doninger v. Niehoff 
April 2011 
 The Second Circuit ruled in Doninger v. Niehoff 17 that school officials had qualified 
immunity for their decision to bar student Avery Doninger from running for class secretary after 
she posted a blog entry on LiveJournal.com, complaining about something going on at school. 
Doninger was a junior at Lewis Mills High School in Burlington, Connecticut, when she posted a 
blog entry that erroneously stated that Jamfest, a battle of the bands competition at school, had 
been canceled “due to douchebags in central office” and asked people to write or call the 
                                                
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 38-9. 
15 Id. 
16 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 552 U.S. 1296 (2008). 
17 Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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superintendent and “piss her off more.”18 The competition was postponed, rather than canceled, 
because the faculty member who was going to run the sound board could not attend on the night 
it was originally scheduled. 
 The school principal and superintendent did not learn of the blog post until early May. 
Avery was not suspended from school but was barred from running for senior class secretary 
because the principal, Karissa Niehoff, thought that her conduct in writing the blog in the middle 
of a dispute “failed to demonstrate good citizenship, which was significant because Doninger 
was ‘acting as a class officer at the time that she created the blog,’ … and because it violated the 
principles governing student officers set out in the student handbook that Doninger had 
signed.”19 Avery’s name was kept off the ballot for class secretary, and she was barred from 
speaking at a school assembly at which candidates were to give speeches.20 Although the Second 
Circuit’s ruling focused on the issue of qualified immunity for the school officials, in granting 
that qualified immunity, it noted that Doninger’s First Amendment right to run for class office 
was not a clearly established right. 
We do not reach the question whether school officials violated Doninger’s 
First Amendment rights by preventing her from running for Senior Class 
Secretary. We see no need to decide this question. We agree with the 
district court that any First Amendment right allegedly violated here was 
not clearly established.21 
 
Additionally, the court noted that Avery’s punishment was limited to not being allowed 
to run for class office. Given that her role as class secretary was to keep lines of communication 
open between students and the administration, “it was not unreasonable for Niehoff to conclude 
                                                
18 Id. at 340. 
 
19 Id. at 342. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 346. 
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that Doninger, by posting an incendiary blog post in the midst of an ongoing school controversy, 
had demonstrated her unwillingness properly to carry out this role.”22   
To be clear, we do not conclude in any way that school administrators are 
immune from First Amendment scrutiny when they react to student speech 
by limiting students’ participation in extracurricular activities. Here, 
however, pursuant to Tinker and its progeny, it was objectively reasonable 
for school officials to conclude that Doninger’s behavior was potentially 
disruptive of student government functions (such as the organization of 
Jamfest) and that Doninger was not free to engage in such behavior while 
serving as a class representative — a representative charged with working 
with these very same school officials to carry out her responsibilities.23 
 
Doninger’s petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari was denied on October 31, 
2011.24 
Third Circuit 
J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District25 
June 2011 
 J.S. was an eighth-grader at Blue Mountain Middle School in 2007 when she and a 
friend, identified only as K.L., created a fake MySpace profile of principal James McGonigle on 
her parents’ computer at her home.26 They did not use McGonigle’s real name but did use his 
photograph from the school’s website.27 Judge Chagares, who wrote the majority opinion for the 
en banc Third Circuit, described the profile “as a self-portrayal of a bisexual Alabama middle 
school principal named ‘M-Hoe.’ The profile contained crude content and vulgar language, 
ranging from nonsense and juvenile humor to profanity and shameful personal attacks aimed at 
                                                
22 Id. at 350-51. 
23 Id. 
24 Doninger v. Niehoff, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
25 J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
26 Id. at 920. 
27 Id. 
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the principal and his family.”28 However, Judge Chagares said the record shows that “the profile 
was so outrageous that no one took its content seriously.”29  Because the school blocked access 
to MySpace, no student could view the profile at school. The two girls initially set the profile to 
“public” so anyone could view it, but the next day, J.S. set it to “private” so only 22 invited 
friends could see it.30 One student, however, notified McGonigle of the profile; the principal 
asked the student to find out who created the profile and to print out a copy and bring it to him.31 
Subsequently, McGonigle suspended J.S. and K.L. from school for 10 days.32 
J.S.’s parents sued the school district, alleging that her First Amendment rights and her 
right to due process had been violated. At issue was whether the speech created off-campus 
caused a material and substantial disruption on campus under Tinker. The school district alleged 
that the fake profile disrupted the school with: 1) “general rumblings in the school”; 2) two 
teachers told McGonigle that “students were discussing the profile in class”; and 3) a math 
teacher “experienced a disruption in his class when six or seven students were talking and 
discussing the profile” leading the teacher to ask three times for them to stop, raising his voice 
the third time; under questioning, he said students frequently talked in his class; 4) the math 
teacher reported that two students talked about the profile in his class on another day; 5) another 
teacher was approached by a group of girls to report the profile, but this did not disrupt her class 
because it occurred during independent work time.33 The school district also alleged disruption to 
                                                
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 921. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. The opinion notes that: “It is undisputed that the only printout of the profile that was ever 
brought to school was one brought at McGonigle’s specific request.” 
32 Id. at 922. 
33 Id. at 922-23. 
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a guidance counselor who was also named in the profile.34 The U.S. district judge upheld the 
suspension, saying that even if a substantial disruption did not occur, the profile’s “vulgar, lewd, 
and potentially illegal speech” was punishable under Fraser.35 J.S.’s parents appealed to the 
Third Circuit. 
The Third Circuit noted: 
Since Tinker, courts have struggled to strike a balance between 
safeguarding students’ First Amendment rights and protecting the 
authority of school administrators to maintain an appropriate learning 
environment. 
    The Supreme Court established a basic framework for assessing student 
free speech claims in Tinker, and we will assume, without deciding, that 
Tinker applies to J.S.’s speech in this case.36  
 
The Third Circuit said “[t]here is no dispute that J.S.’s speech did not cause a substantial 
disruption in the school.”37 In its argument before the court, the school district alleged that a 
substantial disruption was reasonably foreseeable and, thus, J.S.’s punishment was sound.38 The 
Third Circuit disagreed: “The facts simply do not support the conclusion that the School District 
could have reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption of or material interference with the 
school as a result of J.S.’s profile.”39 The court found 8-6 that the school district had violated 
J.S.’s First Amendment rights under Tinker. It also rejected the school district’s contention that 
Fraser would apply and could punish off-campus speech: “The School District’s argument fails 
at the outset because Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech.”40 
 
                                                
34 Id. at 923. 
35 Id. at 923-24. 
36 Id. at 926. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 931. 
40 Id. at 932. 
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Concurring Opinion in J.S. v. Blue Mountain 
 Judge Smith wrote a concurring opinion, in which he was joined by four others. His 
opening salvo: 
Because the school district suspended J.S. for speech that she engaged in 
at home on a Sunday evening, I fully agree with the majority’s conclusion 
that it violated J.S.’s First Amendment rights. I write separately to address 
a question that the majority opinion expressly leaves open: whether Tinker 
applies to off-campus speech in the first place. I would hold that it does 
not, and that the First Amendment protects students engaging in off-
campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the 
community at large.41 
 
 Allowing Tinker to apply to off-campus speech “would create a precedent of ominous 
implications” and would give schools authority over student speech “no matter where it takes 
place, when it occurs, or what subject matter it involves — so long as it causes a substantial 
disruption at school.” 42 Smith acknowledges that determining where speech takes place “will not 
always be easy” and cannot always be based on where the speaker was when the speech 
occurred.43 He writes, “Such a standard would fail to accommodate the ‘everywhere at once’ 
nature of the internet.”44 If speech is intentionally directed toward the school, such as if a student 
sent an email to teachers from his home computer, then it would be “properly considered on-
campus speech.”45 In this case, though, he says it is quite clear that the speech took place off 
campus in J.S.’s home, and she did nothing to change that — she did not send the profile to 
anyone at school and took steps to limit who could see the profile and MySpace was blocked on 
computers on school grounds.46 
                                                
41 Id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring). 
42 Id. at 939. 
43 Id. at 940. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id.  
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Dissenting Opinion in J.S. v. Blue Mountain 
 Judge Fisher, joined by five others, dissented, saying that the majority’s ruling “severely 
undermines schools’ authority to regulate students who ‘materially and substantially disrupt the 
work and discipline of the school.’”47 He takes the majority to task for “mak[ing] light of the 
harmful effects of J.S.’s speech and the serious nature of allegations of sexual misconduct. 
Broadcasting a personal attack against a school official and his family online to the school 
community … undermines the authority of the school.”48 The Tinker standard would apply in 
this case, and that would mean that the court must see whether J.S.’s fake profile “created a 
significant threat of substantial disruption” at the school.49 He said J.S.’s speech had “a 
reasonably foreseeable effect on the classroom environment” by causing a “diminution in respect 
for authority and a diversion of school resources” along with “foreseeable psychological harm” 
to the principal and the guidance counselor.50 
Layshock v. Hermitage School District51 
June 2011 
 At the same time that the J.S. v. Blue Mountain case was making its way through the 
school and then the courts, a very similar case was shaping up in another part of Pennsylvania. 
Justin Layshock was a senior at Hickory High School in Hermitage, Pennsylvania, when he used 
a computer at his grandmother’s house to create a fake MySpace profile of his school principal, 
Eric Trosch.52 Justin used Trosch’s real name and a photo of him taken from a school website 
                                                
47 Id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 943. 
50 Id. at 947. 
51 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
52 Id. at 207. 
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and did access the profile on a school computer on at least one occasion.53 Justin’s was just one 
of four fake profiles created on MySpace by Hickory High School students, all of which, the 
Third Circuit said, was “more vulgar and more offensive than Justin’s.”54 Justin built his answers 
to the questions MySpace asked to get people started with their profiles around the word “big”; 
for example, “big steroid freak,” “big blunt,” “big whore” and “big fag.” were among the 
answers.55 The court notes that “word of the profile ‘spread like wildfire’ and soon reached most, 
if not all, of Hickory High’s student body.”56 The school district tried repeatedly to shut down 
access to MySpace on school computers and finally limited all students to computer use only 
when they could be directly supervised. All computer programming classes for the week leading 
up to Christmas recess were canceled.57 After he was caught, Justin voluntarily went on his own 
to apologize to Trosch.58   Justin was suspended from school for 10 days, was placed in an 
alternative education program for the rest of the school year, was banned from extracurricular 
activities and was barred from participating in his graduation ceremony.59 The Third Circuit 
writes, “Ironically, Justin, who created the least vulgar and offensive profile, and who was the 
only student to apologize for his behavior, was also the only student punished for the MySpace 
profiles.”60 
Justin’s parents filed suit, alleging that the punishment violated Justin’s First Amendment 
right to free expression and that the school district’s policies were overbroad and 
                                                
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 208. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 209. 
59 Id. at 210. 
60 Id. 
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unconstitutional. They also alleged that the school’s action infringed on their rights as parents to 
raise and discipline their child.61  
 The parents eventually withdrew their request for a preliminary injunction when the 
school district agreed to let Justin return to school, participate in the Academic Games and attend 
his graduation.62 The district judge ruled in favor of Justin on his First Amendment claim, saying 
that the school district had not established a “sufficient nexus” between Justin’s off-campus 
speech and an on-campus disruption and that any actual disruption as required by Tinker was 
“minimal.”63 Upon appeal, the school district did not try to claim that Tinker applied. Instead, it 
argued that a “sufficient nexus exists between Justin’s creation and distribution of the vulgar and 
defamatory profile of Principal Trosch and the School District” because Justin “entered school 
property” by copying Trosch’s picture from the school’s website and because the speech was 
aimed at the school community.64 The Third Circuit said the school district’s attempt to establish  
“sufficient nexus” was “unpersuasive at best.”65 The Third Circuit upheld the district judge’s 
ruling, saying that even though “Tinker’s ‘schoolhouse gate’ is not constructed solely of the 
bricks and mortar surrounding the school yard,” school officials’ disciplinary reach is limited.66 
The court wrote: 
It would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state in the 
guise of school authorities to reach into a child's home and control his/her 
actions there to the same extent that they can control that child when 
he/she participates in school sponsored activities. Allowing the District to 
punish Justin for conduct he engaged in using his grandmother's computer 
while at his grandmother's house would create just such a precedent and 
we therefore conclude that the district court correctly ruled that the 
                                                
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 211. 
63 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007). 
64 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., supra note 50, at 214. 
65 Id. at 214-15. 
66 Id. at 216. 
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District's response to Justin's expressive conduct violated the First 
Amendment guarantee of free expression.67 
 
Concurring Opinion in Layshock v. Hermitage 
 Judge Jordan wrote a concurring opinion, joined by one other judge. The concurrence 
raised the same “issue of high importance” as the concurring opinion in J.S. v Blue Mountain 
raised: Does Tinker apply to off-campus speech cases?68 Yet, unlike the J.S. concurrence, Jordan 
writes that Tinker should apply: “It is hard to see how words that may cause pandemonium in a 
public school would be protected by the First Amendment simply because the technology now 
allows the timing and distribution of a shout to be controlled by someone beyond the campus 
boundary.”69 
Fourth Circuit 
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools70 
July 2011 
 This is the only case included in this study that involves student-on-student 
cyberbullying, instead of speech aimed at school officials, school policy or the school in general. 
In December 2005, Kara Kowalski was a senior at Musselman High School in Berkeley County, 
West Virginia, when she used her home computer to create a webpage on MySpace with the 
heading “S.A.S.H.,” which Kowalski said stood for “Students Against Sluts Herpes.”71 But 
another student, Ray Parsons, said it was really an acronym for “Students Against Shay’s 
Herpes,” referring to Shay N., another Musselman student, and who was the “main subject of 
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discussion on the webpage.”72 Kowalski invited about 100 people to join the group.73 Parsons 
was the first student to join the group, using a school computer, and soon after uploaded a photo 
of himself and another student holding their noises with a sign that said “Shay Has Herpes.”74 
Kowalski responded with, “Ray you are soo funny!=)”75 Other photos of Shay N. were uploaded, 
one drawn on to indicate she had herpes and the other with a sign that read “portrait of a 
whore.”76 Within a few hours, Shay N.’s father called Ray Parsons on the telephone “and 
expressed his anger over the photographs.”77 Parsons then called Kowalski, who tried to take 
down the page but couldn’t, so she renamed the page “Students Against Angry People.”78 
 The next morning Shay and her parents went to the school to file a harassment complaint 
and provided the vice principal a printout of the page.79 Shay went home with her parents, 
“feeling uncomfortable about sitting in class with students who had posted comments about her 
on the MySpace webpage.”80 The school principal then contacted the district’s administration to 
see if it would be appropriate to initiate school discipline over the webpage. He was told it was.81 
He and the vice principal talked to Parsons, who admitted posting the photos.82 Then they talked 
to Kowalski, who admitted setting up the website but denied making any comments or posting 
any photos.83 
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 Kowalski was suspended from school for 10 days for setting up a “hate website” in 
violation of school policy against “harassment, bullying, and intimidation.”84 In addition to the 
10-day suspension, she was given a 90-day social suspension, which meant she could not attend 
any extracurricular events at which she was not a direct participant. She was also barred from 
attending the Charm Review to crown that year’s “Queen of Charm,” having received that crown 
herself the year before.85 She was also not allowed to continue as a member of the cheerleading 
squad.86 When her father asked school administrators to reduce or revoke her suspension, the 
assistant superintendent reduced her out-of-school suspension to five days but left the 90-day 
social suspension in place.87 Kowalski then filed suit in November 2007, alleging that her First 
Amendment rights had been violated, among other things. The district court dismissed her First 
Amendment claim because she “failed to allege that she had been disciplined under the School 
District’s policy for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment.”88 Kowalski 
appealed her First Amendment and due process claims to the Fourth Circuit. 
 In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit said Kowalski claimed that “school administrators 
violated her free speech rights under the First Amendment by punishing her for speech that 
occurred outside the school” and that “because this case involved ‘off-campus, non-school 
related speech,’” administrators “had no power to discipline her.”89 The school district, on the 
other hand, claimed that school officials “may regulate off-campus behavior insofar as the off-
campus behavior creates a foreseeable risk of reaching school property and causing a substantial 
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disruption to the work and discipline of the school,” citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d 
Cir. 2008).90 
 The Fourth Circuit writes that although students have First Amendment rights at school, 
they “are not coextensive with those of adults.”91 The court is “confident that Kowalski’s speech 
caused the interference and disruption described in Tinker as being immune from First 
Amendment protection.”92 Referring to the things posted to the webpage, the court said, “This is 
not the conduct and speech that our educational system is required to tolerate, as schools attempt 
to educate students about the ‘habits and manners of civility’ or of the ‘fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system,’” citing Fraser.93 
 However, the court said Kowalski’s argument that her speech was off-campus and 
therefore should not be subject to school punishment and instead was protected by the First 
Amendment required the court to define where her speech occurred.  
This argument, however, raises the metaphysical question of where her 
speech occurred when she used the Internet as the medium. Kowalski 
indeed pushed her computer’s keys in her home, but she knew that the 
electronic response would be, as it in fact was, published beyond her home 
and could reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact the school 
environment.94 
 
 The court acknowledged that “[t]here is surely a limit to the scope of a high school’s 
interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students when the speech at issue originates 
outside the schoolhouse gate” but then said because Kowalski’s speech had sufficient nexus to 
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the school’s pedagogical interests, they did not need to find that limit to rule in this case.95 In 
affirming the district court’s ruling, the Fourth Circuit wrote: 
Kowalski asserts that the protections of free speech and due process 
somehow insulate her activities from school discipline because her activity 
was not sufficiently school-related to be subject to school discipline. Yet, 
every aspect of the webpage’s design and implementation was school-
related. Kowalski designed the website for “students,” perhaps even 
against Shay N.; she sent it to students inviting them to join; and those 
who joined were mostly students, with Kowalski encouraging the 
commentary. The victim understood the attack as school-related, filing her 
complaint with school authorities.96 
 
Kowalski appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied certiorari in January 2012.97 
Fifth Circuit 
Bell v. Itawamba County School Board 
August 2015 
 The most recent likely contender for the Supreme Court was the case of a Mississippi 
teen rapper, who was suspended from high school in January 2011 for posting a self-produced 
rap music video titled “PSK the Truth Need to be Told” to Facebook and YouTube. Taylor Bell 
was a student at Itawamba Agricultural High School in Itawamba County, Mississippi, when he 
posted the song “containing threatening language against two high school teachers/coaches” 
which he intended “to reach the school community.”98 The video alleged “misconduct against 
female students by Coaches W. and R.”99 But the Supreme Court denied certiorari on Feb. 29, 
2016.100 
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 The Fifth Circuit re-heard Bell’s case en banc with all 15 judges present. When the 
majority decision was returned, three judges wrote concurring opinions and four wrote dissenting 
opinions. Those concurring and dissenting opinions are briefly summed up at the end of the 
following discussion of the majority opinion. 
Judge Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale, writing the majority opinion, described the case’s 
central issue as “whether, consistent with the requirements of the First Amendment, off-campus 
speech directed intentionally at the school community and reasonably understood by school 
officials to be threatening, harassing, and intimidating to a teacher satisfies the almost 50-year-
old standard for restricting student speech, based on a reasonable forecast of a substantial 
disruption. … Because that standard is satisfied in this instance, the summary judgment [for the 
school district] is affirmed.”101  
 A sample of the lyrics: 
Heard you textin number 25 / you want to get it on / 
white dude, guess you got a thing for them yellow bones /  
looking down girls shirts / drool running down your mouth / 
you fucking with the wrong one / going to get a pistol down your mouth / Boww102 
 
Barksdale wrote: “At the very least, this incredibly profane and vulgar rap recording had at least 
four instances of threatening, harassing, and intimidating language against the two coaches.”103 
Additionally, a screenshot of Bell’s Facebook page shows that the profile, including this 
recording, was set to public so the public could view it and listen to it.104 The next day, the wife 
of the Coach W. referred to in the song heard about it from a friend. The coach asked a student 
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about the song and then listened to the song at school.105 The coach told the principal, who told 
the superintendent. The next day, the principal, superintendent and a board attorney had a talk 
with Bell about the recording and then sent him home for the rest of the day. The next day, the 
school was closed by inclement weather. Bell used that time “to create a finalized version of the 
recording (adding commentary) and a picture slideshow), and uploaded it to YouTube for public 
viewing.”106 At a disciplinary committee hearing, Bell said he had not notified school authorities 
about the coaches’ alleged behavior because he did not think the school would do anything about 
it.107 “Near the end of the disciplinary-committee hearing, Bell explained again: he put the 
recording on Facebook and YouTube knowing it was open to public viewing; part of his 
motivation was to ‘increase awareness of the situation’; and, although he did not think the 
coaches would hear the recording and did not intend it to be a threat, he knew students would 
listen to it, later stating ‘students all have Facebook.’”108 
 The next day, the school board’s attorney notified Bell’s mother by letter that while “‘the 
issue of whether or not lyrics published by Taylor Bell constituted threats to school district 
teachers was vague,” the publication “constituted harassment and intimidation” against two 
teachers, and the recommended sentence was that Bell be put in the county’s alternative school 
for the remainder of the nine-week grading period.109 Bell requested a hearing before the school 
board; at that hearing, the board found that there was nothing vague about the speech and found 
Bell “had not only harassed and intimidated the teachers, but had also threatened harm.”110 
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Bell and his mother filed suit. After hearing testimony in the case and then learning that Bell’s 
alternative school punishment would end the next day, the district judge ruled that whether to 
grant injunctive relief was moot and, so, denied the injunction. A later hearing granted summary 
judgment to the school board and denied summary judgment to Bell and his mother. In its ruling, 
the court held that the rap song harassed and threatened the teachers and school employees and 
concluded that the song “in fact caused a material and/or substantial disruption at school” and, 
further, that school officials had reason to believe the song would cause a disruption.111 
 Bell appealed only the summary judgment against his First Amendment claim. A divided 
appellate panel held that the “school board violated Bell’s First Amendment right by disciplining 
him based on the language in the rap recording.”112 That opinion was vacated and an en banc 
review was granted.113 Barksdale notes that the Fifth Circuit has extended the Morse exception to 
“certain threats of school violence” as Justice Alito referred to in his concurring opinion in 
Morse.114 Bell contended that “Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech, such as his rap 
recording; and, even if it does, Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption’ test is not satisfied.”115 However, 
the Fifth Circuit held that Tinker does apply to off-campus speech and, given that, that “there is 
no genuine dispute of material fact precluding ruling, as a matter of law, that a school official 
reasonably could find Bell’s rap recording threatened, harassed, and intimidated the two 
teachers; and a substantial disruption reasonably could have been forecast, as a matter of law.”116  
 The Fifth Circuit evaluated Bell’s speech in light of the four Supreme Court student 
speech cases and found that since Bell was not disciplined for lewd speech, Fraser did not apply; 
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since no one claimed that his speech was sponsored by the school, Hazelwood did not apply; 
since Bell’s speech “does not advocate illegal drug use or portend a Columbine-like mass, 
systematic school-shooting,” Morse did not apply.117  
And, as Justice Alito noted, when the type of violence threatened does not 
implicate “the special features of the school environment,” Tinker’s 
“substantial disruption” standard is the appropriate vehicle for analyzing 
such claims. [citation omitted] Although threats against, and harassment 
and intimidation of, teachers certainly pose a “grave … threat to the 
physical safety” of members of the school community, [citation omitted], 
violence forecast by a student against a teacher does not reach the level of 
the above-described exceptions necessitating divergence from Tinker’s 
general rule. We therefore analyze Bell’s speech under Tinker.118 
 
In answer to Bell’s claim that Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech, the Fifth Circuit 
opinion states that “[o]ver 45 years ago, when Tinker was decided, the Internet, cellphones, 
smartphones, and digital social media did not exist. The advent of these technologies and their 
sweeping adoption by students present new and evolving challenges for school administrators, 
confounding previously delineated boundaries of permissible regulations.”119 
The Fifth Circuit looked to one of its own previous rulings for direction in Bell, its 2004 
opinion in Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board.120 In Porter, a boy was expelled after his 
younger brother took a sketchpad to school containing a two-year-old drawing the boy had made 
of the school under an armed attack. The Fifth Circuit held that the boy should not have been 
expelled because the drawing was two years old and he had “never intended for the drawing the 
reach the school, describing its introduction to the school community as ‘accidental and 
unintentional.’”121The Porter case fell outside similar cases’ precedents because of the time lapse 
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and the lack of intention to share the drawing at the school.122 Barksdale wrote, “Porter instructs 
that a speaker’s intent matters when determining whether the off-campus speech being addressed 
is subject to Tinker. A speaker’s intention that his speech reach the school community buttressed 
by his actions in bringing about that consequence, supports applying Tinker’s school-speech 
standard to that speech.”123 Additionally, the “pervasive and omnipresent nature of the Internet 
has obfuscated the on-campus/off-campus distinction advocated by Bell.”124 Therefore, the Fifth 
Circuit held that Tinker does apply to off-campus speech when the speaker “intentionally directs 
at the school community speech reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass, 
and intimidate a teacher, even when such speech originated, and was disseminated, off-campus 
without the use of school resources.”125 Barksdale’s opinion said “there is no genuine dispute” 
over whether Bell intended his rap song to reach the school: he did by his own admission post 
the video to Facebook, edit and upload a more polished version to YouTube even after being 
warned and talked to by school officials, and then tell the school disciplinary hearing that he 
knew people would listen to it and he hoped it would bring more awareness of the alleged 
harassment of students by the two coaches.126 The opinion also states that there is no real dispute 
over whether Bell’s lyrics threatened the two coaches. The lyrics included imagery of a gun 
being put down the mouths and the trigger being pulled.127 
So, the Fifth Circuit said, the only question remaining under Tinker is whether Bell’s rap 
song caused an actual disruption or reasonably could have been seen as causing one, and 
promptly answered it by saying that given that “Bell’s conduct reasonably could have been 
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forecast to cause a substantial disruption,” so it did not need to find whether an actual disruption 
occurred.128 And, to the coaches, the mere fact that they had been threatened and harassed could 
lead to a disruption in their lives and an impediment to their being able to teach effectively. 
If there is to be education, such conduct cannot be permitted. In that 
regard, the real tragedy in this instance is that a high-school student 
thought he could, with impunity, direct speech at the school community 
which threatens, harasses, and intimidates teachers and, as a result, 
objected to being disciplined.129 
 
Once the court found that a disruption had occurred, it did not need to rule on whether Bell’s 
lyrics rose to the level of a true threat under Watts. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling. Bell appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court as noted at the beginning of this section and was 
denied certiorari. 
Jolly Concurring Opinion in Bell v. Itawamba 
 Judge E. Grady Jolly, joined by two other judges, wrote a concurring opinion in which he 
noted that because the law is evolving just as the technological world is evolving, the court 
“should apply reasonable common sense in deciding these continually arising school speech and 
discipline cases.”130 Jolly concurs in the majority opinion but writes that he would add this: 
Student speech is unprotected by the First Amendment and is subject to 
school discipline when that speech contains an actual threat to kill or 
physically harm personnel and/or students of the school; which actual 
threat is connected to the school environment; and which actual threat is 
communicated to the school, or its students, or its personnel.131 
 
Elrod Concurring Opinion in Bell v. Itawamba 
 Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod, joined by one other judge, wrote a concurring opinion in 
which she agreed with the “careful, well-reasoned majority opinion” that Bell’s rap was aimed at 
                                                
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 399-400. 
130 Id. at 400 (Jolly, J., concurring). 
131 Id. at 401. 
 124 
the school and contained violent threats.132 She would, however, join with the judges in the Third 
Circuit who said that “a broad off-campus application of  Tinker ‘would create a precedent with 
ominous implications.’”133 She thinks the majority opinion avoided that, though, by narrowly 
focusing only on Bell’s intention to direct the speech at the school and the fact that it contained 
threats of violence: “Because this cautious approach does not place public school officials in loco 
parentis or confer upon them a broad power to discipline non-threatening off-campus speech, I 
concur in full.”134 
Costa Concurring Opinion in Bell v. Itawamba 
 While Judge Costa notes the dissent’s concern with the fact that little attention was paid 
to the public concern of sexual harassment raised in Bell’s lyrics, he says that Bell’s problem 
was that he went too far “with its graphic discussion of violence against the coaches — goes well 
beyond blowing the whistle on the alleged harassment.”135 
Dennis Dissenting Opinion in Bell v. Itawamba 
 Judge James L. Dennis, joined by one judge in full and one judge in part, dissented. 
Dennis contends that Bell’s rap was entitled to First Amendment protection because it was “on a 
matter of public concern” and did not rise to the level of a substantial disruption of the school 
environment.136 
 Dennis finds four major flaws with the majority opinion: 1) “the majority opinion 
erroneously fails to acknowledge that Bell’s rap song constitutes speech on ‘a matter of public 
concern’ and therefore ‘occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”; 
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2) “in drastically expanding the scope of schools’ authority to regulate students’ off-campus 
speech, the majority opinion disregards Supreme Court precedent establishing that minors are 
entitled to ‘significant’ First Amendment protection”; 3) the majority ignores the fact that 
Tinker’s substantial disruption standard applies only to the “special characteristics of the school 
environment” not the off-campus environment; and 4) the majority also “errs in its very 
application of the Tinker framework” because the record does not show that Bell’s speech caused 
a substantial disruption.137  
 Judge Dennis sums up Bell’s rap lyrics thus: “Although the song does contain some 
violent lyrics, the song’s overall ‘content’ is indisputably a darkly sardonic but impassioned 
protest of two teachers’ alleged sexual misconduct, e.g., opining that Rainey is ‘a fool/30 years 
old fucking with students at the school.’ That Bell’s song may fall short of the School Board’s 
aesthetic preferences for socio-political commentary is not relevant to determining whether the 
rap song’s content addresses a matter of public concern.”138 Dennis compared Bell’s lyrics to the 
offensive signs held by members of the Westboro Baptist Church when protesting at a U.S. 
military person’s funeral. In fact, Dennis noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has said in several 
cases that “listeners’ subjective opinions about speech cannot control whether speech addresses a 
matter of public concern or not.”139 He cautions that “by refusing the recognize that Bell’s 
speech addresses a matter of public concern and is thereby entitled to ‘special protection’ against 
censorship, the majority opinion creates a precedent that effectively inoculates school officials 
against off-campus criticism by students.”140 
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Prado Dissenting Opinion in Bell v. Itawamba 
 Judge Edward C. Prado, who joined with Dennis’ dissent in part, said he believes that 
“speech is presumptively protected by the First Amendment unless it fits within a specific 
category of unprotected speech — regardless of the subject matter of the speech” — regardless 
of whether it is private speech or on a matter of public concern.141 He also took issue with the 
majority opinion’s naming of a new speech category (threatening, harassing, intimidating 
speech): “Bell’s speech does not fit within the currently established, narrow categories of 
unprotected speech, and I would wait for the Supreme Court to act before exempting a new 
category of speech from First Amendment protection.”142 Additionally, Bell’s rap was 
“performed and broadcasted entirely off-campus, and the song described violence directed at 
individual teachers — not a Columbine-type mass school shooting. … Further in the context of 
expressive rap music protesting the sexual misconduct of faculty members, no reasonable juror 
could conclude that Bell’s rap lyrics constituted a ‘true threat.’”143 However, Prado said he does 
“share the majority opinion’s concern about the potentially harmful impact of off-campus online 
speech on the on-campus lives of students” and that “[u]ltimately, the difficult issues of off-
campus online speech will need to be addressed by the Supreme Court.”144 
Haynes Dissenting Opinion in Bell v. Itawamba 
 Judge Haynes said he dissents from the majority’s “greatly and unnecessarily 
expand[ing] Tinker to the detriment of Bell’s First Amendment rights.”145 
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Graves Dissenting Opinion in Bell v. Itawamba 
 Judge James E. Graves Jr. joined Dennis’ dissent because his “view is that the Tinker 
framework was not intended to apply to off-campus speech. I recognize, however, that current 
technology serves to significantly blur the lines between on-campus and off-campus speech.”146 
Because of that “undeniable reality,” he would apply a modified Tinker standard to off-campus 
speech; his Tinker-Bell standard would start with Tinker’s substantial disruption test. Then it 
would include a nexus test similar to the Fourth Circuit’s in Kowalski: it would require 
foreseeability of disruption and consideration of the speech’s predominant message.147 
 Graves lays out his Tinker-Bell test: 
 Before disciplining a student for off-campus speech, the school would have to: 1) provide 
evidence of an actual disruption or facts which “might reasonably have led school authorities to 
forecast a substantial disruption”; AND [his emphasis] “demonstrate a sufficient nexus between 
the speech and the school’s pedagogical interests that would justify the school’s discipline of the 
student.”148 Then Graves would “consider three non-exclusive factors”: whether the speech 
“could reasonably be expected to reach the school environment” and “whether the school’s 
interest as trustee of student well-being outweighs the interest of respecting the traditional parent 
role in disciplining a student for off-campus speech” and, finally, “whether the predominant 
message of the student’s speech is entitled to heightened protection.”149 Using Graves’ Tinker-
Bell test in light of the focus of Bell’s rap lyrics on an issue of public concern would not have 
allowed the school to discipline him.150 
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Eighth Circuit 
D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District #60151 
August 2011 
D.J.M. was a sophomore at Hannibal High School in Hannibal, Missouri, when he sent 
instant messages about “getting a gun and shooting some other students at school” to a fellow 
student, identified as “C.M.”152 He was home when he sent the messages. The student and an 
adult she told about the messages then reported them to the school principal. The principal, in 
turn, notified the police, who went to D.J.M.’s home that evening and questioned him before 
placing him in juvenile detention.153 D.J.M. was suspended from school for ten days and later for 
the rest of the school year.154 His parents appealed to the school board, but his suspension was 
upheld. The parents then sued the school district, claiming that D.J.M.’s First Amendment rights 
had been violated. 
 The district court found that D.J.M.’s speech “had been an unprotected true threat and 
alternatively that the District could properly discipline him for his speech because of its 
disruptive impact on the school environment.”155 D.J.M. appealed, “assert[ing] that he had not 
intended to make any true threats and that his messages were not serious expressions of intent to 
harm.”156 D.J.M. also argued that because he was at home when he sent the messages, they were 
not school speech and therefore outside the school district’s ability to punish.157 
                                                
151 D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District #60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011). 
152 Id. at 756. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 759. 
156 Id. at 760. 
157 Id. 
 129 
 The Eighth Circuit noted that none of the Supreme Court student speech precedents deals 
with true threats.158 However, it had decided a student speech case involving a letter a male 
student wrote at home to his former girlfriend. The letter was later taken to school by the letter 
writer’s friend (without the writer’s knowledge) and given to the girl to whom it was 
addressed.159 The letter referred to her as a “’bitch,’ ‘slut,’ ‘ass,’ and a ‘whore’” and used graphic 
language to describe what the writer would like to do to her.160 The letter writer was suspended 
after a school administrator found out about it. “Since the letter contained true threats, expulsion 
of the student did not violate the First Amendment.”161 In Doe, the Eighth Circuit defined “true 
threat” as “a statement that a reasonable recipient would have interpreted as a serious expression 
of an intent to harm or cause injury to another.”162 Additionally, the speaker must 
“communicate[] the statement to the object of the purported threat or to a third party.”163  
 Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit considered that D.J.M had intended for his 
messages about shooting people to reach the intended victims because he communicated them to 
C.M. and should have known that they could easily be forwarded to someone else. The Eighth 
Circuit wrote: 
Although D.J.M. did not communicate any threatening statements to the 
teenagers targeted in his messages, he intentionally communicated them to 
C.M., a third party. Since C.M. was a classmate of the targeted students, 
D.J.M. knew or at least should have known that the classmates he 
referenced could be told about his statements.164 
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 D.J.M. “assert[ed] that his instant messages were made in jest out of teenage frustration 
and in response to ‘goading’ by C.M.”165 The Eighth Circuit found that D.J.M. had “mentioned 
suicide in connection with a potential school shooting,” that he had “identified a specific type of 
gun he could use and listed a number of specific individuals he planned to shoot.”166 
Additionally, he had written that he would “have to get rid of a few negro bitches” and another 
classmate would “be the first to die.”167 He specifically named one girl he would kill while 
naming another he would allow to live.168 “Combined with his admitted depression, his 
expressed access to weapons, and his statement that he wanted Hannibal ‘to be known for 
something,’ we find no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether his speech could be 
reasonably understood as a true threat.”169 
True threats are not protected under the First Amendment, and here the 
District was given enough information that it reasonably feared D.J.M. 
had access to a handgun and was thinking about shooting specific 
classmates at the high school. … The First Amendment did not require the 
District to wait and see whether D.J.M.’s talk about taking a gun to school 
and shooting certain students would be carried out.170 
 
 In addition to the true threat analysis, the Eighth Circuit also conducted a Tinker 
substantial disruption analysis. Citing Wisniewski,171 the court noted that “[t]he widespread use 
of instant messaging by students in and out of school presents new First Amendment challenges 
for school officials. … School officials cannot constitutionally reach out to discover, monitor, or 
punish any type of out of school speech,” but they must decide how to act, while still respecting 
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the First Amendment, when a student makes a threat.172 The Eighth Circuit found that “it was 
reasonably foreseeable that D.J.M.’s threats about shooting specific students in school would be 
brought to the attention of school authorities and create a risk of substantial disruption within the 
school environment.”173 And, in fact, disruption did occur as worried parents and students 
contacted the school to ask about safety measures and who was on the “hit list.”174  
 In affirming the district court’s judgment, the Eighth Circuit noted that the Supreme 
Court has not yet heard a case involving violent student speech, and summed up the issues facing 
courts when students make threats of violence: 
One of the primary missions of schools is to encourage student creativity 
and to develop student ability to express ideas, but neither can flourish if 
violence threatens the school environment. School authorities as well as 
the courts are called on to protect free expression under the First 
Amendment in a variety of circumstances. … These cases present difficult 
issues for courts required to protect First Amendment values while they 
must also be sensitive to the need for a safe school environment.175 
 
S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District176 
October 2012 
 In December 2011, twin brothers Steven and Sean Wilson were juniors at Lee’s Summit 
North High School in Lee’s Summit, Missouri, when the created a website they called 
NorthPress, which included a blog the brothers said was to “discuss, satirize, and ‘vent’” about 
events at the school.177 They registered the site through a Dutch domain server, which meant the 
U.S. computer users could not find it through a Google search, but anyone who had the URL 
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could access the site, which was not password-protected.178 Between December 13 and 16, 2011, 
the brothers posted “a variety of offensive and racist comments as well as sexually explicit and 
degrading comments about particular female classmates, whom they identified by name” to the 
blog.179 The court noted that one of the Wilsons used a school computer on December 13 to 
upload some files for the website and someone used school computers on December 14 and 15 to 
access NorthPress, though the school district’s records do not identify whom that was and cannot 
tell whether the user(s) added content to the site or just accessed it.180 
 The Wilsons said they only intended the website for sharing among their friends, and 
they told only five or six friends about it, but “whether by accident or intention, word spread 
quickly” and the “student body at large” learned about the site on December 16.181 High school 
administrators investigated and rapidly identified the Wilsons as the creators of the website. The 
brothers were suspended for ten days. The school district conducted a hearing, the Wilsons 
appealed, and the school district conducted a second hearing, at the end of which the Wilsons 
were suspended for 180 days, but they were allowed to enroll in another school during their 
suspensions.182 The Wilsons filed suit and asked for a preliminary injunction to end their 
suspensions. 
 During the three-day federal district court hearing into the preliminary injunction, the 
Wilsons testified that they meant the website “to be satirical rather than serious” and said 
December 16 was a regular school day without any disruption; they also suggested that any 
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disruption that did occur was the result of the third student’s post.183 They also said the classes at 
their alternative school were not challenging and the school did not provide any honors classes; 
they also said they wanted to pursue careers in music or theater and needed to be in the Lee’s 
Summit North band if they were to have a chance at college scholarships.184 The school district, 
on the other hand, testified that the website caused “substantial disruption” on December 16, the 
day it was discovered by the student body at large and that the schools computers were used 
numerous times that day to access or attempt to access the website.185 Teachers testified that 
teaching was difficult that day because students were distracted and upset by the website; at least 
two teachers testified that it was “one of the most or the most disrupted day of their teaching 
careers.”186 High school administrators “testified that local media arrived on campus and that 
parents contacted the school with concerns about safety, bullying, and discrimination” both on 
that day and many days after. The administrators also said they were concerned that: 1) the 
disruption would return and 2) the Wilsons might be in danger if they were allowed to return to 
school before their suspensions were served.187 
 On March 22, the district court judge granted the Wilsons’ motion for preliminary 
injunction, noting that there were no Eighth Circuit direct precedents to offer guidance in this 
situation but pointing to Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District188 and D.J.M. v. Hannibal 
Public School District #60.189 “Citing cases from other circuits, the District Court concluded, 
‘there does seem to be a distinct possibility that the defendants could be exonerated based on the 
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discussion that I’ve mentioned and the cases that I have reviewed.’”190 The court found that 
“irreparable harm” would occur if the Wilsons were not able to try out for the band or attend 
honors classes at Lee’s Summit North.191 The Wilsons were allowed to return to school, and the 
Eighth Circuit denied the school district’s expedited motion for stay pending appeal of the 
preliminary injunction. 
 The Eighth Circuit notes that the district judge “evidently agreed that the third student’s 
post was the primary cause of the disturbance on December 16” but also noted that “at least one 
of the Wilsons’ posts about a female student ‘was part of the sensation of that day’ and 
concluded ‘[t]he greatest school wide problem apparently was created by several racist blogs, 
one of the worst of which was authored by the first twin.’”192 
 On appeal, the school district argued, among other things, that “the preliminary 
injunction essentially forgave the Wilsons’ suspension — if the Wilsons graduate before the 
District Court reaches a final decision on the merits, which is likely, the School District will not 
be able to enforce the remainder of the suspension even if it prevails on the merits.”193 In their 
turn, the Wilsons argued that “their posts on NorthPress were protected free speech for which the 
School District could not constitutionally punish them” and that the website did not cause 
“significant disruption” at the school, “maintain[ing] the third student’s post was the sole cause 
of any actual disruption.”194 They also argued that the Communications Decency Act (CDA) 
“insulates them from punishment altogether.”195  
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 The Eighth Circuit found that the district court’s “findings do not support the relief 
granted” or “establish sufficient irreparable harm to the Wilsons” and held “that the Wilsons are 
unlikely to succeed on the merits under the relevant caselaw,” thus concluding that the district 
court’s preliminary injunction was not justified.196 The Eighth Circuit vacated the preliminary 
injunction and remanded the case to the district court for “the unenviable task of fashioning a 
remedy several months after the entry of the injunction and the Wilsons’ return to school.”197 
The Wilsons sought an en banc rehearing, which was denied in November 2012.198 Both the 
Wilsons and the school district eventually made a joint stipulation for dismissal with prejudice, 
and the case was dismissed from the federal court in the Western District of Missouri.199  
 The Eight Circuit, however, made some instructive comments regarding whether the 
Wilsons’ off-campus online speech was subject to school punishment and regarding their claim 
of immunity because of the CDA. 
 On their claim that their speech cannot be regulated by the school, “[t]he Wilsons’ 
success on the merits will depend on what standard the District Court applies,” the Eighth Circuit 
wrote.200  The school district argues that Tinker’s substantial disruption standard applies, but the 
Wilsons “argue all off-campus speech is protected and cannot be the subject of school discipline, 
even if the speech is directed at the school or specified students.”201 However, the Wilsons also 
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argue that if Tinker does apply, “the speech was not directed at the school and did not create a 
substantial disruption.”202 The Eighth Circuit noted that the district court judge found that the 
website “targeted” the high school.203 The court also cited its D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School 
District  #60 opinion that said Tinker does apply to off-campus speech “where it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the speech will reach the school community and cause a substantial disruption to 
the educational setting.”204 It also cited Doninger v. Niehoff, Kowalski v. Berkeley County 
Schools, and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, all summarized above, as cases supporting 
the Eighth Circuit’s belief that Tinker would apply to the Wilsons’ off-campus online speech. 
[W]e expect Tinker will apply here because the Wilsons’ speech was, in 
the District Court’s words “targeted at” Lee’s Summit North. The parties 
dispute the extent to which the Wilsons’ speech was “off-campus,” but the 
location from which the Wilsons spoke may be less important than the 
District Court’s finding that the posts were directed at Lee’s Summit 
North. … Furthermore, unlike in J.S., the District Court found that the 
NorthPress postings “caused considerable disturbance and disruption on 
Friday, the 16th. Under Tinker, speech which actually caused a substantial 
disruption to the educational environment is not protected by the First 
Amendment.205 
 
 The Eighth Circuit declined to comment on whether the CDA “protects high school 
students from school discipline.”206 The Wilsons claimed that the third student’s post was 
responsible for any disruption at the high school, and they were merely the “providers of a 
computer service” and therefore not responsible for the post that caused the disruption. But the 
Eighth Circuit noted that the district court’s “findings do not support the Wilsons’ contention that 
the disruption stemmed exclusively from the third student’s post” and, instead, “expressly found 
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that the Wilsons’ own posts contributed to the disruption. Thus, the CDA would not necessarily 
protect the Wilsons even if it applied.”207 
Ninth Circuit 
Wynar v. Douglas County School District208 
August 2013 
 Landon Wynar was a sophomore at Douglas High school in Minden, Nevada, when he 
“engaged in a string of increasingly violent and threatening instant messages sent from home to 
his friends bragging about his weapons, threatening to shoot specific classmates, intimating that 
he would ‘take out’ other people at a school shooting on a specific date, and invoking the image 
of the Virginia Tech massacre.”209 Landon used instant messaging through MySpace to 
“communicate[] frequently with friends from school,” writing about such things as weapons and 
Hitler (“whom he once referred to as ‘our hero’”) and also statements like “[my parents] also 
don’t like me just like everyone at school” and “its ignore landon day everyday.”210 As his 
sophomore year drew on, his messages “became increasingly violent and disturbing,” and he 
began to reference a school shooting to take place on April 20 (the court notes that is both 
Hitler’s birthday and the anniversary of the Columbine shooting).211 The court opinion quotes 
several of the messages. Three examples: 1) “its pretty simple / i have a sweet gun / my neighbor 
is giving me 500 rounds / dhs is gay / ive watched these kinds of movies so i know how NOT to 
go wrong / i just cant decide who will be on my hit list I and that’s totally deminted and it scares 
even my self” and 2) “and ill probly only kill the people i hate? who hate me / then a few random 
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to get the record” and 3) that stupid kid from vtech. he didnt do shit and got a record, i bet i could 
get 50+ people / and not one bullet would be wasted.”212 
 His friends became alarmed, and two of them notified the football coach, who took them 
to talk to the school principal. Two police deputies interviewed the boys and looked at the 
message printouts and then questioned Landon in the principal’s office.213 The police took him 
into custody and then school administrators met with him and asked him if he wanted his parents 
there, to which he replied that he did not.214 Landon admitted writing the messages but claimed 
they were a “joke.”215 He provided a statement, signed it, and then was suspended for ten days.216 
The school board charged Landon with violating a Nevada statute that “provides that a student 
will be deemed a habitual discipline problem if there is written evidence that the student 
threatened or extorted another pupil, teacher, or school employee.”217 Under that law, a student 
who is declared a habitual discipline problem “must be suspended or expelled for at least a 
semester.”218 Landon was represented by an attorney at the board hearing but did not call any 
witnesses; the board voted to expel him for 90 days. 
Landon and his father sued the school district for violation of his constitutional rights, 
among other things.219 As the facts were not in dispute, the district court denied Landon’s motion 
for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the school district. The Ninth Circuit 
noted in its opinion holding that the school district did not violate Landon’s constitutional rights 
that the U.S. Supreme Court had not addressed “the applicability of its school speech cases to 
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speech originating off campus,” but it looked to the previous Supreme Court rulings on student 
speech, as well as its own precedent and precedent from other circuits.220 The Ninth Circuit used 
the Tinker standard to analyze Landon’s First Amendment claims. 
Referring to its “most analogous precedent,” LaVine v. Blaine School District,221 the 
Ninth Circuit noted that it involved a student who wrote a first-person poem about a school 
shooting and suicide and later took it to school to show to his English teacher.222 The school 
expelled him on a “temporary, emergency basis,” and the Ninth Circuit upheld the suspension 
because, under Tinker, the school could “forecast substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities.”223  
LaVine definitely did not say that the geographic origin of speech doesn’t 
matter, nor did it say that an individual’s free speech rights are diminished 
simply by virtue of being a student. Rather, it dealt with speech created off 
campus but brought to the school by the speaker. This is not a minor 
distinction. Our case presents another variation — off-campus 
communication among students involving a safety threat to the school 
environment and brought to the school’s attention by a fellow student, not 
the speaker. … [T]he location of the speech can make a difference, but 
that does not mean that all off-campus speech is beyond the reach of 
school officials.224 
 
The Ninth Circuit noted that it is difficult to “divine and impose a global standard for a 
myriad of circumstances involving off-campus speech. A student’s profanity-laced parody of a 
principal is hardly the same as a threat of a school shooting, and we are reluctant to try and craft 
a one-size fits all approach.”225 However, “[g]iven the subject and addressees of Landon’s 
messages, it is hard to imagine how their nexus to the school could have been more direct; for 
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the same reasons, it should have been reasonably foreseeable to Landon that his messages would 
reach campus.”226 
The court said it was “reasonable’ for the school district “to interpret the messages as a 
real risk and to forecast a substantial disruption.”227 Therefore, Tinker’s substantial disruption 
standard was satisfied. But the court also said Tinker’s second prong, that of speech that 
infringes on the rights of others, also applied: 
Whatever the scope of the “rights of other students to be secure and to be 
let alone,” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, without doubt the threat of a school 
shooting impinges on those rights. Landon’s messages threatened the 
student body as a whole and targeted specific students by name. They 
represent the quintessential harm to the rights of other students to be 
secure.228 
 
The Challenge for Courts and Schools 
 It is appropriate that the last case covered in this chapter happened to be Wynar because 
Circuit Judge M. Margaret McKeown penned a thoughtful, succinct summary of the central 
problem facing courts and schools in the age of electronic communication, social media and the 
Internet in the opening of the opinion she wrote for the Ninth Circuit case. In addition to having 
to balance students’ rights of free expression against school officials’ need to maintain an orderly 
learning environment, both courts and schools now have the added worry of keeping students 
safe from threats of violence. Of course, courts and schools have always had to worry about 
student safety, but the age of social media has grown alongside the age of school shootings. 
Concern about students being mean to each other and/or disrespectful to school officials now 
must also encompass the very real concern about students sliding over the edge into violence. 
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 McKeown wrote that “[w]ith the advent of the Internet and in the wake of school 
shootings,” administrators now must balance the constitutional rights of their students against the 
possibility of threats of violence: 
It is a feat like tightrope balancing, where an error in judgment can lead to 
a tragic result. … [T]he challenge for administrators is made all the more 
difficult because, outside of the school environment, students are instant 
messaging, texting, emailing, Twittering, Tumblring, and otherwise 
communicating electronically, sometimes about subjects that threaten the 
safety of the school environment. At the same time, school officials must 
take care not to overreact and to take into account the creative juices and 
often startling writings of the students.229 
 
That challenge is also made all the more difficult by the silence of the U.S. Supreme Court. All 
the parties involved — students, parents, school officials, and judges — could use some help. 
                                                
229 Id. at 1064. 
 142 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The study undertaken in this project was aimed at answering three research questions, 
outlined in Chapter 2, but repeated here: 
RQ1: Do the federal appellate courts recognize more free speech protection for students 
engaged in off-campus online speech than on-campus in-person speech? 
RQ2: Do the statements of the U.S. Supreme Court in student speech cases suggest the 
Court will recognize broad rights for off-campus online student speech? 
RQ3: Are the statements of the U.S. Supreme Court on the character of the Internet as a 
modern public square relevant to the way it should view off-campus online speech? 
The author’s consideration of these questions follows: 
RQ1: Appellate-Court Level of Protection for Off-Campus Online Student Speech 
 The researcher expected to see a higher level of protection for off-campus online speech 
given that Tinker should apply only to speech that takes place on campus and given that courts 
have been reluctant to put limits on student expression that takes place in the physical world off 
campus. For example, one 1986 ruling from the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine 
upheld the right of a student to flip his middle finger at one of his teachers in a restaurant parking 
lot.1 The court granted a permanent injunction stopping the school from suspending student 
Jason Klein for ten days for “extend[ing] the middle finger of one hand” toward teacher Clyde 
Clark.2 A school rule that students would be suspended for “vulgar or extremely inappropriate 
language or conduct directed to a staff member” did not apply because “[t]he conduct in question 
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occurred in a restaurant parking lot, far removed from any school premises or facility.”3 
Additionally, Mr. Clark was not acting as a teacher at the time, and Klein was not acting as a 
student.4 The court noted: “Anyone would wish that responsible teachers could go about their 
lives in society without being subjected to Klein-like abuse. But the question becomes ultimately 
what should we be prepared to pay in terms of restriction of our freedom to obtain that particular 
security.”5 In a footnote, the judge noted the role parents have to play in situations involving bad 
behavior on the part of their children away from school: “Under ideal circumstances, the 
effective response to out-of-school misbehavior would be the swift application of that parental 
discipline which is here roundly deserved.”6 
 Unfortunately, appellate courts in this study generally applied the Tinker standard of 
“substantial disruption” of the school environment to off-campus online speech. Even where they 
specifically did not rule that Tinker applied, the courts assumed that it did, as the Third Circuit 
did in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, one of only two cases that favored students. (The 
other was Layshock v. Hermitage, also from the Third Circuit.) In cases that involved threats 
(real or imagined), the courts generally completed both a threat analysis and a Tinker disruption 
analysis and usually based their decisions on the outcome of the Tinker analysis. 
 Courts need to determine how they will decide the question of whether online speech is 
considered on-campus or off-campus based on where it originates or where it is seen or heard. 
The issue of simultaneity complicates that decision. The obvious worry is that if courts decide it 
does not matter where the speech was created, nothing will stop schools from being able to 
punish students for other off-campus speech that is not online. For example, under current case 
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law, a student could write a letter to the editor complaining about a school policy. That speech is 
protected, even if someone reads the newspaper on campus. If courts decide that the defining 
factor of speech is where it is consumed, that policy could change. A teacher could bring the 
newspaper to school and share it in the faculty lounge, and, what has long been considered as 
protected free expression could become on-campus speech, and if it caused a disruption or if the 
students’ opinion caused a teacher to feel intimidated, the student speaker could be punished at 
school. 
Additionally, consider that these days, students are participating in protests against gun 
violence at schools and other issues. Under current case law, if a student takes a megaphone in 
the city park and protests against a school policy, that student could not be punished. Remember 
Tinker’s admonition that students are “persons” under the Constitution in school and out of 
school. But if a friend records the protest and posts the video to Facebook or Twitter, would the 
protesting student’s off-campus right to protest, protected to the same extent as an adult’s under 
the First Amendment, be compromised by the other student’s social media post? Or, if the 
protest takes place on a Saturday and students are talking about it Monday at school, would that 
off-campus speech then become on-campus for the purpose of punishment? Now imagine that 
same student protesting by posting a comment on Twitter or Snapchat. If someone makes a 
screenshot of the post and shares it on Monday via text to other students, and those students are 
looking at and talking about the text at school, the student’s constitutionally protected right to 
protest could be threatened. Or, imagine that a student is angry about something that happens at 
school one day and, still angry at bedtime, posts a tweet calling a teacher a name and 
complaining about him. Some students will not see that tweet until the following morning, when 
the student might have already calmed down and moved on. But the tweet exists as fresh in the 
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minds of the people who have just seen it. They go to school and talk about it, a teacher 
overhears, and the student is reported to the administration and hit with a violation of the code of 
conduct prohibiting directing inappropriate language or conduct toward a teacher as Jason Klein 
was accused of. The only difference is that Jason Klein’s speech occurred and was seen entirely 
off campus. With online speech, the speech may occur anywhere off campus, but courts seem 
willing to allow school officials to punish that speech at school if it makes its way onto campus 
in any way. 
The only thing all the courts agreed upon was that the Supreme Court needs to grant 
certiorari to an online student speech case to give lower courts guidance on just what the rules 
will be. Yet in the absence of that guidance, five of the six appellate circuits that have heard 
online student speech cases have had no qualms about punishing students for their off-campus 
online speech. The content of the speech did not affect courts’ willingness to allow schools to 
punish students’ off-campus online speech. Tinker’s disruption standard was applied in every 
type of situation. Even threatening speech was tested under Tinker rather than under the Watts v. 
United States true threat analysis. Taylor Bell’s rap lyrics, which were about a matter of public 
concern, were given no more protection than the threatening speech. The First Amendment 
protects parody, yet even the Third Circuit, which found for Justin Layshock, merely sidestepped 
the issue of whether Tinker applied because the school district did not raise the issue on appeal. 
The Layshock outcome rested on the court’s decision that there was not a sufficient nexus 
between Layshock’s speech and the school. And in the other case it decided in favor of the 
student, J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third Circuit assumed without deciding that 
Tinker applied.  
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That means, unfortunately, that it appears appellate courts would not recognize more 
protection for off-campus online speech that disrupts the school than on-campus speech. In fact, 
most appellate judges seem all too willing to allow school officials to reach into a student’s home 
to punish speech that causes some kind of reaction — or even the possibility of a reaction — at 
school. That is a slippery slope that once begun could easily lead to squelching or punishing 
student speech anywhere, even when that speech airs a legitimate complaint about a school 
policy or school official. 
RQ2: Anticipation of Supreme Court Treatment of Off-Campus Online Student Speech 
 The Supreme Court’s statements thus far in student speech cases do suggest that the 
Court will recognize rights for off-campus online speech. However, that statement comes with a 
caveat because, as noted throughout this study, the Court has yet to rule on a case involving 
online student speech. However, in a case involving an adult man who posted threatening rap 
lyrics to Facebook, the Court ruled in favor the man, Anthony Elonis. Elonis’ lyrics threatened 
his estranged wife, the police, the FBI, and patrons and employees at a park where he had been 
employed until he was fired for posting a picture of himself holding a toy knife to a co-worker’s 
throat at a Halloween party and captioning it “I wish…”7 The Court overturned a Third Circuit 
ruling affirming the district court’s finding that Elonis’ speech was a true threat because the 
standard used to determine how likely it was he would carry through on the threats was too low. 
 An example of Elonis’ lyrics (published to Facebook after changing his account name to 
Tone Dougie):  
“Fold up your [protection-from-abuse order] and put it in your pocket 
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet? 
Try to enforce an Order  
that was improperly granted in the first place 
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Me thinks the Judge needs an education 
on true threat jurisprudence 
And prison time’ll add zeros to my settlement . . .  
And if worse comes to worse  
I’ve got enough explosives 
to take care of the State Police and the Sheriff’s Department.”8 
 
Another post threatened that Elonis would shoot up a school if he could decide on which school, 
and he was visited by FBI agents following that post. That visit prompted him to post another 
rap: 
“You know your s***’s ridiculous 
when you have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door 
Little Agent lady stood so close 
Took all the strength I had not to turn the b**** ghost Pull my knife, flick my wrist, 
and slit her throat Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms of her partner 
[laughter] 
So the next time you knock, you best be serving a warrant 
And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert while you’re at it 
Cause little did y’all know, I was strapped wit’ a bomb Why do you think it took me 
so long to get dressed with no shoes on? 
I was jus’ waitin’ for y’all to handcuff me and pat me down 
Touch the detonator in my pocket and we’re all goin’ [BOOM!] 
Are all the pieces comin’ together? 
S***, I’m just a crazy sociopath  
that gets off playin’ you stupid f***s like a fiddle 
And if y’all didn’t hear, I’m gonna be famous 
Cause I’m just an aspiring rapper who likes the attention  
who happens to be under investigation for terrorism cause y’all think I’m ready to 
turn the Valley into Fallujah 
But I ain’t gonna tell you which bridge is gonna fall into which river or road  
And if you really believe this s*** 
I’ll have some bridge rubble to sell you tomorrow [BOOM!][BOOM!][BOOM!]”9  
 
 A grand jury indicted Elonis for making threats, but he moved to dismiss because the 
indictment failed to “allege that he had intended to threaten anyone.”10 The district court judge 
denied Elonis’ motion, saying that “Third Circuit precedent required only that Elonis 
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‘intentionally made the communication, not that he intended to communicate a threat.’”11 But 
Elonis said his rap lyrics were “emulat[ing] the rap lyrics of the well-known performer Eminem, 
some of which involve fantasies of killing his ex-wife.”12 The instructions given to the jury did 
not include Elonis’ request that the jury be told that the government had to prove that Elonis 
intended to make a threat; instead, these instructions were given: 
A statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a 
statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable 
person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to 
whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an 
intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.13 
 
Elonis appealed his conviction on four of the five counts with which he had been charged, 
making the argument that the jury should have found that he intended to make a threat when 
speaking.14 The Third Circuit denied his appeal, holding that “intent” is only “the intent to 
communicate words the defendant understands, and that a reasonable person would view as a 
threat.”15 
 The Supreme Court ruled that neither Elonis nor the government had “identified any 
indication of a particular mental state requirement” in the law under which Elonis was charged.16 
But the Court said that did not necessarily matter: 
The fact that the statute does not specify any required mental state, 
however, does not mean that none exists. We have repeatedly held that 
“mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal 
intent” should not be read “as dispensing with it.” Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U. S. 246, 250 (1952).17  
 
                                                
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 6-7. 
14 Id. at 7. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 9. 
17 Id. 
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In light of that, the Court overturned Elonis’ conviction, saying, “The jury was instructed that the 
Government need prove only that a reasonable person would regard Elonis’s communications as 
threats, and that was error. Federal criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the results 
of an act without considering the defendant’s mental state.”18 
 The Elonis case would be most directly analogous to student online speech cases that 
involved threats because it was ruling on the intent of the speaker.19 But given the Court’s ruling, 
recognizing as it does that using violent imagery in song lyrics does not equate to the intention to 
carry out violent acts, it would seem that Taylor Bell would have received a favorable ruling on 
his rap lyrics that exposed sexual harassment by two coaches at his school. The school district, 
the district court and the Fifth Circuit court did not take into account Bell’s statements that he did 
not intend to communicate a threat of violence and that he was merely using tried-and-true rap 
tropes in his lyrics, but those statements mirror Elonis’ justifications for his violent lyrics. 
 The Court has made clear in several rulings that students do not have the exact rights as 
adults while in school, but it has also said that students do have rights outside school property 
and hours. That lends support to the idea that the Court would grant broad speech rights to 
students for their off-campus speech. However, its rulings in Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse 
show that Tinker’s substantial disruption standard is not the only standard under which student 
speech can be restricted. If the speech is lewd and interferes with the civic education schools are 
undertaking (Fraser), it can be curtailed. If it is speech produced under the “imprimatur” of the 
                                                
18 Id. at 16. 
19 The comparison of student threatening speech to the Elonis case is admittedly imperfect 
because Elonis involved speech being criminally prosecuted, and the student speech cases in this 
study involved civil violations. However, the Supreme Court took Elonis’ intent into account. 
The speaker’s intent also would matter under the proposal made in this chapter that if a student’s 
speech is determined to be a true threat, it would be prosecuted as such under Watts. Courts 
would not have the option to apply Tinker to student speech intending to communicate a credible 
threat against a student, school official or the school building itself. 
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school (Hazelwood), it can be curtailed. If it is speech that advocates illegal drug use or 
communicates some other danger to the school environment (Morse), it can be curtailed. Who is 
to say that the Court would not find it reasonable to carve out yet another exception to Tinker for 
speech that occurs off campus but, through the problem of simultaneity, makes its way onto 
campus, blurring the lines of what is truly off campus and what is on? 
 The Court’s apparent rejection of Justice Thomas’ argument to restore to schools the 
unfettered authority of in loco parentis does seem to indicate that it believes there are boundaries 
to what schools can or should control. It also shows that the Court is unwilling to give schools 
absolute power over conduct or speech that would best be left up to parents to punish. Other 
evidence to support a belief that the Court would protect students’ off-campus online speech 
from school interference comes from concurring and dissenting opinions in two pre-social media 
cases. Although such opinions do not have the mandatory authority that the majority opinion 
carries, they do carry persuasive authority on lower court judges and sometimes in future 
Supreme Court opinions. 
 In Bethel v. Fraser, where the Court upheld Matthew Fraser’s punishment for his lewd 
nominating speech, Justice William Brennan wrote a concurring opinion “to express my 
understanding of the breadth of the Court’s holding.”20 Brennan took issue with the Court’s 
characterization of Fraser’s speech as “obscene,” saying merely that it “exceeded permissible 
limits” on speech in the school environment because the school has a legitimate need to teach 
students about civil discourse while preventing disruption of the educational environment.21 
Noting that the First Amendment protects speech that is not obscene, Brennan also noted that 
                                                
20 Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986). (Brennan, J., concurring.) 
21 Id. 
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Fraser’s speech “is far removed from the very narrow class of ‘obscene’ speech which the Court 
has held is not protected by the First Amendment.”22  
The Court today reaffirms the unimpeachable proposition that students do 
not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate.” [citation omitted] If the respondent had given the 
same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been 
penalized simply because government officials considered his language to 
be inappropriate [citation omitted]; the Court’s opinion does not suggest 
otherwise.23 
 
Brennan continued in a footnote: 
In the course of its opinion, the Court makes certain remarks concerning 
the authority of school officials to regulate student language in public 
schools. For example, the Court notes that “[nothing] in the Constitution 
prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are 
inappropriate and subject to sanctions.” [citation omitted] These 
statements obviously do not, and indeed given our prior precedents could 
not, refer to the government’s authority generally to regulate the language 
used in public debate outside of the school environment.24 
 
 Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented in Fraser, because the school district did not, in his 
view, demonstrate that Fraser’s speech disrupted the school environment. Marshall recognized 
school officials’ authority to determine what is and is not appropriate in their educational 
environments; however, “where speech is involved, we may not unquestioningly accept a 
teacher’s or administrator’s assertion that certain pure speech interfered with education.”25 
 Justice John Paul Stevens, in his dissent, noted the stir that the line “Frankly, my dear, I 
don’t give a damn” made when actor Clark Gable delivered it in the movie “Gone With the 
Wind.”26 He also noted that the word “damn,” which “shocked the Nation” when he was in high 
                                                
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id., n. 1. 
25 Fraser, supra note 20, at 690. (Marshall, J., dissenting.) 
26 Fraser, supra note 20, at 691. (Stevens, J., dissenting.) 
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school, was seen as “less offensive” in 1986. 27 Despite that, he recognized that school officials 
could regulate such speech in the classroom and “even in extracurricular activities that are 
sponsored by the school and held on school premises [emphasis added].28 Clearly, there was no 
doubt in Justice Stevens’ mind that the schools cannot meddle in speech that occurs off school 
premises. Arguing that Fraser should not have been punished, Stevens concluded: 
It seems fairly obvious that respondent’s speech would be inappropriate in 
certain classroom and formal social settings. On the other hand, in a locker 
room or perhaps in a school corridor the metaphor in the speech might be 
regarded as rather routine comment. If this be true, and if [Fraser’s] 
audience consisted almost entirely of young people with whom he 
conversed on a daily basis, can we — at this distance — confidently assert 
that he must have known that the school administration would punish him 
for delivering it?29 
 
 In another of the landmark student speech cases, Morse v. Frederick, Justice Samuel 
Alito, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, concurred with the majority opinion that Joseph 
Frederick’s “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner was punishable because it promoted illegal drug 
use. However, Alito noted: 
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (a) it goes no 
further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a 
reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and (b) 
it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be 
interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including 
speech on issues such as “the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing 
marijuana for medicinal use.” [citation omitted]30 
 
Alito carefully outlined the precedents under which student speech may be curtailed or punished: 
1) when it occurs on campus and causes a substantial disruption under Tinker; 2) when it 
advocates illegal drug use under Morse; 3) when it is delivered in a lewd or vulgar manner as 
                                                
27 Id. 
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 696. 
30 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007). (Alito & Kennedy, JJ., concurring.) 
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part of a school program under Fraser; and 4) when it is “in essence the school’s own speech” 
appearing in a publication that is an official school organ” under Hazelwood.31 He reiterated: “I 
join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that the opinion does not hold that the special 
characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other speech restrictions.”32 Any 
restriction on student speech must be “based on some special characteristic of the school 
setting,” including as in Morse, “the threat to the physical safety of students.”33 And while the 
government is usually prohibited from suppressing speech merely because it “presents a threat of 
violence … due to the special features of the school environment, school officials must have 
greater authority to intervene before speech leads to violence. And, in most cases, Tinker’s 
‘substantial disruption’ standard permits school officials to step in before actual violence 
erupts.”34 Alito’s concurrence has caught the attention of lower court judges, who frequently cite 
it as justification for punishing students for threatening under Tinker rather than relying on a 
Watts test. 
 Finally, remember Justice Stevens’ dissent, joined by Justice David Souter and Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: “In my judgment, the First Amendment protects student speech if the 
message itself neither violates a permissible rule nor expressly advocates conduct that is illegal 
and harmful to students.”35 
Stevens pointed out “two cardinal First Amendment principles” that underlie First 
Amendment protections: 1) that “censorship based on the content of speech, particularly 
censorship that depends on the viewpoint of the speaker, is subject to the most rigorous burden 
                                                
31 Id. at 423. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 424. 
34 Id. at 425. 
35 Morse v. Frederick, supra note 30, at 435. (Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting.) 
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of justification” and 2) that “punishing someone for advocating illegal conduct is constitutional 
only when the advocacy is likely to provoke a harm that the government seeks to avoid.”36 
Stevens contended that the majority opinion in Morse “trivializes the two cardinal principles” 
and “invites stark viewpoint discrimination.”37 As part of his opinion, Stevens discussed 
Frederick’s intent in unfurling the banner while TV cameras followed the progress of the 
Olympic torch as it passed by his school: “As Joseph Frederick repeatedly explained, he did not 
address the curious message — ‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS’ — to his fellow students. He just 
wanted get the camera crews’ attention.”38 Nothing contradicted Frederick’s statement, and 
Stevens wrote, “Frederick’s credible and uncontradicted explanation for the message — he just 
wanted to get on television — is also relevant because a speaker who does not intend to persuade 
his audience can hardly be said to be advocating anything.”39 And while pointedly making fun of 
the majority’s position, Stevens also sounded a note of caution at where the line would be drawn 
over what speech school officials may and may not punish: 
Admittedly, some high school students (including those who use drugs) 
are dumb. Most students, however, do not shed their brains at the 
schoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb advocacy when they see 
it. The notion that the message on this banner would actually persuade 
either the average student or even the dumbest one to change his or her 
behavior is most implausible. That the Court believes such a silly message 
can be proscribed as advocacy underscores the novelty of its position, and 
suggests that the principle it articulates has no stopping point.40 
 
Alito’s concurrence speaks to that concern and attempts to delineate a stopping point: that the 
speech being proscribed in Morse can only be proscribed because it advocates illegal drug use. 
Lower courts have latched onto Alito’s language about speech that presents a danger to the 
                                                
36 Id. at 436. 
37 Id. at 437. 
38 Id. at 434. 
39 Id. at 444. 
40 Id. 
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physical safety of students or the school environment. So, even there, when a justice is trying to 
limit the scope of the Court’s ruling, lower courts interpret the opinion in different ways, and, 
when it comes to student speech, regrettably have allowed school interference to proceed on the 
basis that the speech poses a danger to the school. 
RQ3: Relevance of Supreme Court Statements on the Internet as Modern Public Square 
 The Supreme Court’s statements in Reno v. ACLU and Packingham v. North Carolina, 
indicate that the Court has a wide-eyed belief in the virtue of the Internet as a space for public 
speech. Anyone who has read the online comments on a news article knows that the buffer of the 
computer or phone screen can loosen inhibitions on speech and civility. However, the Internet 
does have great power as a level playing field that anyone can enter. While this can strain the 
theory that in the marketplace of ideas, the good idea will prevail over the bad, we must 
remember that the Internet as a mode of public communication is still rather young. Only twenty 
years separate the Reno and Packingham rulings. In Reno, from 1997, the Court looked askance 
at government efforts to establish safe “zones” for children where they could be free from 
indecent or obscene material, reminding everyone that indecent speech does fall under First 
Amendment protection. It also took an important step in declaring that the Internet was not 
subject to the same strictures as the broadcasting medium, leaving it relatively free from 
regulation and closer to the status that has been afforded print media since colonial days. In 
Packingham, from 2017, the Court declared that social media are an important path to allow 
people, even convicted sex offenders, to exercise their First Amendment right to free speech and 
press. As with Reno, the Court was not saying that the Internet could not be regulated in some 
fashion, but any regulation would have to be consonant with constitutional rights. Narrow 
regulations could be written to limit children’s exposure to obscenity online, and narrow 
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regulations could be written to limit convicted sex offenders from using the Internet to search for 
and cultivate victims. 
 Taken together, the Court’s statements about the Internet as a new communication 
frontier in both Reno and Packingham lay a solid foundation for both unfettered freedom of 
expression online and recognition of the centrality of social media and the Internet to public 
debate and political thought in today’s American society. The United States has a long tradition 
of tolerating less-than-admirable speech, including speech that is highly critical of public events 
and government actions. Tinker said that students have rights to free expression on school 
grounds outside class time, if they were in the cafeteria or on the playing fields, for example, and 
that schools had no right to control that speech if it did not disrupt the school discipline or 
infringe on someone else’s rights. In the same way, the school cannot control every conversation 
in the locker room or at marching band practice. The Internet is a vast “place,” limitless, in fact, 
and surely within that limitless space there is space for free speech for students. 
 If one looks at the Supreme Court’s language concerning the place of the public square 
and the marketplace of ideas in combination with Habermas’ language about the public sphere, 
one sees clear-cut statements of the importance of open and free discussion in social and civic 
life and of the solid First Amendment protections those discussions enjoy. Indeed, Habermas 
“argued that ‘public discussion’ should translate voluntas into ratio as the consensus concerning 
what is practically necessary in the general interest, produced in the open competition between 
individual arguments.’”41 Voluntas is Latin for “will” or, in some translations, “wish,” and ratio 
is “thought.” In other words, Habermas is calling for people to debate in the marketplace of ideas 
(“open competition between individual arguments”) to clarify what they desire for the public 
                                                
41 DAVID RASMUSSEN, READING HABERMAS 41 (1990), quoting JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 
STRUKTURWANDEL DER ÖFFENTLICHKEIT 95 (Neuwied and Berlin, Luchterhand, 1962). 
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good into solid thought, and, presumably, then from thought into action. This is in line with the 
Court’s statements about the centrality of open participation in public, social life in the public 
square or marketplace of ideas. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Packingham: “Social media allows 
users to gain access to information and communicate with one another about it on any subject 
that might come to mind.”42 Prohibiting access to that portal for anyone, even convicted sex 
offenders, “bars access to what for many are the principal sources for knowing current events, 
checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and other 
exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge,” Kennedy wrote.43 This access and 
the interactions it leads to are essential avenues of communication for people, without which 
they are denied their right to participate in public life, both in the civic and social sense. If 
students’ rights off campus are as strong under the First Amendment as an adult’s, that means 
that their off-campus online speech should be subject to that same protection, regardless of 
where the speech is consumed. 
A Prescription for the Courts in Cases Involving Threatening or Libelous Speech 
 Taking into account all the various opinions offered by legal scholars and methods 
outlined in court opinions, and in line with legal research that often prescribes how the author 
thinks courts should proceed, I would like to proffer my own suggestions for how courts should 
proceed with regulating (or not) off-campus online student speech. Note that this prescription has 
several parts. 
 1) Threats of violence. If a student uses any form of digital communication, whether a 
text, message, social media post, email or blog, to make a true threat against the school, a school 
official or other students, that threat must be dealt with swiftly. Students should face an 
                                                
42 Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. ____, 8 (2017) (slip op.). 
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immediate, temporary suspension while authorities investigate whether the student intended the 
speech as a threat or whether it is a bad attempt by a student at a joke gone wrong or satire that 
falls flat. If the police or state’s attorney determines that the threat is a true threat, the speech is 
outside First Amendment protection, and the student should be tried under applicable state or 
federal law. As the 20th anniversary of the Columbine school shooting is approaching in 2019 
and given the alarming frequency with which gun violence aimed at school occurs now, there is 
no wiggle room here. Students need to know that such speech will be taken seriously, 
investigated and then dealt with as needed. 
Note that the police in Wisniewski did not think Aaron Wisniewski’s speech posed a real 
threat. This would mean that Aaron’s speech was not punishable at school. The fact that his 
teacher asked to be reassigned would not matter. If the speech was not threatening, it would not 
be under the school’s oversight, even if it caused a disruption in school administrators’ schedules 
as they had to deal with the speech, find a replacement teacher, meet with the student, parents 
and teachers, field phone calls from the public, etc. Those types of interruptions, while an 
inconvenience, do not rise to the level of Tinker’s substantial disruption threshold. Conversely, in 
D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District, police did place D.J.M. in juvenile detention, and 
both the federal district and appellate courts found that his messages were true threats against the 
school and specific students. Under this prescription, D.J.M. would be punished through the legal 
process and not through the school. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit’s finding of a true threat would 
have been sufficient and would have negated the need to conduct a substantial disruption 
analysis under Tinker. In much the same way, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Wynar v. Douglas 
County School District would not have needed the Tinker standard to analyze Landon Wynar’s 
First Amendment claims, because true threats fall outside First Amendment protection. 
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 2) Defamation. If a student creates a webpage or social media profile that mocks a school 
official and that speech defames the subject, then the subject of the speech should take action 
through existing libel laws to seek punishment of the student. Students must learn that while they 
are free to say whatever they want, they must then accept the consequences if their speech 
crosses into territory that falls outside First Amendment protection. One aspect that would have 
to be cleared up would be whether the subject of the alleged libel is considered a public official 
or public figure by virtue of his job. A school principal or school district superintendent would 
definitely be considered a public official, but what of a high school English teacher? What of a 
lunchroom worker? What of a janitor? Despite being on the public payroll, might some of those 
kinds of employees be considered private figures? Settling this issue will not be simple, of 
course, and a one-size-fits-all approach would not work. A teacher might be considered a private 
individual ordinarily, but what if he speaks out on public issues at school board meetings? What 
if she is an official in the teachers’ union? What if he is a coach and frequently quoted in the 
local newspaper? These questions would have to be settled on a case-by-case basis, as they 
generally are now in any libel suit, so they are not insurmountable. But if a person’s reputation is 
actually harmed by a student’s Web posting, then the student should face the consequences 
through the legal system, not through the schools. 
 That said, if a person simply has hurt feelings or is embarrassed by some such posting, as 
in J.S. v. Blue Mountain or Layshock v. Hermitage, then the student should face no consequences 
at school. Judges frequently admonish school officials in these situations to develop a thicker 
skin, which admittedly can be hard to do, but which is vital so that the free flow of speech (even 
less-than-valuable speech) is not stunted. School officials should instead undertake education 
campaigns to turn bad speech into a life lesson. If a student has a legitimate gripe with someone 
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or something at school, school officials should try to discern what that is and work to eliminate it 
while at the same time working with the student to find more productive ways to bring 
grievances to light. Taylor Bell, for example, could have been counseled on how to bring a 
complaint against the coaches who were accused of sexually harassing students. But the school 
officials must also make sure that they treat student grievances seriously so that students will feel 
that established procedures allow their voice to be heard. Avery Doninger could have been 
taught how to constructively stir up public action without resorting to calling school officials 
douchebags. Schools should fulfill their duty to teach students how to be active citizens who 
participate constructively in public life by sparing the punishment and instead apply education. 
In-School Suspension and Education to Combat Hateful Speech 
 Issues like true threats and libel, which fall outside First Amendment protection, are easy 
to decide, even for a First Amendment absolutist. The thornier issue is what to do with student 
speech such as that at issue in S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District. It is hard to defend 
students’ freedom to create racist, sexist, homophobic or other hateful speech when the speaker 
is a teenager who may be a jerk or who may simply be clueless about how his words will be 
received. As part of their duty to educate students in ways to participate in the civic process, 
schools must also teach them how to be civil to others, and that is an issue that goes way beyond 
the scope of this project. Ethics education that includes empathy exercises would be a good place 
to start. My attitude toward this kind of online speech has changed over the years. People on the 
internet can be truly horrible creatures and say some incredibly vile things. It is understandable 
that those things would cause disruption on a campus if they were egregious enough. I would 
advocate for a temporary suspension in those instances, but rather than leaving the student free to 
go about at his leisure at home away from school for the length of his suspension, I would 
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implement an in-school suspension that would require participation in ethics education or service 
work or both, aimed at broadening the student’s understanding of the people he has targeted with 
his hateful speech. This will require resources that are in short supply in many school districts in 
many states. But, for example, this might be something similar to when a defendant in court has 
to sit through victim impact statements. If the speaker were required to hear how his words 
affected people, that might be an effective lesson that would make him think twice the next time 
he contemplated engaging in racist or sexist or any other kind of discriminatory speech aimed at 
diminishing other people’s social standing or feelings of worth. 
 Many legislative attempts to ban hate speech and schools’ attempts to regulate speech 
through codes of conduct have been struck down by the courts. The process I am advocating here 
does not ban such speech, since that would surely face constitutional challenges. Instead, the 
process would attempt to educate students about the equality and inclusiveness Habermas 
believed was necessary to the successful operation of the public sphere. Perhaps this is a Utopian 
idea, but it is a Utopia, as Finlayson wrote, that is definitely worth pursuing.44 
All Other Off-Campus Speech Outside School Control 
 Besides the above exceptions for true threats, defamation and cyber bullying, I oppose 
any kind of school oversight of any other off-campus student speech, including online speech, 
under Tinker. My plan for handling true threats and libel through laws governing those two kinds 
of speech that fall outside First Amendment protection puts the onus for investigating and 
punishing such speech on the legal system. The risk to First Amendment freedoms for students 
off campus in the physical world is too great to allow schools to govern their speech off campus 
in the virtual world. Rather than have those freedoms curtailed in any way, I would simply not 
                                                
44 See JAMES FINLAYSON, HABERMAS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2005) to read his take on 
Habermas’ hopeful view of the public sphere, particularly pp. 10-15. 
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allow schools to punish off-campus online speech regardless of where or when it is created or 
consumed. This will undoubtedly allow speech that will create some kind of disruption, 
substantial or minor, at school because, of course, most student speech is consumed by other 
students. Students’ friends and classmates follow them on social media and thus are their 
primary audience. And teenagers being teenagers, they will talk about what they see online when 
they are at school. Tinker already allows for speech that occurs on school grounds to be punished 
at school if it causes a substantial disruption or infringes on the rights of others. And school 
officials can already punish disruptive behavior that occurs on school grounds without having to 
concern themselves with the off-campus speech that caused or contributed to the disruptive 
behavior. Thus, there is no need for school regulation of off-campus speech. The danger that 
school officials would begin sliding down the slippery slope of increasing regulation of student 
speech is too great. We must not allow regulation that stifles the rights of students to participate 
in protests, to write letters to the editor, to launch flier campaigns, or to call their representatives 
and senators. 
To emphasize: Since the Supreme Court in Tinker said students and teachers do not shed 
their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, that means they have rights when they are 
outside the schoolhouse gate. And those rights must be protected, especially their right to freely 
express their ideas, and especially when those ideas are related to participation in the public 
sphere. Schools exist at least in part to show students how a democratic society operates and to 
help them find their role in that society. That important task cannot be accomplished if students 
learn that they must mind their P’s and Q’s if they do not want to be punished for what they have 
to say. And that means that school officials will undoubtedly have to put up with boisterous 
speech, with rough speech, with crude speech, with angry speech. Instead of focusing their 
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efforts on stamping out such speech and tamping down such feelings in the students under their 
guidance, school officials should focus on modeling for students the socially acceptable ways of 
voicing their criticisms. If school resources are tight and do not allow for additional educational 
programs in the curriculum, school officials could look for community volunteers to lead 
extracurricular activities and could stage assemblies and programs that involve students in civic 
life. These are positive ways to bring about the more civilized speech officials desire. The way to 
achieve that civilized speech is through education, not through punishment. 
Areas for Further Study 
Cyberspace as a Third Location, Distinct from the Physical World 
 Allison Martin’s proposal to treat virtual space as a “location” separate from either the 
on-campus or off-campus domains deserves further study, especially if it appears that the 
Supreme Court might rule that off-campus online student speech can be regulated by school 
officials. For fear that such regulation might then spread to off-campus student speech in the 
physical world, and only for that reason, this is an idea that might offer a compromise between 
school officials and students. Depending on your point of view and on the way such a proposal 
was constructed, designating cyberspace as a third location — a buffer — between on-campus 
and off-campus could result in either a no man’s land or a demilitarized zone. I do not 
wholeheartedly, full-speed-ahead endorse the idea because it could easily result in a no man’s 
land with harsh regulations that would allow school officials to squelch any dissent among 
students at any time and any place. I could see it becoming a nightmare dystopia where students 
are not free from the school’s reach even in summer since children are basically seen as students 
from about the age of 5 to graduation from high school around age 18. Whether that third space 
existed as a gentle buffer zone aimed at continuing to educate students about their role in society 
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or whether it were a harsh buffer aimed at limiting their speech and shutting down their 
independent thoughts could turn on the composition of the Supreme Court at the time the Court 
structured such a space in an opinion. But if regulation of student online speech is inevitable, this 
is an area worth exploring to see if a separate online location could be concretely defined to the 
satisfaction of courts and legislatures — and citizens, including students — so that a separate 
category of constitutional protection or limitation could be set up. This would deal with the 
problem of simultaneity in location because the basis for determining what kind of speech it was 
would be settled. It would be neither on-campus speech nor off-campus speech, nor even some 
hybrid combination of those. It would be, simply, “online speech.” Then the question of making 
rules or establishing constitutional protections for it based on where it was created or where it 
was consumed would be moot. 
One problem that would remain, however, would be that of what to do when the time of 
the speech differs from creation to consumption. A statute of limitations, so to speak, would need 
to be decided so that online speech that disrupted the school environment could not be 
resurrected again and again with separate punishments for each incident whenever someone new 
consumed it at some distant future point. I would argue for allowing only one punishment per act 
of speech, rather than one punishment for each time that act of speech is rediscovered. Much like 
the guidelines that surround the republication of a libel, however, if the original speaker reposted 
his speech, this would be treated as a new incident and subject to school oversight. However, if 
another student shared, retweeted or reposted the offending speech, that student would be 
responsible for any incident arising from the new post. This is similar to the way an allegation of 
libelous speech is currently handled. When one news organization publishes a libelous statement, 
the libel is considered republished only if it is repeated in a future publication, whether a 
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publication by the original news organization or by a different news organization. This would 
allow for school regulation of student-on-student cyber bullying, as in Kowalski v. Berkeley 
County Schools, if one student or a group of students is targeting another. 
 However, if the Court designates online speech a separate location, I would add another 
limitation: that of intent. Modeled after the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Elonis case, this intent 
requirement would mean that the speaker must intend for the speech to cause a disruption in the 
school environment, just as the Court said that Elonis could not be convicted for speech that 
others read as threatening if his intent was not to threaten. If a student did not intend for his 
speech to cause a disruption at school, a court would have to take that into account when 
determining whether the speech could be punished at school. Thus, if the student’s intent was 
simply to state his opposition to a school policy or action, and his intention was not to cause 
trouble, that speech would be protected against school punishment. Additionally, if a student’s 
post or tweet was merely intended to let off steam in a moment of anger, it could not be punished 
at school either. If, however, the student intended his online speech to stir up trouble at school 
and it did indeed disrupt the school, then it would be subject to school regulation. The intent 
requirement is essential because teenagers often speak hastily and angrily and may say 
something that is the thought of the moment and not anything concretely planned to cause 
trouble at school. This should have the effect of allowing most student online speech to fall 
outside the purview of the school, but it would allow for action when a student’s online speech is 
aimed at causing a disruption at school. My reluctant allowance of school oversight of online 
speech intended to disrupt should not be read as giving schools carte blanche to claim any 
speech as a disruption simply because it intersects with the school. Bell’s rap lyrics would be 
protected under this plan because, even though he aimed his speech at the student body, he 
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intended it only to make people aware of the situation at school. He did not intend for it to cause 
a disruption nor did it cause an actual disruption. Making two coaches who are accused of 
sexually harassing female students uncomfortable or worried should not be considered a 
substantial disruption. The disruption must rise to a level where school officials have real 
difficulty maintaining order in the school because of the speech. That did not happen in Bell. 
That did not happen in Doninger, despite the fact that the school administration office had to 
deal with an increased number of phone calls and emails for a few days.  
Defining “Substantial” Disruption 
 One major flaw with a plan to declare cyberspace as a separate location, as well as with 
the original Tinker decision, is that the term “substantial” is subjective. An overly sensitive 
principal or teacher might think that two or three students laughing in a class is substantial. But 
that is a much different event than, say, the disruption that occurred in S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit, 
when the racist posts on the Wilson brothers’ website did cause a serious disruption at school. 
Because the term is subjective, we are left with lower court rulings that sometimes side with 
overly sensitive adults and sometimes with teenagers. This means that students do not have any 
way of knowing, from one tweet to the next, just which online speech might get them in trouble 
with school officials. When the Supreme Court does finally accept an appeal involving online 
off-campus student speech, it would be helpful if the justices clarified or quantified just what is 
meant by “substantial” disruption. In the meantime, an area for further research would be to 
undertake a study of court precedent at various levels — state supreme courts and federal district 
and appellate courts — to catalogue the types of disruptions and anticipated disruptions school 
authorities claim occur because of student speech. A researcher could even attempt to determine 
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whether any patterns appear over time and whether those patterns are ongoing or cyclical. Do 
some rise and fade quickly, or do some have staying power, resonating with judges? 
Composition of the Supreme Court 
 Because courts and scholars keep calling for Supreme Court guidance on the issue of 
student online speech, the composition of the Court, as noted above, will be important to the 
outcome. Thus, another area for future research would be to review justices’ track records, dating 
back to their days on federal district or appellate benches to see how they have viewed speech 
issues involving the First Amendment. It would be important for the researcher to study their 
stances on student speech, of course, but it would also be instructive to study their view on 
speech by adults in whatever settings that speech occurs. Such a study would, of course, need to 
be updated each time a justice left or joined the high court. 
Americans’ Attitudes Toward Student Speech Rights 
 A final area for research would be a quantitative study of Americans’ attitudes toward 
student speech rights. Although Pew Internet Research has included a few questions on related 
topics over the years, it would be fascinating to poll both adults and young people specifically 
about whether they think junior high and high school students should have the right to speak 
freely on campus, off campus or online, especially when that speech is critical of school 
authority, whether that authority is in the form of a policy or a teacher or administrator.  
A Final Thought 
The tendency toward authoritarianism that we are seeing in American government, 
including in the public schools, presents too big a danger to the future of our democratic 
experiment to allow school officials unfettered control over student speech. If children are raised 
to believe that school authorities can censor, limit and punish speech that is critical of or makes 
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fun of school policy or officials, they will grow up to be citizens who believe that government 
authorities can do the same. That would undermine one of the tenets of the American 
participatory system of government — that, as Justice William J. Brennan Jr. wrote in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, we have “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”45 If the First Amendment is not to be rendered meaningless, that has to apply to school 
officials as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
45 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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